This case involved the rights to broadcast the Floyd "Money" Mayweather, Jr. v. Ricky Watton WBC Welterweight Championship Fight. On appeal, defendants challenged summary judgment in favor of J&J on its Federal Communication Act (FCA) claims pursuant to 47 U.S.C. 553 & 605. J&J alleged that defendants violated sections 553 and 605 by receiving and displaying the fight without first paying a licensing fee to J&J. The court concluded that J&J failed to meet its summary judgment burden under section 553 where there was at least a dispute of material fact as to whether defendants fell into the "safe harbor," that precluded the imposition of liability on the majority of cable recipients - customers of cable providers. This exclusion constrained the reach of the statute by exempting from liability those individuals who receive authorization from a cable operator. The court joined the majority of circuits in holding that section 605 does not encompass the conduct presented here: the receipt or interception of communications by wire from a cable system. The court concluded that the plain language of the statute compelled this interpretation. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "J&J Sports Productions, Inc. v. Mandell Family Ventures L.L.C., et al." on Justia Law

Bovee contends that his sister, Broom, violated the due process clause when, in her role as guidance counselor at his children’s school, she criticized his parenting methods and called him a “bad father.” Bovee claims that this alienated his children’s affections, violating his fundamental liberty interest in familial relations. The district court dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Seventh Circuit held that the dismissal should have been on the merits. “The suit is about words, and only words.” Bovee’s lawyer conceded that Broom has not taken any official act adverse to his interests. Defamation, words not accompanied by any other official action, does not violate the due process clause.View "Bovee v. Broom" on Justia Law

Green Mountain Realty Corp. (“GMR”) sought to erect a 140-foot cell phone tower in Milton, Massachusetts that would fill a significant gap in the wireless coverage provided by T-Mobile’s networks. The Town of Milton rejected the proposed tower. GMR sued Milton in federal court. The district court granted summary judgment to Milton. The First Circuit Court of Appeals remanded for consideration of whether Milton’s denials resulted an “effective prohibition” of personal wireless services in contravention of the Telecommunications Act of 1996. On remand, GMR submitted evidence indicating that a shorter tower would suffice to eliminate the coverage gap in T-Mobile’s network. The district court granted summary judgment for Milton. The First Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that a reasonable finder of fact could have found Milton’s denials rejected the only feasible plan for remedying the coverage gap and therefore constituted an unlawful effective prohibition of T-Mobile’s provision of wireless services, unless GMR was allowed to build a cell phone tower between ninety and 120 feet tall. Remanded. View "Green Mountain Realty Corp. v. Leonard" on Justia Law

Addison filed a class action, alleging that Domino had sent thousands of “junk faxes” in violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. 227, and the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act, and had committed the tort of conversion. Domino’s insurers refused to defend. Domino negotiated a settlement to protect its own interests; Addison and Domino agreed that the state court should certify a class and enter a judgment of $18 million. Addison agreed that the class would not recover any money from Domino, but that Domino would assign to Addison, as class representative and for the class, whatever claims Domino might have against its insurers. The state court approved the settlement. Addison sought a state court declaratory judgment holding Hartford liable for the judgment. Hartford removed the case to federal court. Addison dismissed the case voluntarily and filed another state court suit, naming Addison as the only plaintiff. Hartford again removed the case under the Class Action Fairness Act, 28 U.S.C. 1453. The district court granted remand, finding that the suit did not fit the CAFA definition. Hartford argued that under the assignment in the underlying settlement, Addison had standing only as a class representative. The Seventh Circuit agreed, reversed, and remanded to state court.View "Addison Automatics, Inc. v. Hartford Cas. Ins. Co." on Justia Law

The City appealed the district court's order granting T-Mobile's motion for summary judgment and issuing an injunction on the basis that the City's denial of T-Mobile's requested cell phone tower permit violated the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. 322(c)(7)(B)(iii). The district court held that the City's short denial letter failed to satisfy the "in writing" requirement under the Act. Under the court's recent analysis in T-Mobile South, LLC v. City of Milton, the court concluded in this instance that the documents at issue collectively were enough to satisfy the writing requirement under the Act. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded.View "T-Mobile South, LLC v. City of Roswell, GA" on Justia Law

CE is a small Chicago-area engineering firm that has filed at least 150 class action suits under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act. In this case, CE sued Cy’s Crab House on behalf of a class of junk-fax recipients. Truck is the liability carrier for the Cy’s Crab House restaurants and provided a defense under a reservation of rights. The case was certified as a class action, and went to trial. In the middle of trial, without notifying the insurer, Cy’s settled with the class, for policy limits. State-court coverage litigation ensued. The district court approved the final settlement and entered final judgment. Less than a month later, the Seventh Circuit issued a decision casting doubt on the conduct of class counsel. In light of that decision, Truck moved to intervene to reopen the judgment, challenge the settlement, and seek class decertification based on misconduct by class counsel. Instead of filing a conditional appeal, Truck asked the district court for a 14-day extension of the time to appeal. Ultimately the court denied intervention as untimely. Truck Insurance filed a notice purporting to appeal both the order denying intervention and the final judgment. The Seventh Circuit held that it had jurisdiction to review the order denying intervention, but could not grant any meaningful relief because it lacked jurisdiction to review the final judgment. View "Truck Ins. Exch. v. CE Design Ltd." on Justia Law

Apple introduced the iPad in 2010. To send and receive data over cellular networks (3G), customers had to purchase a data contract from AT&T and register on an AT&T website. AT&T prepopulated the user ID field on the login screen with customers’ email addresses by programming servers to search for the user’s Integrated Circuit Card Identifier to reduce the time to log into an account. Spitler discovered this “shortcut” and wrote a program, the “account slurper,” to repeatedly access the AT&T website, each time changing the ICC-ID by one digit. If an email address appeared in the login box, the program would save that address. Spitler shared this discovery with Auernheimer, who helped him to refine the account slurper, which collected 114,000 email addresses. Auernheimer emailed the media to publicize their exploits. AT&T fixed the breach. Auernheimer shared the list of email addresses with Tate, who published a story that mentioned some names of those whose email addresses were obtained, but published only redacted email addresses and ICC-IDs. Spitler was in California. Auernheimer was in Arkansas. The servers t were physically located in Texas and Georgia. Despite the absence of any connection to New Jersey, a Newark grand jury indicted Auernheimer for conspiracy to violate the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. 1030(a)(2)(C) and (c)(2)(B)(ii), and identity fraud under 18 U.S.C. 1028(a)(7). The Third Circuit vacated his conviction. Venue in criminal cases is more than a technicality; it involves “matters that touch closely the fair administration of criminal justice and public confidence in it.”View "United States v. Auernheimer" on Justia Law

Elonis’s wife left their home with their children. Elonis began experiencing trouble at work at an amusement park, reportedly leaving early and crying at his desk. An employee Elonis supervised, Morrissey, claimed sexual harassment. In October Elonis posted on Facebook a photograph taken for his employer’s Halloween Haunt. The photograph showed Elonis in costume holding a knife to Morrissey’s neck. Elonis added the caption “I wish.” Elonis’s supervisor saw the posting and fired Elonis. Days later, Elonis began posting statements on Facebook about having “keys for the fucking gates … sinister plans for all my friends,” and, concerning his wife, “would have smothered your ass … dumped your body … and made it look like a rape and murder” that their son “should dress up as matricide for Halloween … head on a stick” and “I’m not going to rest until your body is a mess, soaked in blood and dying from all the little cuts.” Following issuance of a state court protective order, Elonis posted statements concerning shooting at his wife’s house, using explosives, and “I’m checking out and making a name for myself … hell hath no fury like a crazy man in a kindergarten class.” After being visited by federal agents, he posted statements about blowing up SWAT members. Elonis was convicted of transmitting in interstate commerce communications containing a threat to injure the person of another, 18 U.S.C. 875(c). The Third Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that he did not subjectively intend his Facebook posts to be threatening. A 2003 Supreme Court decision, Virginia v. Black, did not overturn its prior holding that a statement is a true threat when a reasonable speaker would foresee the statement would be interpreted as a threat. View "United States v. Elonis" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs deal in silver and gold jewelry, ingots, numismatics, and other related items. They challenged the facial constitutionality of the Precious Metals Dealers Act, Ohio Rev. Code 4728, alleging violation of the commercial speech rights of businesses dealing in precious metals, vagueness, and violation of the Fourth Amendment by imposing overly burdensome retention, reporting, and record-keeping requirements. The district court granted a preliminary injunction, finding that the Act violated the First Amendment because only those engaged in commercial speech are subject to its licensing requirement. The injunction prohibited the state from requiring licenses or fining those, like plaintiffs, who previously violated the statute. The Sixth Circuit reversed, applying “rational basis” review. The Act does not burden the commercial speech rights of unlicensed precious metals dealers. Such dealers do not have a constitutional right to advertise or operate a business does not comply with reasonable requirements of Ohio law and cannot “hold themselves out” to the public without a license, regardless of whether they advertise. The issue is not advertising, but whether a business holds itself out to the public, which can occur by posting a sign, placing goods in a window, or simply conducting business in a manner that is visible to the public. The court noted the public interest in the statutory scheme .View "Liberty Coins, LLC v. Goodman" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against Google under the Wiretap Act, 18 U.S.C. 2511, after the antennas and software installed in Google's Street View cars collected basic identifying information transmitted by Wi-Fi networks, as well as gathered and stored "payload data" that was sent and received over unencrypted Wi-Fi connections. On appeal, Google challenged the district court's denial of its motion to dismiss based on the Wiretap Act's exemption for electronic communication that was readily accessible to the general public. The court held that the phrase "radio communication" in section 2510(16) excluded payload data transmitted over a Wi-Fi network. Consequently, the definition of "readily accessible to the general public [] with respect to a radio communication" in section 2510(16) did not apply to the exemption for an "electronic communication" that was "readily accessible to the general public" under section 18 U.S.C. 2511(2)(g)(i). The court also held that payload data transmitted over an unencrypted Wi-Fi network was not "readily accessible to the general public" under the ordinary meaning of the phrase as it was used in section 2511(2)(g)(i). Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgment.View "Joffe v. Google, Inc." on Justia Law