Justia Communications Law Opinion Summaries

McKesson Corporation sent unsolicited fax advertisements to medical practices, including McLaughlin Chiropractic Associates, in 2009 and 2010. McLaughlin sued McKesson in 2014 in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California, alleging violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA) for sending unsolicited faxes without the required opt-out notices. McLaughlin sought damages and an injunction and aimed to represent a class of fax recipients who received the advertisements on traditional fax machines or through online fax services. The District Court certified the class without distinguishing between the two methods of receipt.During the lawsuit, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) issued the Amerifactors order, which interpreted "telephone facsimile machine" in the TCPA to exclude online fax services. The District Court, following Ninth Circuit precedent, deemed the Amerifactors order binding and granted summary judgment to McKesson for claims involving online fax services. The court then decertified the class, leaving McLaughlin with claims for only 12 faxes received on a traditional machine and damages of $6,000. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the District Court's decision.The Supreme Court of the United States reviewed the case and held that the Hobbs Act does not bind district courts in civil enforcement proceedings to an agency’s interpretation of a statute. District courts must independently determine the law’s meaning under ordinary principles of statutory interpretation while affording appropriate respect to the agency’s interpretation. The Court reversed the Ninth Circuit's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "McLaughlin Chiropractic Associates, Inc. v. McKesson Corp." on Justia Law

Verizon Wireless sought permits from the City of Milwaukee to install small cells and matching utility poles in a downtown plaza next to a major arena. The City denied most of the permits, initially citing aesthetic concerns and proximity to existing poles. Later, it claimed it lacked authority to grant the permits because the plaza was leased to Deer District LLC. Verizon sued the City, arguing the denials violated the Telecommunications Act (TCA) and Wisconsin state law. The district court ruled in favor of Verizon, finding the City's justifications insufficient and ordered the City to issue the permits. Verizon installed the poles, and the City accepted the ruling.The district court found that the City's initial reasons for denial were not supported by substantial evidence and violated the TCA. It also found the City's later rationale, based on the lease with Deer District, untimely and unconvincing. The court held that the City violated Wisconsin state law as well, and ordered the City to issue the permits. The City complied and did not appeal the decision. Deer District, an intervening defendant, appealed, challenging the district court's interpretation of the lease and state law, but not the TCA holding.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court dismissed Deer District's appeal for lack of Article III standing, as Deer District could not demonstrate that its injury would be redressed by a favorable decision. The court noted that the City did not join the appeal and that the injunction ran exclusively against the City. Therefore, even if the court ruled in Deer District's favor, it would not change the City's obligations under the district court's order. The appeal was dismissed for want of jurisdiction. View "Cellco Partnership v Deer District LLC" on Justia Law

A child was removed from her mother's care by the Department of Children and Families (DCF) shortly after birth due to neglect. The child spent most of her life in foster care. In February 2019, a Juvenile Court judge awarded custody to the child's father, a New Hampshire resident, despite the absence of an Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children (ICPC) report. The child went missing after moving to New Hampshire with her father and is presumed dead. The father was later convicted of her murder.The journalist sought access to audio recordings of the February 2019 hearings where custody was awarded to the father. The Juvenile Court judge denied the request, applying the Uniform Rules on Impoundment Procedure (URIP). The journalist filed a motion for reconsideration, which was also denied. The case was transferred to the Supreme Judicial Court.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed the case and determined that the good cause standard under Rule 7(b) of the URIP was the appropriate test for evaluating the journalist's request. The court found that the privacy interests of the parties involved were minimal, given the extensive public disclosure of the case details. The court also recognized the significant public interest in understanding the child welfare system and the circumstances leading to the child's death.The court concluded that the journalist demonstrated good cause for the release of the February 2019 hearing recordings for use in a documentary, subject to specific redactions and conditions. The order denying the motion for access was vacated, and the case was remanded to the Juvenile Court for the release of the recordings with the specified limitations. View "Care and Protection of Adele" on Justia Law

AT&T sought review of a Federal Communications Commission (FCC) forfeiture order, which fined the company $57 million for mishandling customer data in violation of section 222 of the Telecommunications Act. The FCC found that AT&T failed to protect customer proprietary network information (CPNI) and issued the fine after an internal adjudication process. AT&T argued that the FCC's in-house adjudication violated the Constitution by denying it an Article III decisionmaker and a jury trial.The FCC's Enforcement Bureau investigated AT&T following reports of misuse of customer location data by service providers. The Bureau issued a Notice of Apparent Liability for Forfeiture (NAL), proposing the penalty. AT&T responded in writing, contesting the penalty and raising constitutional challenges. The FCC rejected AT&T's arguments and affirmed the penalty, leading AT&T to pay the fine and seek review in the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.The Fifth Circuit, guided by the Supreme Court's decision in SEC v. Jarkesy, agreed with AT&T that the FCC's enforcement procedures violated the Seventh Amendment and Article III. The court found that the FCC's imposition of civil penalties was akin to a common law action for money damages, which traditionally requires a jury trial. The court also determined that the public rights exception did not apply, as the action was closely related to common law negligence and did not fall within the historical categories of non-Article III adjudications.The court concluded that the FCC's process, which allowed for a section 504 trial only after the agency had already adjudicated the matter, did not satisfy the constitutional requirements. As a result, the Fifth Circuit granted AT&T's petition and vacated the FCC's forfeiture order. View "AT&T v. Federal Communications Commission" on Justia Law

A recently enacted Mississippi statute, House Bill 1126, aims to protect minors from harmful online material by requiring digital service providers (DSPs) to verify users' ages, obtain parental consent for minors, limit data collection, and implement strategies to mitigate harmful content exposure. NetChoice, L.L.C., a trade association for internet-focused companies, challenged the statute's constitutionality under the First and Fourteenth Amendments and sought a preliminary injunction to prevent its enforcement.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi granted the preliminary injunction, finding that NetChoice was likely to succeed on its claims that the statute was unconstitutional. The court determined that NetChoice had associational standing to bring the suit on behalf of its members and that the statute imposed significant regulatory burdens that could cause financial harm. The Attorney General of Mississippi appealed, arguing that the district court erred in its findings and failed to perform the necessary facial analysis as mandated by the Supreme Court in Moody v. NetChoice, LLC.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case and found that the district court did not conduct the required two-step analysis outlined in Moody. This analysis involves defining the law's scope and determining which applications violate the First Amendment. The Fifth Circuit noted that the district court did not fully assess the range of activities and actors regulated by the statute or the specific regulatory burdens imposed on different DSPs. Consequently, the court vacated the preliminary injunction and remanded the case to the district court for further factual analysis consistent with the Supreme Court's opinion in Moody and Fifth Circuit precedent. View "NetChoice v. Fitch" on Justia Law

An underage user of the Grindr application, John Doe, filed a lawsuit against Grindr Inc. and Grindr LLC, alleging that the app facilitated his sexual exploitation by adult men. Doe claimed that Grindr's design and operation allowed him to be matched with adults despite being a minor, leading to his rape by four men, three of whom were later convicted. Doe's lawsuit included state law claims for defective design, defective manufacturing, negligence, failure to warn, and negligent misrepresentation, as well as a federal claim under the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act (TVPRA).The United States District Court for the Central District of California dismissed Doe's claims, ruling that Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act (CDA) provided Grindr with immunity from liability for the state law claims. The court also found that Doe failed to state a plausible claim under the TVPRA, as he did not sufficiently allege that Grindr knowingly participated in or benefitted from sex trafficking.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's dismissal. The Ninth Circuit held that Section 230 barred Doe's state law claims because they implicated Grindr's role as a publisher of third-party content. The court also agreed that Doe failed to state a plausible TVPRA claim, as he did not allege that Grindr had actual knowledge of or actively participated in sex trafficking. Consequently, Doe could not invoke the statutory exception to Section 230 immunity under the Allow States and Victims to Fight Online Sex Trafficking Act of 2018. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of Doe's claims in their entirety. View "DOE V. GRINDR INC." on Justia Law

The plaintiff filed a complaint against the defendant, alleging that he made and retained an unauthorized copy of her computer hard drive, which contained private and confidential data. The complaint included a claim for violation of Penal Code section 502, which prohibits unauthorized use of any computer system for an improper purpose. The plaintiff sought damages and attorney fees.In the Superior Court of San Diego County, a civil jury trial was held, and the jury found in favor of the defendant on all of the plaintiff's causes of action. The trial court entered judgment for the defendant. Subsequently, the defendant filed a motion for attorney fees and costs under section 502, subdivision (e). The trial court granted the defendant's costs but denied his request for attorney fees, concluding that section 502 does not permit an award of fees to prevailing defendants and that, even if it did, it would be unreasonable to award fees in this case because there was no evidence that the plaintiff's claim was frivolous or abusive.The defendant appealed the order to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, State of California. The appellate court agreed with the defendant that section 502 allows the award of attorney fees to prevailing defendants. However, the court concluded that section 502 defendants may only recover attorney fees where the plaintiff's claim was objectively without foundation when brought, or the plaintiff continued to litigate after it clearly became so. The appellate court found that the trial court acted within its discretion in finding that the plaintiff's claim was not frivolous or abusive and affirmed the order denying attorney fees. View "Hay v. Marinkovich" on Justia Law

In June 2015, Dylann Roof shot and killed nine people at Mother Emanuel AME Church in Charleston, South Carolina, including M.P.'s father, Reverend Clementa Pinckney. M.P., a minor, filed a lawsuit against Meta Platforms, Inc. (formerly Facebook, Inc.) and its subsidiaries, alleging that Facebook's algorithm recommended harmful content that radicalized Roof, leading to the murders. M.P. asserted claims of strict products liability, negligence, and negligent infliction of emotional distress under South Carolina law, as well as a federal claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) for conspiracy to deprive her of her civil rights.The United States District Court for the District of South Carolina dismissed M.P.'s complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), concluding that Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act barred her state law tort claims. The court also found that M.P. failed to plausibly allege a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3).The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that M.P.'s state law tort claims were barred by Section 230 because they sought to hold Facebook liable as a publisher of third-party content. The court also determined that M.P. failed to plausibly allege proximate causation under South Carolina law, as her complaint did not provide sufficient factual foundation linking Roof's Facebook use to his crimes. Additionally, the court found that M.P. forfeited her challenge to the dismissal of her Section 1985 claim by not adequately addressing it in her appellate brief. The court also concluded that any potential claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1986 was barred by the one-year statute of limitations. Thus, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment granting Facebook's motion to dismiss. View "M.P. v. Meta Platforms Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, a group of sex-trafficking victims, were trafficked through advertisements posted on Backpage.com, an online advertisement forum. They sued Salesforce, a company that provided cloud-based software tools and related support services to Backpage. Salesforce moved for summary judgment on the grounds that section 230 of the Communications Decency Act bars Plaintiffs’ claims. Plaintiffs allege that Salesforce knowingly assisted, supported, and facilitated sex trafficking by selling its tools and operational support to Backpage even though it knew (or should have known) that Backpage was under investigation for facilitating sex trafficking.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas denied Salesforce’s motion for summary judgment, holding that section 230 does not shield Salesforce because Plaintiffs’ claims do not treat Salesforce as a publisher or speaker of third-party content. After denying Salesforce’s motion for summary judgment, the district court sua sponte certified its order for interlocutory appeal, identifying three controlling questions of law on which there may be substantial grounds for difference of opinion.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s denial of summary judgment. The court held that Plaintiffs’ claims do not treat Salesforce as the publisher or speaker of third-party content because they do not derive from Salesforce’s status or conduct as a publisher or speaker or impose on Salesforce any duty traditionally associated with publication. Therefore, section 230 does not provide immunity to Salesforce. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "A. B. v. Salesforce" on Justia Law

The case involves a claim by Mitchell against Race under the Florida Security of Communications Act, which prohibits recording phone calls without the consent of all parties. Mitchell alleged that Race, while out of state, recorded phone calls with him, a Florida resident, without his consent. The central issue was whether Florida courts have personal jurisdiction over Race, a nonresident defendant.The trial court focused on whether Race committed a tortious act in Florida, concluding that he did because the interceptions occurred where Mitchell's statements were made. The court also found that exercising personal jurisdiction over Race did not violate due process. On appeal, the Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's decision, concluding that Race lacked sufficient minimum contacts with Florida to justify personal jurisdiction. The Fourth District did not address whether Race committed a tortious act in Florida but certified conflict with a previous case, France v. France, which addressed the first step of the jurisdictional test.The Supreme Court of Florida initially accepted jurisdiction to resolve the certified conflict. However, after further consideration, the court concluded that the conflict was not clear and that the record was insufficient to address the due process issue analyzed by the Fourth District. Consequently, the Supreme Court of Florida decided to discharge jurisdiction and dismiss the proceeding, determining that the issues presented were largely academic given the unique procedural history of the case. View "Mitchell v. Race" on Justia Law