Justia Communications Law Opinion Summaries

Law enforcement authorities investigating a graduate student at a university for rape served a search warrant on a major electronic service provider seeking data linked to the student’s university email account. Along with the warrant, the authorities obtained a nondisclosure order (NDO) that prohibited the provider from disclosing the existence of the warrant or the investigation to the target, the university, or others for 90 days. The provider did not contest the restriction as it applied to the target, but sought to modify the NDO so it could inform a trusted contact at the university about the warrant, arguing that doing so would not compromise the investigation and was required under state law and the First Amendment.In the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, the provider’s motion to modify the NDO was denied. The court based its decision on a sealed affidavit supporting the warrant and NDO, finding that several statutory criteria justifying nondisclosure were satisfied. The court also rejected the provider’s proposal to notify a university contact, expressing concern about its lack of jurisdiction over the university and the possibility of unauthorized disclosure. The NDO was later extended, but ultimately lifted after the student was arrested.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed the provider’s petition for a writ of mandate. The court held that the trial court complied with the California Electronic Communications Privacy Act by making the required findings before issuing the NDO, and that the NDO satisfied strict scrutiny under the First Amendment. The court reasoned that the NDO served a compelling governmental interest in protecting an ongoing criminal investigation and was narrowly tailored, as allowing disclosure to a university contact posed unacceptable risks. The petition for writ of mandate was denied, and each party was ordered to bear its own costs on appeal. View "Microsoft Corp. v. Superior Ct." on Justia Law

Several subsidiaries of a major entertainment company providing video streaming services were notified by the City of Santa Barbara that they owed significant sums in unpaid video users’ taxes, penalties, and interest for the period from 2018 to 2020. The City’s demand was based on a 2008 ordinance, approved by local voters, which imposed a tax on those using “video services” in the city. The ordinance defined “video services” broadly, including services delivered by Internet Protocol. The companies argued that their streaming services did not fall under the ordinance because streaming platforms do not provide a “channel” as contemplated by the ordinance, instead relying on customers’ independently obtained Internet services.Following the City’s deficiency notice, the companies appealed administratively. An independent hearing officer upheld the City’s position, concluding that the ordinance applied to video streaming. The companies then sought judicial review in the Superior Court of Santa Barbara County by filing a petition for a writ of administrative mandate. The trial court denied their petition, determining that the ordinance was intended to apply to streaming, that its enforcement did not violate federal or state law, and that the City was not required to provide additional notice before enforcement.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Six, affirmed the lower court’s judgment. The appellate court held that the ordinance, as approved by the electorate, applies to providers of video streaming services and that the ordinary, non-technical meaning of “channel” should govern. The court further held that applying the tax to streaming services does not violate the Internet Tax Freedom Act, the First Amendment, or the California Constitution, nor did the City’s delayed enforcement require additional voter approval or special notice under state law. The judgment denying the companies’ petition was affirmed. View "Disney Platform Distribution, Inc. v. City of Santa Barbara" on Justia Law

A law enforcement agency served an electronic service provider with a search warrant for data associated with an email account belonging to a university graduate student under investigation for rape. The warrant was accompanied by a nondisclosure order (NDO) prohibiting the provider from notifying the student or anyone at the university about the warrant for 90 days. The provider did not contest the restriction against notifying the account holder but sought permission to inform a trusted contact at the university about the warrant's existence, citing concerns under the California Electronic Communications Privacy Act (CalECPA) and the First Amendment.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County reviewed a sealed affidavit and found that several statutory criteria for “adverse results” under CalECPA were present, justifying the NDO. When the provider requested to modify the order to allow notification of a university contact, the court considered the proposal but ultimately declined after law enforcement objected, noting the court lacked jurisdiction over the university and could not ensure compliance with the NDO. The order was extended once and later lifted after the target was arrested. The provider’s initial petition for writ of mandate was summarily denied by the California Court of Appeal. The California Supreme Court then granted review and transferred the matter back to the appellate court for further consideration.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case de novo and held that the trial court made the required findings under CalECPA before issuing the NDO and that the NDO did not violate the provider’s First Amendment rights. The court found the NDO served a compelling government interest and was narrowly tailored to protect the integrity of an ongoing investigation. The petition for writ of mandate was denied. View "Microsoft Corp. v. Superior Ct." on Justia Law

Disney Platform Distribution, BAMTech, and Hulu, subsidiaries of the Walt Disney Company, provide video streaming services to subscribers in the City of Santa Barbara. In 2022, the City’s Tax Administrator notified these companies that they had failed to collect and remit video users’ taxes under Ordinance 5471 for the period January 1, 2018, through December 31, 2020, resulting in substantial assessments. The companies appealed to the City Administrator, and a retired Associate Justice served as hearing officer, ultimately upholding the Tax Administrator’s decision.Following the administrative appeal, the companies sought judicial review by filing a petition for a writ of administrative mandate in the Superior Court of Santa Barbara County. The trial court denied their petition, finding that the Ordinance does apply to video streaming services and rejecting arguments that the Ordinance violated the Internet Tax Freedom Act, the First Amendment, and Article XIII C of the California Constitution. The trial court also found there was no violation of Public Utilities Code section 799’s notice requirements, as the City’s actions did not constitute a change in the tax base or adoption of a new tax.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Six, affirmed the trial court’s judgment. The court held that the Ordinance applies to video streaming services, interpreting the term “channel” in its ordinary, non-technical sense and finding that the voters intended technological neutrality. The court further held that the Ordinance does not violate the Internet Tax Freedom Act because video streaming subscriptions and DVD sales/rentals are not “similar” under the Act. Additionally, the court concluded the tax is not a content-based regulation of speech under the First Amendment, and that delayed enforcement did not constitute a tax increase requiring additional voter approval or notice under the California Constitution or Public Utilities Code section 799. View "Disney Platform Distribution v. City of Santa Barbara" on Justia Law

Sacramento Television Stations Inc. (Sac TV) sought additional audio and video recordings from the City of Roseville (City) under the California Public Records Act (CPRA) related to an incident on April 6, 2023, where Roseville Police Department (Roseville PD) officers discharged firearms at a suspect, Eric J. Abril. The City provided limited footage, arguing that further disclosure would interfere with an active investigation. Sac TV filed a petition for writ of mandate to compel the City to release more recordings.The Superior Court of Placer County denied Sac TV's petition, finding that the City had shown by clear and convincing evidence that further disclosure would substantially interfere with an active investigation, specifically Abril's ongoing criminal case. The court acknowledged that more footage was required under CPRA but did not determine the extent due to the active investigation exemption.The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court concluded that the Superior Court's finding of an active investigation was not supported by substantial evidence. The court noted that a pending criminal prosecution alone does not constitute an active investigation under CPRA. The court also found that the City’s interpretation of the required disclosure was too narrow and that more context was needed to understand the incident involving the discharge of a firearm.The Court of Appeal vacated the Superior Court's ruling and directed it to hold further proceedings, including an in camera review of the City’s recordings, to determine the extent of additional disclosure required. The court emphasized the importance of providing sufficient context to fully understand the events captured in the recordings. The petition for rehearing was denied, and the judgment remained unchanged. View "Sacramento Television Stations Inc. v. Superior Ct." on Justia Law

Six4Three, LLC developed an app called "Pikinis" that allowed users to search for photos of people in bathing suits on Facebook. Six4Three sued Facebook, Inc. and six individuals, alleging a "bait-and-switch" scheme where Facebook initially provided developers with access to data but later restricted it. Six4Three claimed this restriction harmed their business.The case began in April 2015, with Six4Three filing against Facebook. Facebook responded with demurrers, leading to multiple amended complaints. The trial court allowed new causes of action but not new defendants. Six4Three filed a third amended complaint and sought to add individual defendants through a writ of mandate. The trial court sustained some demurrers and granted summary adjudication on certain damages. Six4Three's fourth amended complaint included eight causes of action against Facebook. Facebook filed an anti-SLAPP motion, and the trial court initially denied it as untimely but granted the individual defendants' anti-SLAPP motion. On appeal, the denial of Facebook's motion was affirmed, but the individual defendants' motion was remanded for reconsideration.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in considering Facebook's untimely anti-SLAPP motion after granting the individual defendants' motion. The court also held that Six4Three failed to demonstrate the commercial speech exception to the anti-SLAPP statute and did not show a probability of prevailing on its claims. The court affirmed the trial court's orders granting the anti-SLAPP motions and awarding $683,417.50 in attorney fees to the defendants. The court concluded that section 230 of the Communications Decency Act barred Six4Three's non-contract claims and that Six4Three did not show a probability of prevailing on its breach of contract claim. View "Six4Three v. Facebook" on Justia Law

The plaintiff filed a complaint against the defendant, alleging that he made and retained an unauthorized copy of her computer hard drive, which contained private and confidential data. The complaint included a claim for violation of Penal Code section 502, which prohibits unauthorized use of any computer system for an improper purpose. The plaintiff sought damages and attorney fees.In the Superior Court of San Diego County, a civil jury trial was held, and the jury found in favor of the defendant on all of the plaintiff's causes of action. The trial court entered judgment for the defendant. Subsequently, the defendant filed a motion for attorney fees and costs under section 502, subdivision (e). The trial court granted the defendant's costs but denied his request for attorney fees, concluding that section 502 does not permit an award of fees to prevailing defendants and that, even if it did, it would be unreasonable to award fees in this case because there was no evidence that the plaintiff's claim was frivolous or abusive.The defendant appealed the order to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, State of California. The appellate court agreed with the defendant that section 502 allows the award of attorney fees to prevailing defendants. However, the court concluded that section 502 defendants may only recover attorney fees where the plaintiff's claim was objectively without foundation when brought, or the plaintiff continued to litigate after it clearly became so. The appellate court found that the trial court acted within its discretion in finding that the plaintiff's claim was not frivolous or abusive and affirmed the order denying attorney fees. View "Hay v. Marinkovich" on Justia Law

Adrian Pina was charged with the murder of his brother, Samuel, and the attempted murder of another man. Pina's defense counsel issued subpoenas to Snap, Inc. and Meta Platforms, Inc. to obtain Samuel's social media posts and communications from the two years prior to his death, believing they might show Samuel's violent character. Snap refused to provide the information, and Meta ignored the subpoena. The trial court ordered both companies to comply, prompting them to file motions to quash, citing the Stored Communications Act (SCA). The trial court denied the motions, leading Snap and Meta to petition the California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District.The trial court found that Pina had shown good cause for the subpoenas, based on evidence from Samuel's phone and testimony from Samuel's girlfriend. The court determined that the requested material was not available from other sources and that Pina had a plausible justification for seeking it. The court also noted that the material should be produced to the court for in-camera review to determine its relevance to Pina's defense.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, reviewed the case and agreed with the trial court's good cause finding. The court concluded that the business models of Snap and Meta, which involve accessing and using their users' data for business purposes, exclude them from the SCA's limitations on disclosure. The court held that the SCA does not apply to the material sought by Pina because Snap and Meta are not acting solely as providers of electronic communication or remote computing services under the SCA. The court directed the trial court to issue a modified order requiring Snap and Meta to produce the requested material for in-camera review to determine its relevance to Pina's defense. The petitions for writ relief were denied in part and granted in part. View "Snap, Inc. v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

The case involves tech icon Steve Wozniak and 17 other plaintiffs who sued YouTube and Google over a cryptocurrency scam. The scam involved hijacking popular YouTube channels, impersonating tech celebrities, and hosting fake live events promising to double any cryptocurrency sent to a specific account. The plaintiffs claimed that YouTube and Google knowingly hosted, promoted, and profited from the scam for years. The trial court dismissed the case on the grounds of the Communications Decency Act (CDA) of 1996, which provides immunity to interactive computer services against liability arising from content created by third parties.On appeal, the Court of Appeal of the State of California, Sixth Appellate District, affirmed the lower court's decision for most of the plaintiffs’ claims. It held that the claims were barred by the CDA as they sought to treat YouTube and Google as publishers of third-party content. However, the court found one claim – that YouTube and Google created their own content and materially contributed to the illegality of the scam by providing verification badges to hijacked YouTube channels – could potentially fall outside the scope of CDA immunity. The court concluded that as currently pleaded, these allegations were inadequate, but there was a reasonable possibility the defects could be cured by amendment. Therefore, the court reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Wozniak v. YouTube, LLC" on Justia Law

An online business, Interactive Life Forms, LLC, was sued by a customer, Brinan Weeks, who alleged that the company falsely advertised a product he purchased. In response, the company invoked an arbitration clause found in the terms of use on its website, claiming that these terms bound customers irrespective of whether they clicked on the link or provided any affirmative assent. The company argued that by using the website and making a purchase, Weeks had agreed to the terms of use, which included a provision mandating arbitration for any disputes.The trial court denied the motion to compel arbitration, finding that the company failed to show the parties agreed to arbitrate their dispute. The court held that the link to the terms of use was insufficient to put a reasonable user on notice of the terms of use and the arbitration agreement.On appeal, the Appellate Court of the State of California, Second Appellate District Division One, affirmed the trial court’s decision. It held that the company failed to establish that a reasonably prudent user would be on notice of the terms of use. The court rejected the company's argument that it should depart from precedent, which generally considers browsewrap provisions unenforceable, and also dismissed the company's claim that Federal Arbitration Act preempts California law adverse to browsewrap provisions. The court concluded there were no grounds to deviate from this precedent, and that the Federal Arbitration Act did not preempt California law concerning browsewrap agreements. The court emphasized that the company had the onus to put users on notice of the terms to which it wished to bind consumers. View "Weeks v. Interactive Life Forms, LLC" on Justia Law