Justia Communications Law Opinion Summaries

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In late 2011, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) issued a Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking comprehensively reforming and modernizing its universal service and intercarrier compensation systems. Petitioners, all parties to the rulemaking proceeding, filed petitions for judicial review of the FCC’s Order. In multiple briefs, petitioners asserted a host of challenges to the portions of the Order revising how universal service funds are to be allocated to and employed by recipients. After carefully considering those claims, the Tenth Circuit found them either unpersuasive or barred from judicial review. Consequently, the Court denied the petitions to the extent they were based upon those claims. View "IN RE: FCC 11-161" on Justia Law

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Bridgeview Health Care Center filed a class action complaint against Clark, an Illinois resident who operates Affordable Digital Hearing, a sole proprietorship out of Terre Haute, Indiana. Bridgeview alleged that Clark sent Bridgeview and others unsolicited faxes and claimed violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, 47 U.S.C. 227; common law conversion of its fax paper and toner; and violation of the Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act, 815 ILCS 505/2. Clark had a comprehensive general liability policy issued by State Farm, an Illinois corporation. The policy was purchased through an Indiana agent and issued to Clark’s Indiana business address. State Farm sought declaratory judgment that it had no duty to defend in Indiana state court. The action was dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction over Bridgeview. Bridgeview sought a declaration, in Illinois state court that State Farm had a duty to defend and indemnify Clark under the advertising injury and property damage provisions of the policy. State Farm argued that Illinois law conflicts with Indiana law on coverage issues and that Indiana law should apply. The circuit court found that there was no conflict and no need to conduct a choice-of-law analysis. The appellate court reversed, finding that decisions cited by State Farm were sufficient to raise the possibility of a conflict, requiring a choice-of-law analysis The Illinois Supreme Court reversed, finding that State Farm failed to meet its burden of demonstrating that an actual conflict exists between Illinois and Indiana law.View "Bridgeview Health Care Ctr., Ltd. v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co." on Justia Law

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In 1997, the Miami Township police department fired Sergeant Young for allegedly forcing sex on a woman while on the job; the termination was overturned by an arbitrator. The arbitrator concluded that the department had not proven its allegations, noting that DNA samples from the scene did not match Young, that Young and his accuser had been in a relationship, and that the accuser had a history that cast doubt on her credibility. In 2010, the newspaper published the statement “Young had sex with a woman while on the job” in an article about the suspension of another officer. Young sued for defamation and obtained a $100,000 verdict. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. There was sufficient evidence for a jury to decide that the editor knew that the accusation was probably false and published it regardless. View "Young v. Gannett Satellite Info.Network, Inc." on Justia Law

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This case arose from a dispute between CoreTel and Verizon regarding their respective responsibilities under an interconnection agreement (ICA), a private contract that implements duties imposed by the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. 151 et seq. Each party contended that the other improperly billed it for various services. The district court granted summary judgment in Verizon's favor on each claim. The court concluded that CoreTel was entitled to summary judgment in its favor on both its and Verizon's claims for declaratory relief relating to Verizon's facilities charges where the ICA entitled CoreTel to order entrance facilities for interconnection at TELRIC. The court remanded for consideration of CoreTel's claim for injunctive relief. The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment on CoreTel's facilities claims where the facilities CoreTel provided were not entrance facilities under ICA 1.25 and CoreTel pointed to no provision of the ICA that authorized it to simply levy facilities charges for any piece of equipment that handled Verizon's traffic. The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in Verizon's favor on CoreTel's reciprocal compensation claims. Finally, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in Verizon's favor on Verizon's switched-access claims. View "CoreTel Virginia, LLC v. Verizon Virginia, LLC" on Justia Law

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American Satellite, a third party retailer of Dish Network satellite television services, received a call from a potential customer. A woman, who identified herself as “Dickley,” provided what she claimed to be her social security number. In actuality, the number belonged to a man named Bickley. Dickley was an identity thief. The agent entered Dickley’s name and social security number into an interface that connects to credit reporting agencies. Unable to verify the information, American Satellite informed Dickley that her attempt to open an account was declined. Bickley later received a credit report indicating that Dish had made an inquiry on his name. Dish informed him that someone had attempted to open an account in his name, providing a recording of the conversation between the agent and the identity thief. A year later, despite knowing that the inquiry had prevented the theft of his identity, Bickley filed suit under the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. 1681b, alleging request and use of his credit report without a “permissible purpose” and sought emotional distress damages. The district court entered summary judgment for Dish, including a counterclaim for abuse of process. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, referring to the conspicuous underdevelopment of key factual detail in Bickley’s complaint and in briefs as “bordering on deceitful” and to the adage that no good deed goes unpunished. View "Bickley v. Dish Network LLC" on Justia Law

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In 2011, in order to combat the use of anonymous prepaid cell phone for criminal purposes, the Puerto Rico Governor signed into law the Registry Act, which requires telephone companies and other sellers of prepaid phones to provide information about the purchasers of the phones to the government of Puerto Rico, which then compiles a registry with the names, numbers, and addresses of the purchasers. Plaintiff, a non-profit corporation that represents the interests of the wireless communications industry, sought declaratory and injunctive relief, arguing that the Registry Act was preempted by the federal Stored Communications Act (SCA) because the SCA prohibits Plaintiff’s members from turning over to the government without a subpoena the information required by the Registry Act. The district court granted Plaintiff’s motion for a permanent injunction. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the Registry Act is preempted by the SCA, and its enforcement should be enjoined. View "CTIA - The Wireless Assoc. v. P.R. Telecomms. Regulatory Bd." on Justia Law

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This case involved the rights to broadcast the Floyd "Money" Mayweather, Jr. v. Ricky Watton WBC Welterweight Championship Fight. On appeal, defendants challenged summary judgment in favor of J&J on its Federal Communication Act (FCA) claims pursuant to 47 U.S.C. 553 & 605. J&J alleged that defendants violated sections 553 and 605 by receiving and displaying the fight without first paying a licensing fee to J&J. The court concluded that J&J failed to meet its summary judgment burden under section 553 where there was at least a dispute of material fact as to whether defendants fell into the "safe harbor," that precluded the imposition of liability on the majority of cable recipients - customers of cable providers. This exclusion constrained the reach of the statute by exempting from liability those individuals who receive authorization from a cable operator. The court joined the majority of circuits in holding that section 605 does not encompass the conduct presented here: the receipt or interception of communications by wire from a cable system. The court concluded that the plain language of the statute compelled this interpretation. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "J&J Sports Productions, Inc. v. Mandell Family Ventures L.L.C., et al." on Justia Law

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Bovee contends that his sister, Broom, violated the due process clause when, in her role as guidance counselor at his children’s school, she criticized his parenting methods and called him a “bad father.” Bovee claims that this alienated his children’s affections, violating his fundamental liberty interest in familial relations. The district court dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Seventh Circuit held that the dismissal should have been on the merits. “The suit is about words, and only words.” Bovee’s lawyer conceded that Broom has not taken any official act adverse to his interests. Defamation, words not accompanied by any other official action, does not violate the due process clause.View "Bovee v. Broom" on Justia Law

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Green Mountain Realty Corp. (“GMR”) sought to erect a 140-foot cell phone tower in Milton, Massachusetts that would fill a significant gap in the wireless coverage provided by T-Mobile’s networks. The Town of Milton rejected the proposed tower. GMR sued Milton in federal court. The district court granted summary judgment to Milton. The First Circuit Court of Appeals remanded for consideration of whether Milton’s denials resulted an “effective prohibition” of personal wireless services in contravention of the Telecommunications Act of 1996. On remand, GMR submitted evidence indicating that a shorter tower would suffice to eliminate the coverage gap in T-Mobile’s network. The district court granted summary judgment for Milton. The First Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that a reasonable finder of fact could have found Milton’s denials rejected the only feasible plan for remedying the coverage gap and therefore constituted an unlawful effective prohibition of T-Mobile’s provision of wireless services, unless GMR was allowed to build a cell phone tower between ninety and 120 feet tall. Remanded. View "Green Mountain Realty Corp. v. Leonard" on Justia Law

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Addison filed a class action, alleging that Domino had sent thousands of “junk faxes” in violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. 227, and the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act, and had committed the tort of conversion. Domino’s insurers refused to defend. Domino negotiated a settlement to protect its own interests; Addison and Domino agreed that the state court should certify a class and enter a judgment of $18 million. Addison agreed that the class would not recover any money from Domino, but that Domino would assign to Addison, as class representative and for the class, whatever claims Domino might have against its insurers. The state court approved the settlement. Addison sought a state court declaratory judgment holding Hartford liable for the judgment. Hartford removed the case to federal court. Addison dismissed the case voluntarily and filed another state court suit, naming Addison as the only plaintiff. Hartford again removed the case under the Class Action Fairness Act, 28 U.S.C. 1453. The district court granted remand, finding that the suit did not fit the CAFA definition. Hartford argued that under the assignment in the underlying settlement, Addison had standing only as a class representative. The Seventh Circuit agreed, reversed, and remanded to state court.View "Addison Automatics, Inc. v. Hartford Cas. Ins. Co." on Justia Law