Plaintiffs, physicians and Medicaid providers, wanted to support candidates in the 2010 election, but were barred from doing so by Ohio Rev. Code 3599.45, which limits campaign contributions from Medicaid providers. They sued , arguing that the statute was unconstitutional on its face under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The court rejected that position on plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction and on summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit reversed, finding unconstitutionality “clear” and “unavoidable.” The district court then entered a permanent injunction. Plaintiffs sought attorneys’ fees and costs (42 U.S.C. 1988) of $665,645.68. A magistrate recommended an award of $454,635.53 in fees and $6,442.03 in costs, with a $100,183 reduction for investigatory work performed before plaintiffs signed a fee agreement; a 25 percent reduction on discovery fees; and a 25 percent reduction on appellate fees. The district court awarded only $128,908.74 in fees and $6,315.00 in costs, drastically cutting hourly rates, striking hours spent on third-party discovery and other miscellaneous matters, and reducing appellate hours by 50 percent. After arriving at its lodestar calculation, the district court further reduced the fees by 35 percent under the Johnson factors. The court expressed concern that “taxpayers will ultimately bear the burden … Plaintiffs are medical doctors presumably abundantly capable of paying for representation” and that “counsel was merely scouring through campaign laws hoping to find an old one … to challenge in the hope of raking in overstated fees.” The Sixth Circuit vacated and remanded for recalculation before a different judge. View "Lavin v. Husted" on Justia Law

Sorenson, a leading provider of video relay service (VRS), petitioned for review of the FCC's 2013 Rate Order as arbitrary and capricious, in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 706(2)(a). The court found no fault with the new rates because the 2013 Rate Order is not arbitrary and capricious for ignoring costs incurred unnecessarily, even when the consequence for the provider that incurred those costs might be ruinous. However, Sorenson has demonstrated that additional consideration by the FCC is necessary in regards to providing service under the more demanding speed-of-answer requirement that the agency adopted as part of the 2013 Rate Order. Therefore, the court vacated the new speed-of-answer requirement and remanded that portion of the Order. In regard to tiered rates, the court held that the FCC adequately justified the 500,000- and 1,000,000-minute cut-offs. The court deferred to the FCC's decision concerning the tiered structure because the task of balancing the goals of setting rates to reflect economies of scale and transitioning the industry from rate regulation to competitive bidding is fairly within the discretion of the agency. View "Sorenson Communications, Inc., et al. v. FCC, et al." on Justia Law

Dearborn hosted the Arab International Festival from 1995 until 2012, welcoming roughly 250,000 people with carnival attractions, entertainment, and international food. The 2012 Festival had 85 vendors, information tables, and booths, including several affiliated with Christian and other groups. Bible Believers attended the 2011 Festival, bearing “Christian signs, banners, and t-shirts” that provoked confrontations. Preparing for the 2012 Festival, their attorney wrote a letter, asserting that the sheriff sided with “the violent Muslims,” that “officers have a duty to protect speakers … from … hostile audiences,” and demanding protection. Counsel responded, stating that the sheriff “owes a duty to the public as a whole and is not required to serve as a security force for the sole benefit of … Believers … cannot protect everyone from the foreseeable consequences that come from speech that is designed and perhaps intended to elicit a potentially negative reaction.” The sheriff claims to have allocated more personnel to the Festival than to “the World Series or the President of the United States.” At the 2012 Festival, Believers displayed messages including “Islam Is A Religion of Blood and Murder.” One carried a severed pig’s head on a stick; others preached, using a megaphone, referring to a “pedophile” prophet. The crowd yelled, threw debris, and shoved a Believer to the ground. Officers detained debris-throwers and attempted to quell the crowd. As the confrontation intensified, Believers continued to preach. Officers reiterated safety concerns. Officers escorted the Believers out. In a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the court granted summary judgment in favor of the county defendants. Finding no constitutional violations, it did not address qualified immunity. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, reasoning that the plan for Festival security was content-neutral and that the Believers were not treated differently than the counter-protestors.View "Bible Believers v. Wayne Cnty. " on Justia Law

Dr. Kiser is trained as a general dentist and as an endodontist specializing in root canal procedures. In 2009, the Ohio State Dental Board issued a warning to Kiser for practicing “outside the scope” of his declared specialty, stating, “if you wish to continue to declare yourself as a specialist in endodontics, you must advertise accordingly, and limit your practice per the ADA’s definition. If you would prefer to practice in areas outside the scope of endodontics, you may do so by no longer holding yourself out as a specialist in endodontics. You can be a general dentist, and then advertise and perform specialty services you are qualified to perform, so long as you also state you are a general dentist.” The Board took no further action and declined to answer Kiser’s 2012 inquiry about signage including the terms “endodontist” and “general dentist.” Kiser challenged the regulations as chilling his exercise of First Amendment commercial speech rights. The district court dismissed. The Sixth Circuit reversed, applying the Supreme Court decision, Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus (2014) and finding that Kiser alleged facts demonstrating that he faces a credible threat that the regulations will be enforced against him in the future, so that he has standing to assert his pre-enforcement challenge. View "Kiser v. Reitz" on Justia Law

Viaero sought to construct a telecommunications tower in the City. After the City Council voted to deny Viaero's application for a permit to build the tower, Viaero filed suit for violation of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 (TCA), 47 U.S.C. 332. The court affirmed the district court's upholding of the City's decision where the City Council's denial of was "in writing" by being memorialized in a final resolution and "supported by substantial evidence." View "NE Colorado Cellular v. City of North Platte" on Justia Law

Telrite Corporation was designated as an eligible telecommunications carrier and a Nebraska eligible telecommunications carrier by the Nebraska Public Service Commission (PSC). The designation allowed Telrite to participate in the “Lifeline” program and receive subsidies from federal and state funds for the provision of telecommunications service to low-income households. Soon after receiving its designations, Telrite held its first enrollment event in Omaha. Telrite, however, used the wrong enrollment form at the event. Consequently, the PSC revoked Telrite’s ETC designation and ordered Telrite to cease and desist from offering services as a Lifeline provider in Nebraska. The Supreme Court reversed the order, holding that the penalty ordered by the PSC was excessive. Remanded. View "Telrite Corp. v. Neb. Pub. Serv. Comm’n" on Justia Law

Virgin Mobile USA (Virgin) began doing business in Kentucky as a commercial mobile radio service (CMRS) provider in 2002. In July 2006, the General Assembly amended Ky. Rev. Stat. 65.7629(3), which required Virgin to collect a CMRS service charge from its customers. In 2008, the Commercial Mobile Radio Emergency Service Telecommunications Board (Board) filed suit against Virgin to recover from Virgin all monthly 911 services charges owed by Virgin for commercial mobile radio service (CMRS) connections before July 2006. The circuit court entered summary judgment against Virgin for $547,945, concluding that under the pre-July 2006 version of section 65.7629, Virgin was to collect the CMRS service charges and remit them to the Board. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the CMRS service charge did not apply to Virgin prior to the July 2006 amendment. View "Virgin Mobile U.S.A., LP v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

The Fraternal Order of Police (FOP), an incorporated collective bargaining organization that represents the approximately 6,600 active police officers employed by the Philadelphia, operates a political action committee, COPPAC, for purposes of distributing contributions to candidates for local and state office. FOP, COPPAC, and four police officers challenged the constitutionality of section 10-107(3) of the Philadelphia Home Rule Charter, which prohibits employees of the Philadelphia Police Department from making contributions “for any political purpose,” 351 Pa. Code 10.10-107(3). The provision was enacted in 1951, based on Philadelphia’s history of political patronage. As interpreted by its implementing regulation, employees of the police department cannot donate to COPPAC because it uses some of its funds for partisan political purposes. The Charter ban applies only to the police, and does not proscribe political donations made by Philadelphia’s other 20,000 employees, the vast majority of whom are organized interests. The Third Circuit reversed summary judgment upholding the ban. Despite its valid concerns, the city did not explain how the ban serves in a direct and material way to address these harms. Given the lack of fit between the stated objectives and the means selected to achieve it, the Charter ban is unconstitutional. View "Lodge No. 5 of the Fraternal Order of Police v. City of Philadelphia" on Justia Law

The defendants were charged with violations of the California False Claims Act (CFCA) arising out of their alleged business practice of inflating the credit ratings of various structured finance securities. Defendants moved to strike the CFCA causes of action under section 425.16, subdivision (b) of the Code of Civil Procedure, the anti-SLAPP (Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation) statute. The superior court denied the motion, holding that the enforcement action was exempt from the special motion to strike procedure pursuant to section 425.16, subdivision (d), which provides that “This section shall not apply to any enforcement action brought in the name of the people of the State of California by the Attorney General, district attorney, or city attorney, acting as a public prosecutor.” The court of appeal dismissed, concluding that the order is not appealable.View "People v. McGraw-Hill Co., Inc." on Justia Law

ATC filed suit challenging the City's denial of its Conditional Use Permit (CUP) applications for three of its San Diego telecommunications facilities. ATC raised claims under, among other provisions, the California Permit Streamlining Act (PSA), Cal. Gov't Code 65956(b); the Federal Telecommunications Act (TCA), 47 U.S.C. 332; California Code of Civil Procedure 1094.5; and the Equal Protection Clause. The court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of ATC on the PSA claim because the court concluded that the CUP applications were not deemed approved before the City denied them. The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment on the TCA claim where the City evaluated the CUP applications under the proper provision of the Land Development Code and supported its decision to deny them with substantial evidence; the City did not unreasonably discriminate among providers of functionally equivalent services because ATC and the City are not "similarly situated" providers; and ATC has failed to show effective prohibition because it has not demonstrated that its proposals were the least intrusive means of filling a significant gap in coverage. ATC could not prevail on California Code of Civil Procedure 1094.5 because it does not have a fundamental vested right to the continued use of the Verus, Border, and Mission Valley Facilities. There was no violation of the Equal Protection Clause because the City's decision to deny the CUP applications was rationally related to the City's legitimate interest in minimizing the aesthetic impact of wireless facilities and in providing public communications services. Accordingly, the court reversed in part and affirmed in part. View "American Tower Corp. v. City of San Diego" on Justia Law