Justia Communications Law Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Civil Procedure
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Plaintiffs, a group of sex-trafficking victims, were trafficked through advertisements posted on Backpage.com, an online advertisement forum. They sued Salesforce, a company that provided cloud-based software tools and related support services to Backpage. Salesforce moved for summary judgment on the grounds that section 230 of the Communications Decency Act bars Plaintiffs’ claims. Plaintiffs allege that Salesforce knowingly assisted, supported, and facilitated sex trafficking by selling its tools and operational support to Backpage even though it knew (or should have known) that Backpage was under investigation for facilitating sex trafficking.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas denied Salesforce’s motion for summary judgment, holding that section 230 does not shield Salesforce because Plaintiffs’ claims do not treat Salesforce as a publisher or speaker of third-party content. After denying Salesforce’s motion for summary judgment, the district court sua sponte certified its order for interlocutory appeal, identifying three controlling questions of law on which there may be substantial grounds for difference of opinion.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s denial of summary judgment. The court held that Plaintiffs’ claims do not treat Salesforce as the publisher or speaker of third-party content because they do not derive from Salesforce’s status or conduct as a publisher or speaker or impose on Salesforce any duty traditionally associated with publication. Therefore, section 230 does not provide immunity to Salesforce. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "A. B. v. Salesforce" on Justia Law

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The case involves a claim by Mitchell against Race under the Florida Security of Communications Act, which prohibits recording phone calls without the consent of all parties. Mitchell alleged that Race, while out of state, recorded phone calls with him, a Florida resident, without his consent. The central issue was whether Florida courts have personal jurisdiction over Race, a nonresident defendant.The trial court focused on whether Race committed a tortious act in Florida, concluding that he did because the interceptions occurred where Mitchell's statements were made. The court also found that exercising personal jurisdiction over Race did not violate due process. On appeal, the Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's decision, concluding that Race lacked sufficient minimum contacts with Florida to justify personal jurisdiction. The Fourth District did not address whether Race committed a tortious act in Florida but certified conflict with a previous case, France v. France, which addressed the first step of the jurisdictional test.The Supreme Court of Florida initially accepted jurisdiction to resolve the certified conflict. However, after further consideration, the court concluded that the conflict was not clear and that the record was insufficient to address the due process issue analyzed by the Fourth District. Consequently, the Supreme Court of Florida decided to discharge jurisdiction and dismiss the proceeding, determining that the issues presented were largely academic given the unique procedural history of the case. View "Mitchell v. Race" on Justia Law

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The plaintiff, Kathleen Vita, alleged that New England Baptist Hospital (NEBH) and Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center, Inc. (BIDMC) violated the Massachusetts wiretap act by collecting and transmitting her browsing activities on their websites to third parties for advertising purposes without her consent. Vita accessed information about doctors and medical conditions on the hospitals' websites and claimed these interactions were "wire communications" protected by the wiretap act. She did not allege that private patient records or messages to healthcare providers were intercepted.The Superior Court denied the hospitals' motions to dismiss Vita's complaints, leading to the hospitals' appeal. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts granted direct appellate review.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that the term "communication" in the wiretap act is ambiguous as applied to web browsing activities. The court found that the legislative history of the wiretap act focused on the secret interception of person-to-person conversations and messaging, particularly private ones, and did not clearly extend to interactions with websites. Given this ambiguity, the court applied the rule of lenity, which requires that any ambiguity in a criminal statute be resolved in favor of the defendant. Consequently, the court concluded that the wiretap act does not unambiguously prohibit the interception of web browsing activities and reversed the Superior Court's denial of the hospitals' motions to dismiss. View "Vita v. New England Baptist Hospital" on Justia Law

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In 2016, Unitednet, Ltd., a UK company, entered into an agreement to purchase a fiber-optic telecommunications network from three foreign companies within the Tata Communications conglomerate. Steven Lucero, a New Mexico resident, allegedly conspired with three Tata companies to sabotage the deal so he could purchase the network through his New Mexico-based company, LatinGroup, LLC. After the deal fell apart, Unitednet and its director, Levi Russell, filed a lawsuit in New Mexico federal district court, asserting claims of tortious interference with a contract and related claims against Lucero, LatinGroup, and the Tata companies.The United States District Court for the District of New Mexico dismissed the case under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, determining that the United Kingdom was a more appropriate forum for the litigation. The court found that foreign law applied to the claims and that the private and public interests favored dismissal. The court conditioned the dismissal on the defendants submitting to jurisdiction in the United Kingdom and waiving any statute-of-limitations defenses.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The Tenth Circuit agreed that the United Kingdom was an adequate alternative forum and that foreign law governed the dispute. The court found that the district court had appropriately balanced the private and public interest factors, noting that the case had stronger ties to the United Kingdom, which had a greater interest in resolving the dispute. The Tenth Circuit concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the case for forum non conveniens. View "Unitednet v. Tata Communications America" on Justia Law

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In late 2019, Verizon Wireless identified a coverage gap in Berlin Township, Ohio, and partnered with TowerCo to construct a cell tower to address this issue. TowerCo secured a lease with the local school district to build the tower on school property. Initially, TowerCo notified local residents as required by zoning regulations but later claimed immunity from these regulations under Ohio's "Brownfield immunity" doctrine, arguing that the project served a public purpose. Despite this claim, the Township insisted on compliance with local zoning laws, leading to a dispute.The Township filed a complaint in the Delaware County Common Pleas Court seeking a declaratory judgment and an injunction to halt the tower's construction. TowerCo counterclaimed under the Telecommunications Act (TCA) and removed the case to federal court. After negotiations failed, TowerCo filed a separate federal lawsuit asserting TCA violations and sought a preliminary injunction to continue construction. The district court granted the preliminary injunction, finding that the Township's actions likely violated the TCA by effectively prohibiting wireless services.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court's order. The appellate court held that the Township's filing of a state court lawsuit did not constitute a "final action" under the TCA, which is necessary to trigger the Act's remedies. Additionally, TowerCo failed to file its federal TCA claims within the 30-day statutory deadline after the Township's state court filing. The court concluded that TowerCo's claims were not ripe and were time-barred, and thus, TowerCo could not show a likelihood of success on the merits. Consequently, the preliminary injunction was reversed, and the case was remanded for further proceedings. View "TowerCo 2013, LLC v. Berlin Township Board of Trustees" on Justia Law

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The case involves XMission, a Utah-based internet service provider, and PureHealth Research, a Wyoming LLC that sells nutritional supplements online. XMission sued PureHealth in federal district court in Utah, alleging that PureHealth sent thousands of unwanted promotional emails to XMission’s customers in Utah, violating state and federal law. This resulted in increased server maintenance costs and customer complaints for XMission. PureHealth moved to dismiss the case for lack of specific personal jurisdiction, arguing it lacked sufficient contacts with Utah and the lawsuit did not “arise out of or relate to” its forum conduct. The district court granted the motion.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed the district court's decision. The court found that PureHealth knowingly sent marketing emails to XMission’s customers in Utah, which constituted purposeful direction of its activities at residents of the forum state. The court also found that XMission’s claims arose out of or related to those activities. Therefore, the court concluded that Utah had specific personal jurisdiction over PureHealth. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "XMission, LC v. PureHealth Research" on Justia Law

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The case involves Capitol Broadcasting Company, McClatchy Company LLC, and James S. Farrin, P.C. (the plaintiffs) who sought access to certain accident reports from the City of Raleigh, the City of Salisbury, the City of Kannapolis, the North Carolina Department of Public Safety, and the North Carolina State Highway Patrol Department (the defendants). The plaintiffs claimed they were entitled to these reports under North Carolina state law. However, the defendants refused to release the reports, arguing that a federal privacy statute prohibited them from doing so. The plaintiffs then sought a declaratory judgment in federal court that the federal law did not apply.The case was initially heard in the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina. The district court dismissed the plaintiffs' declaratory judgment action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The court concluded that the plaintiffs' complaint failed to raise a federal question on its face, as the right the plaintiffs asserted was a state law right and the federal law was only relevant as a potential defense.The plaintiffs appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. The appellate court affirmed the district court's decision, agreeing that the plaintiffs' complaint failed to raise a federal question on its face. The court explained that the plaintiffs' claim was based on state law, and the federal law was only relevant as a potential defense. The court also rejected the plaintiffs' argument that the complaint presented a substantial question of federal law because it sought to assert their First Amendment rights. The court concluded that the First Amendment concerns were not sufficient to create federal question jurisdiction as they were not dispositive in resolving the core dispute of the interplay between the state law and the federal law. View "Capitol Broadcasting Company, Inc. v. City of Raleigh" on Justia Law

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A graphic designer, Cynthia Foss, filed a lawsuit against Marvic, Inc., Brady-Built, Inc., and Charter Communications, alleging copyright infringement. Foss claimed that Marvic and Brady-Built used a marketing brochure she created without her permission. She also sought a declaratory judgment that Charter Communications was not eligible for the Digital Millennium Copyright Act's safe-harbor defense.Previously, Foss had filed a similar lawsuit against Marvic alone, which was dismissed because she had not registered her copyright before filing the suit. This dismissal was affirmed by the First Circuit Court of Appeals. In the current case, the District Court dismissed Foss's copyright infringement claim against Marvic and Brady-Built on the grounds of claim preclusion, citing the dismissal of her earlier lawsuit. The court also dismissed her claim against Charter Communications for lack of jurisdiction and failure to state a plausible claim.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit vacated the dismissal of the copyright infringement claim against Marvic and Brady-Built. The court found that the dismissal of Foss's earlier lawsuit was not a "final judgment on the merits" for claim preclusion purposes. However, the court affirmed the dismissal of Foss's claim against Charter Communications for lack of jurisdiction. The court also vacated the District Court's alternative merits-based dismissal of Foss's claim against Charter Communications. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Foss v. Marvic" on Justia Law

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A group of media organizations and reporters sought copies of law enforcement recordings of a march in Graham, North Carolina. The Superior Court granted their petition, but the Court of Appeals vacated the order, arguing that the trial court failed to determine the petitioners' eligibility to request copies of the recordings under the statute. The Court of Appeals also held that the trial court did not understand that it could place conditions or restrictions on the release of the recordings.The Supreme Court of North Carolina disagreed with the Court of Appeals' interpretation of the statute, stating that anyone may seek copies of law enforcement recordings under the provision invoked by the petitioners, so the trial court had no reason to question their eligibility. However, the Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeals that the trial court erroneously believed that it could not condition or restrict the release of the recordings.The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the decision of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case for further proceedings. The Supreme Court concluded that the trial court did not need to determine the petitioners' eligibility to request the recordings, but it did err in believing it could not place conditions or restrictions on the release of the recordings. View "In re The McClatchy Company, LLC" on Justia Law

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Tammy and James Rutledge filed a lawsuit against Pamela Menard and Randall Nappi, seeking to recover personal property. The Rutledges followed the instructions on Form CV-218, which was available on the Maine Judicial Branch's website, to serve the defendants. This form was created during the COVID-19 pandemic and instructed plaintiffs to prepare for a telephonic status conference as the first court event. However, by the time the Rutledges filed their lawsuit, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court had rescinded most of the pandemic management orders, and court proceedings had returned to an in-person format.The District Court (Bridgton, Malia, J.) dismissed the Rutledges' complaint with prejudice due to their failure to appear in person for a hearing. The Rutledges had mistakenly believed that the initial court proceeding would be a telephonic status conference, as per the instructions on Form CV-218. They appealed the decision, arguing that the court erred in dismissing their case with prejudice and denying their post-judgment motion to reopen the case or amend the judgment to a dismissal without prejudice.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court found that the District Court did not err in finding that the Rutledges failed to appear. However, it held that the dismissal with prejudice was too drastic a sanction given the circumstances. The court noted that the Judicial Branch's website continued to direct parties to Form CV-218, which no longer reflected current court practices, contributing to the Rutledges' mistaken belief. The court also noted that the Rutledges' nonappearance was neither deliberate nor the result of misconduct, and they made a sustained effort to remedy their error. The court vacated the judgment and remanded the case to the District Court for entry of a judgment of dismissal without prejudice. View "Rutledge v. Menard" on Justia Law