A referee recommended that Attorney Sommers' license to practice law be suspended for 60 days for professional misconduct. He did not appeal. The Wisconsin Supreme Court held that the misconduct warrants public discipline, but deemed a public reprimand sufficient and imposed the full costs on Attorney Sommers, which total $5,033.16. Sommers was admitted to practice law in Wisconsin in 1992. His Wisconsin law license is currently suspended for nonpayment of State Bar dues and for noncompliance with continuing legal education requirements. Sommers was previously suspended for 30 days as discipline based on a related matter: allegations relating to improper ex parte communications, press releases, and other statements involving the judiciary. View "Office of Lawyer Regulation v. Sommers" on Justia Law

A strike against the hotel began in 2003, but apparently escalated in 2008, when the union pursued a more aggressive strategy. It began engaging in secondary activity by targeting organizations that had made arrangements to reserve large blocks of rooms or space at the hotel, in the hopes that they would cancel their plans and pressure the hotel to end the strike. The union would send delegations, consisting of striking hotel workers and union staff in groups of two-10 people, to the stores and offices of potential hotel patrons. The hotel claims that these delegations violated 29 U.S.C. 187(a) and 29 U.S.C. 158(b)(4)(ii)(B) by coercing the customers into cancelling their agreements to book rooms. Although the strike ended in 2013, the hotel sought damages for past activity. At the close of discovery, the district court granted the union summary judgment, finding that the union’s conduct was not coercive, and that barring it as a matter of federal labor law would raise important free speech concerns. The Seventh Circuit reversed in part and remanded for a trial regarding whether certain of the union’s actions were coercive, whether any such coercive conduct damaged the hotel, and if so, to what extent. View "520 S. MI Ave. Assocs., Ltd. v. Unite Here Local 1" on Justia Law

The Educational Rate Program, a subsidy program authorized by the Telecommunications Act of 1996, is implemented by the FCC, which established USAC, a private non-profit corporation, to administer the Program. USAC provides subsidies to eligible school districts for the cost of telecommunication services. FCC regulations require that providers offer schools the “lowest corresponding price” (LCP) for their services: the “lowest price that a service provider charges to non-residential customers who are similarly situated to a particular school, library, or library consortium for similar services.” Heath operates a business that audits telecommunications bills and was retained by Wisconsin school districts. Heath found that certain schools paid much higher rates than others for the same services. As a result, many districts did not receive the benefit of LCP and the government paid subsidies greater than they should have been. Heath informed Wisconsin Bell of the discrepancy, but it refused to provide the more favorable pricing. Heath also learned of an even lower price charged to the Wisconsin Department of Administration (DOA). Heath filed a qui tam lawsuit. The government declined to intervene. The district court dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, finding that the public disclosure bar applied and that Heath was not saved by the original source exception, because the DOA pricing was on its website. The Seventh Circuit reversed, stating that the claim was not based on the DOA website information and that Heath was not an opportunist plaintiff who did not contribute significant information. View "Heath v. WI Bell, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit seeking an injunction to prevent Yelp, a popular website, from making claims about the accuracy and efficacy of its "filter" of unreliable or biased customer reviews. The trial court granted Yelp's special motion to strike plaintiff's complaint under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 because Yelp's statements at issue were matters of public interest. The court concluded that Yelp's representations about its review filter constitute commercial speech squarely within the public speech exemption of section 425.17, subdivision (c) where Yelp's statements about its review filter consists of representations of fact about Yelp's website that are made for the purpose of obtaining approval for, promoting, or securing advertisements on Yelp's website, and Yelp's statements were made in the course of delivering Yelp's website. Further, Yelp's intended audience is an actual or potential buyer or customer, or a person likely to repeat the statement to, or otherwise influence, an actual or potential buyer or customer. The court rejected Yelp's assertion that the federal Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. 230, barred plaintiff's claims. Accordingly, the court reversed the trial court's order. Finally, plaintiff shall be given an opportunity to move to amend his complaint to substitute the real party in interest in this action as plaintiff. View "Demetriades v. Yelp, Inc." on Justia Law

Hardin suffered complete blindness and permanent, severe and painful scarring after she took Lamotrigine, the generic form of the medication Lamictal. Hardin sued the prescribing physician, the manufacturer, the store where she bought the prescription (Safeway), WKH, which produced the drug information pamphlet (monograph), and PDX, a software provider that distributes drug information to pharmacy customers. Unlike physician package inserts and patient medication guides, which are FDA-mandated, WKH monographs are not regulated or reviewed by the FDA, but are produced as part of a self-regulating action plan required under 110 Stat. 1593. The WKH monograph was the only information received by Hardin when she first filled her prescription for Lamictal. The abbreviated warning used by Safeway and provided to Hardin omitted the “Black Box” warning: “BEFORE USING THIS MEDICINE” that stated: “SERIOUS AND SOMETIMES FATAL RASHES HAVE OCCURRED RARELY WITH THE USE OF THIS MEDICINE. Hardin says that had she been provided this warning, she would not have taken the medication. WKH moved to strike Hardin’s claims against it under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, the “anti-SLAPP” (Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation ) statute.. The trial court ruled that WKH’s production of drug monographs was protected speech concerning a public issue or an issue of public interest and that Hardin had no probability of prevailing because she could not establish that WKH owed her any duty. The court denied PDX’s motion to strike, finding that the activity underlying PDX’s alleged liability was the reprogramming of its software to permit Safeway to give customers an abbreviated, five-section monograph that omitted warnings instead of the full eight-section version that included those warnings. The court of appeal affirmed. View "Hardin v. PDX, Inc." on Justia Law

In Wisconsin, Register of Deeds is an elected position. If a vacancy occurs mid-term, the governor may appoint an interim Register for any unexpired portion of the term. The Marinette County Register announced her mid-term retirement. Chasensky, then employed as Chief Deputy Register of Deeds, sought the interim appointment. Chasensky was interviewed by Esser, Walker’s appointments official, who informed Chasensky that he would forward her application to Governor Walker for appointment to the position. Esser subsequently learned that Chasensky was involved in a personal bankruptcy proceeding. Esser informed Chasensky that Walker would not appoint her as interim Register. Chasensky claims that Werwie, Walker’s official spokesperson, publically broadcast that she was not appointed because she was in a bankruptcy proceeding and that “[d]erogatory comments and innuendo regarding [her] bankruptcy, personal financial matters and character which impugned and harmed [her] professional and personal reputation were intentionally publically disclosed by Governor Walker and Mr. Werwie” when Governor Walker spoke on the FOX television network. Werwie publically announced that Walker had planned to appoint her until he learned of her bankruptcy. In her suit alleging violation of privacy rights, employment rights, and of 11 U.S.C. 525(a) (bankruptcy discrimination), the district court held that the defendants waived qualified immunity by failing to raise it before their motion to dismiss the amended complaint. The Seventh Circuit reversed; the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity from Chasensky’s privacy and equal protection claims.View "Chasensky v. Walker" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a defamation suit against defendant where defendant published blog posts on several websites that she created accusing plaintiffs of fraud, corruption, money-laundering, and other illegal activities. The court joined its sister circuits in concluding that the protections of the First Amendment did not turn on whether the defendant was a trained journalist, formally affiliated with traditional news entities, engaged in conflict-of-interest disclosure, went beyond just assembling others' writings, or tried to get both sides of a story; therefore, the court held that the Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.'s negligence requirement for private defamation actions was not limited to cases with institutional media defendants; because defendant's blog post addressed a matter of public concern, even assuming that Gertz was limited to such speech, the district court should have instructed the jury that it could not find defendant liable for defamation unless it found that she acted negligently; the district court also should have instructed the jury that it could not award presumed damages unless it found that defendant acted with actual malice; the court rejected defendant's argument that plaintiffs are public officials; and the court found no error in the district court's application of the Unelko Corp. v. Rooney test and rejected plaintiffs' cross-appeal. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.View "Obsidian Finance Group v. Cox" on Justia Law

Verizon challenged the FCC's Open Internet Order, which imposed disclosure, anti-blocking, and anti-discrimination requirements on broadband providers. The court concluded that the Commission has established that section 706 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. 1302(a), (b), vests it with affirmative authority to enact measures encouraging the deployment of broadband infrastructure; the Commission reasonably interpreted section 706 to empower it to promulgate rules governing broadband providers' treatment of Internet traffic, and its justification for the specific rules at issue here - that they will preserve and facilitate the "virtuous circle" of innovation that has driven the explosive growth of the Internet - was reasonable and supported by substantial evidence; given that the Commission has chosen to classify broadband providers in a manner that exempts them from treatment as common carriers, the Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. 201 et seq., expressly prohibits the Commission from nonetheless regulating them as such; and because the Commission has failed to establish that the anti-discrimination and anti-blocking rules did not impose per se common carrier obligations, the court vacated those portions of the Open Internet Order. View "Verizon v. FCC, et al." on Justia Law

A Code Division Multiple Access (CDMA) system wireless cellular network has a base station and mobile stations, such as cellular telephones. To establish communication between a mobile station and a base, the mobile station transmits a known signal (preamble) over a random access channel (RACH). The CDMA system allows multiple signals to be sent over the same RACH by using different numerical spreading codes that enable the stations to distinguish a particular wireless communication from other concurrent communications. If too many mobile stations transmit simultaneously at high power levels, the signals can interfere with each other. GBT’s patents disclose an improvement that reduces the risk of interference: a mobile station seeking to communicate with the base will transmit preambles at increasing power levels until it receives an acknowledgment signal from the base. Once the mobile station receives that acknowledgment, it stops transmitting preambles and starts transmitting message information, so that each data signal is transmitted at the lowest power necessary to reach the base, reducing the risk of interference. In Texas litigation, the court construed preamble as “a signal used for communicating with the base station that is spread before transmission” and granted summary judgment of anticipation, which the Federal Circuit affirmed. While appeal was pending, GBT sought new claims during reexamination of one patent and in a pending continuation application and submitted the claim construction order from the Texas litigation and filings setting forth GBT’s stipulated definition of preamble. The claims GBT asserted, in this case, against Apple were added during the proceedings. The district court construed the disputed terms, including preamble, and granted Apple summary judgment of noninfringement. The Federal Circuit affirmed. View "Golden Bridge Tech., Inc. v. Apple Inc." on Justia Law

This petition involves Bermuda's efforts to secure rights from the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) to operate a satellite at the 96.2 degree W.L. orbital location. Bermuda partnered with EchoStar to deploy and maintain its satellite at this orbital location. Meanwhile, the Netherlands also sought rights from the ITU to operate a satellite at a nearby orbital location. Petitioner, Spectrum Five, a developer and operator of satellites working in partnership with the Netherlands, filed an objection to the FCC to EchoStar's request to move its satellite from 76.8 degrees W.L. to 96.2 degrees W.L. The FCC granted EchoStar's request and determined that Bermuda secured rights to the 96.2 degree W.L. orbital location. Spectrum Five petitioned for review of the Commission's order, claiming principally that the Commission acted arbitrarily and capriciously. The court dismissed the petition for lack of Article III standing because Spectrum Five failed to demonstrate a significant likelihood that a decision of this court would redress its alleged injury. View "Spectrum Five LLC v. FCC" on Justia Law