Justia Communications Law Opinion Summaries

Alliance for Water Efficiency engaged Fryer to analyze how water agencies’ programs affect elasticity of water demand during droughts. Fryer prepared a draft report. Alliance was dissatisfied, and sued to prevent Fryer from publishing the report. The California Department of Water Resources, a project sponsor, wanted to present his findings under its auspices. After negotiations, Fryer promised to remove Alliance’s name from his report, issue it under California’s sponsorship, and provide his data to Alliance, which would issue a separate report. After a magistrate concluded that a binding settlement had been reached, acrimony resumed. Complete written agreement was never reached. Alliance protested when Fryer circulated a new draft report that identified, as providers of data and assistance, some organizations that had participated through a committee that Alliance had organized. Fryer claimed that the organizations wish to be identified and that a consultant is entitled to name sponsors and collaborators. The magistrate concluded that Fryer must remove any reference to entities that worked with him through or in connection with Alliance, unless those entities take the initiative to contact him and say that he can mention their names. Fryer challenged the order as a prior restraint, violating the First Amendment. Declining to address the constitutional issue, the Seventh Circuit vacated the injunction as going beyond what the parties agreed. View "Alliance for Water Efficiency v. Fryer" on Justia Law

Key TV, a local over-the-air broadcaster, filed suit against Comcast, owner and operator of a cable television system serving the same area, alleging that it was unlawfully overcharged for the right to broadcast its content over Comcast's cable system and that Comcast illegally discriminated against it by not carrying the station in high definition or including it on Comcast's "hospitality tier." Key TV also filed two state law claims. The district court stayed the entire case under the primary jurisdiction doctrine pending resolution of Key TV's federal law claims by the FCC. The court concluded that it lacked appellate jurisdiction to entertain this interlocutory appeal where this stay does not end the litigation on the merits and it does not leave the district court without anything to do but execute the judgment. The court further concluded that the collateral order doctrine does not apply to save appellate jurisdiction. Accordingly, the court dismissed the appeal. View "Beach TV Cable Co. v. Comcast of Florida/Georgia, LLC" on Justia Law

The members of the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission (PPUC) and Core Communications, Inc., appealed a District Court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of AT&T Corp. Core billed AT&T for terminating phone calls from AT&T’s customers to Core’s Internet Service Provider (ISP) customers from 2004 to 2009. When AT&T refused to pay, Core filed a complaint with the PPUC, which ruled in Core’s favor. AT&T then filed suit in federal court seeking an injunction on the ground that the PPUC lacked jurisdiction over ISP-bound traffic because such traffic is the exclusive province of the Federal Communications Commission. After review of the matter, the Third Circuit found that the FCC’s jurisdiction over local ISP-bound traffic was not exclusive and the PPUC orders did not conflict with federal law. As such, the Court vacated the District Court’s order and remanded this case for entry of judgment in favor of Core and the members of the PPUC. View "AT&T Corp v. Core Communications Inc" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs sell technology that permits computers to identify license-plate numbers in digital photographs taken by cameras mounted on vehicles. The cameras automatically photograph everything the vehicles encounter, with GPS coordinates; software provides notice if a photographed vehicle is subject to repossession. The information is sold to clients, including automobile finance and insurance companies and law enforcement. Arkansas’s Automatic License Plate Reader System Act prohibits use of automatic license plate reader systems and permits any person claiming harm from a violation to seek damages from the violator. Vigilant and its affiliates sued, arguing that “use of [automatic license plate reader] systems to collect and create information” and dissemination of the information constitutes speech and that the Act impermissibly restricts this speech based on content—license-plate data—and on the identity of the speaker, because it exempts some entities, such as law enforcement agencies. The district court dismissed, ruling that state officials were immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment. The Eighth Circuit affirmed on the ground that the plaintiffs lack standing, so there is no Article III case or controversy. State officials do not have authority to enforce the Act, so they do not cause injury; the Act provides for enforcement only through private actions for damages. View "Digital Recognition Network, Inc. v. Hutchinson" on Justia Law

Fans of the musical group Insane Clown Posse, who call themselves “Juggalos,” frequently display, on person or property, insignia representative of the band. In 2011, the National Gang Intelligence Center—an informational center operating under the Federal Bureau of Investigation—released a congressionally-mandated report on gang activity that included a section on Juggalos. The report identified Juggalos as a “hybrid gang” and relayed information about criminal activity committed by Juggalo subsets. Juggalos allege that they subsequently suffered violations of their First and Fifth Amendment constitutional rights at the hands of state and local law enforcement officers who were motivated to commit the injuries in question due to the identification of Juggalos as a criminal gang. They filed suit against the Department of Justice and FBI under the Administrative Procedure Act and the Declaratory Judgment Act. The SIxth Circuit reversed dismissal for lack of standing. The Juggalos sufficiently alleged that the reputational harm and chill was caused by the 2011 Report and, where reputational harm and chill will likely be alleviated by the relief sought, redressability exists. View "Parsons v. Dep't of Justice" on Justia Law

Dr. Meinders sued United Healthcare in Illinois state court, alleging that in 2013, United sent him and a number of similarly-situated persons an unsolicited “junk fax” advertising United’s services, which violated the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA), 47 U.S.C. 227, the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Practices Act, and amounted to common law conversion. United removed the case to federal court and successfully moved to dismiss for improper venue under Federal Rule of Procedure 12(b)(3), claiming that Meinders had entered into a “Provider Agreement” with a United-owned entity, ACN, in 2006, which bound him to arbitrate his “junk fax” claims in Minnesota. Meinders unsuccessfully moved to strike or, in the alternative, for leave to file a sur-reply addressing the assumption theory and declaration. The Seventh Circuit reversed because the district court premised its dismissal order on law and facts to which Meinders did not have a full and fair opportunity to respond. View "Dr. Robert L. Meinders, D.C. v. UnitedHealthcare, Inc." on Justia Law

HP sued Oracle, based on Oracle's announcement that it would no longer make software products compatible with HP hardware products. After the court found that Oracle was obligated to adapt its products to the HP systems. Oracle announced that it would appeal. Oracle brought a motion under the anti-SLAPP statute, Code of Civil Procedure 425.16, asserting that HP had “changed its damages theory” by relying on “customer uncertainty" resulting from Oracle’s announcement and refusal to accept the ruling. Oracle contended that this theory of damages arose in substantial part from its announced intention to appeal, which announcement was protected under the anti-SLAPP act because it constituted an exercise or attempt to exercise Oracle’s rights to freedom of speech and to petition the government for redress. The court denied the motion as untimely. Oracle appealed. The court of appeal affirmed, finding the appeal and underlying motion ”utterly without merit.” The motion was late under any reasonable construction of the facts and was properly denied because it could not possibly achieve the purposes for which the anti-SLAPP statute was enacted. The court declined to assess sanctions against Oracle “only because we do not wish to further delay the long-overdue trial of the merits.” View "Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Oracle Corp." on Justia Law

Avio claimed that Alfoccino violated the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA), 47 U.S.C. 227(b)(1)(C), (b)(3), by hiring B2B to send unsolicited facsimile advertisements to Avio and a class of similarly situated persons. The district court dismissed for lack of Article III standing and found that Avio could not prove Alfoccino was vicariously liable for B2B’s transmission of the faxes. The Sixth Circuit reversed. Avio demonstrated standing. Though the TCPA does not expressly state who has a cause of action to sue under its provisions, its descriptions of prohibited conduct repeatedly refer to the “recipient” of the unsolicited fax, and in enacting the TCPA, Congress noted that such fax advertising “is problematic” because it “shifts some of the costs of advertising from the sender to the recipient” and “occupies the recipient’s facsimile machine so that it is unavailable for legitimate business messages while processing and printing the junk fax.” FCC regulations define “sender” with respect to the TCPA’s prohibition of unsolicited fax advertisements as being “the person or entity on whose behalf a facsimile unsolicited advertisement is sent or whose goods or services are advertised or promoted in the unsolicited advertisement,” indicating that primary, not vicarious liability attaches to Alfoccino. View "Imhoff Inv., LLC v. Alfoccino, Inc." on Justia Law

Intercon, which provides electronic recycling services, engaged BAN to evaluate its business for certification as environmentally friendly. BAN concluded that Intercon shipped hazardous waste to companies in China that use disposal methods that violate policy in Illinois, where Intercon operates and were inconsistent with Intercon’s public representations. BAN reported its conclusion to state and federal agencies. Intercon sued for defamation. BAN asserted an Anti-SLAPP (strategic lawsuit against public participation) defense. The district court declined to dismiss, the remedy under the state Anti-SLAPP law, reasoning that a special motion to strike was inconsistent with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, concluding that the Washington State Anti-SLAPP law cited by BAN would require the judge to resolve jury questions. View "Intercon Solutions, Inc. v. Puckett" on Justia Law

The Freeport Journal published an online article concerning Hadley’s decision to again seek election to the Stephenson County Board. Online readers could post comments after completing a basic registration. “Fuboy” posted: “Hadley is a Sandusky waiting to be exposed. Check out the view he has [an elementary school] from his front door” and “Anybody know the tale of Hadley’s suicide attempt? ….” Hadley filed a defamation lawsuit against the Journal and its parent company. The company provided Hadley the IP address acquired from Fuboy’s internet service provider, Comcast. The federal court dismissed the suit against as barred by federal statute. Hadley returned to state court with a defamation action against Subscriber Doe a/k/a “Fuboy” and issued a subpoena to Comcast. The circuit court directed Comcast to comply and to notify the subscriber. An attorney moved to quash. The court stated that the better procedure to discover Fuboy’s identity would be Illinois Supreme Court Rule 224, under which Hadley would have the burden of setting forth allegations that would be sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss under Code of Civil Procedure 2-615, even if such a motion was not filed. The court allowed Hadley to add a count, directed at Comcast, seeking relief under Rule 224. The court concluded that count I could withstand a motion to dismiss, so Hadley was entitled to Rule 224 relief. The court found that the comment imputed the commission of a crime to Hadley; was not capable of innocent construction; and could not be considered an opinion. The court directed Comcast to provide identification. The appellate court and Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. Hadley’s complaint states facts to establish a defamation cause of action sufficient to withstand a section 2-615 motion, so the court properly concluded that necessity was established under Rule 224. View "Hadley v. Subscriber Doe" on Justia Law