SEB distributes household products under several brand names, including electric steam irons sold under the Rowenta brand name. Euro-Pro distributes household appliances under the Shark brand name. The Shark packaging states: “MORE POWERFUL STEAM vs. Rowenta®†† at half the price.” The “††”refers to a fine-print footnote on the package’s bottom, stating that the claim is “††[b]ased on independent comparative steam burst testing to Rowenta DW5080 (grams/shot).” The packaging also asserts “#1 MOST POWERFUL STEAM*” with a fine-print reference on the bottom stating it “*[o]ffers more grams per minute (maximum steam setting while bursting before water spots appear) when compared to leading competition in the same price range, at time of printing.” SEB directed its internal laboratory to conduct tests, which showed that the Rowenta performed the same as the Shark. SEB commissioned an independent laboratory to conduct tests, which showed that the Rowenta outperformed the Shark. SEB claimed false advertising under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. 1125(a), and unfair competition under Pennsylvania common law. The Third Circuit affirmed entry of an injunction, agreeing that the packaging’s definition of a claim term applies to the claim’s explicit message and that the court properly disregarded consumer survey evidence offering alternative meanings. View "Groupe SEB USA Inc v. Euro Pro Operating, LLC" on Justia Law

The Board of Supervisors of Pittsylvania County, Virginia met twice per month. At the beginning of each meeting, a member of the Board opened the proceedings with an invocation, usually explicitly Christian in nature, and asked the audience to stand for the prayers. Hudson is a non-Christian resident of Pittsylvania County who has attended nearly every Board meeting and alleges that the Christian prayers made her and other non-Christian citizens of Pittsylvania County feel unwelcome. Hudson filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action alleging violation of the Establishment Clause. The district court entered summary judgment for Hudson and permanently enjoined Pittsylvania “from repeatedly opening its meetings with prayers associated with any one religion,” and struck the case from the active docket while retaining jurisdiction. Hudson sought attorney’s fees and costs in the amount of $59,679.92.1. A magistrate judge recommended an award of $53,229.92 and the district court adopted the recommendation. Pittsylvania filed a notice of appeal and a motion to stay the proceedings pending the Supreme Court’s decision in Town of Greece v. Galloway (2014), 175 days after the court entered its order. The Fourth Circuit dismissed the merits appeal as untimely and affirmed the award of fees. View "Hudson v. Pittsylvania Cnty, Va." on Justia Law

The trial court granted a motion to enforce a settlement between plaintiffs and defendants. The trial court found that defendant Fair’s printed name at the end of his email where he had agreed to settlement terms set forth in an email from plaintiffs’ counsel was an “electronic signature” within the meaning of California’s Uniform Electronic Transactions Act (Civ. Code, 1633.1) and what it referred to as the “common law of contract” or “contract case law.” Subsequently, plaintiffs requested attorney fees under a provision in an arbitration agreement between the parties. The trial court found plaintiffs to be the prevailing parties but denied the request for attorney fees because the matter never proceeded to arbitration and plaintiffs had failed to show that any contract authorized fees in the litigation. The court of appeal reversed the order enforcing the settlement: the agreement was not signed by plaintiffs and the trial court erred in determining that Fair’s printed name at the end of his email was enforceable. Since plaintiffs are not the prevailing party, they are not entitled to attorney fees. View "J.B.B. Inv. Partners v. Fair" on Justia Law

Cohen and Cohen and Associates Law Corporation represented Slack in a personal injury action on a contingent fee basis. They withdrew from the representation and Drell took over the case. Cohen asserted an attorney fee lien, informing one of the insurers in the personal injury case that any payment of funds to Slack was subject to a lien for their fees incurred during their representation. Drell negotiated settlement of the case, but the insurer made the check payable to Cohen and Drell. Cohen filed a special motion to strike Drell’s complaint seeking declaratory judgment, claiming that it arose from their protected activity of asserting a lien in a demand letter that threatened litigation. (Code Civ. Proc., 425.16 (b)(1).)1. The trial court denied the motion, finding the gravamen of the complaint was not protected activity and denied Drell’s request for attorney fees. The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting arguments that the declaratory relief action targeted protected activity. View "Drell v. Cohen" on Justia Law

This dispute arose out of a cable television services system operated by Charter within Glendale and the free public, educational, and governmental-affairs (PEG) requirements in connection with such services. Both parties appealed from the trial court's orders. The court held that federal law precluded Charter from obtaining a declaration of a right of offset against future franchise payments to Glendale for past overpayments of PEG fees to Glendale; Glendale did not breach any obligation in connection with its refusal to approve Charter's request to realign channel numbers for PEG programming that was broadcast on Charter's cable television system in Glendale; Charter had no further obligation to provide free video programming and cable modem services to Glendale; the trial court did not err in concluding that Charter had not conveyed to Glendale a permanent right to possess or use the fiber capacity for government intranet communications; and Charter established that Glendale improperly and contrary to law used PEG fees. Accordingly, the court affirmed the trial court's order judgment. View "City of Glendale v. Marcus Cable Associates, LLC" on Justia Law

This case concerns Congress's requirement that the FCC establish rules prescribing a Uniform System of Accounts for use by telephone companies. The Commission adopted a new accounting system in 1986 (Part 32) to respond to the introduction of competition and new services. Section 10(a), 47 U.S.C. 160, provided the FCC with the authority to forbear from enforcing provisions of the Communication Act as well as its own regulations. Petitioners, Verizon and AT&T, appealed the FCC's denial of their petition to forbear from applying the requirement that incumbent price cap carriers maintain a Uniform System of Accounts. Petitioners argued that the switch to price cap regulation has rendered Part 32 useless, and section 10 therefore requires the FCC to forebear from applying it to incumbent price cap carriers. The court concluded that the FCC reasonably concluded that it continued to need Part 32 data to ensure that access rates were not discriminatory. Accordingly, the court concluded that the FCC's interpretation and application of section 10 are permissible and denied the petition for review. View "Verizon v. FCC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against defendant, a Florida dental practice, under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991 (TCPA), 47 U.S.C. 227(b)(3) and common law conversion, after receiving an unsolicited one-page fax advertisement from defendant. On interlocutory appeal, the district court entered a final judgment for defendant. The court concluded that this case is justiciable and that plaintiff has Article III standing; on the merits, because In re DISH Network, LLC did not address the TCPA's junk-fax-ban provision, the district court's reliance on it, to hold that a plaintiff must establish vicarious liability in order to recover under the statute when a third party sends unsolicited fax advertisements on behalf of the advertiser, was misplaced; because the FCC's construction of the statute is a reasonable interpretation of Congressional intent under the TCPA and does not conflict with the statute's underlying legislative history, the court must defer to the Agency's construction of the statute; in this case, the record contains sufficient evidence for a jury to find that the fax at issue was sent on behalf of defendant; and therefore, the court reversed the district court's judgment on the TCPA claim and remanded for further proceedings. The court also concluded that the district court erred in granting summary judgment to defendant on the conversion claim. The court reversed and remanded as to that claim. View "Palm Beach Golf Center-Boca, Inc. v. John G. Sarris, D.D.S., P.A." on Justia Law

Redbox operates automated self‐service kiosks at which customers rent DVDs and Blu‐ray discs with a debit or credit card. Redbox outsources certain functions to service providers, including Stream, which provides customer service when, for example, a customer encounters technical problems at a kiosk and requires help from a live person. If resolution of the issue requires accessing that customer’s video rental history the Stream employee will do so. Redbox has granted Stream access to the database in which Redbox stores relevant customer information. Plaintiffs challenged Stream’s ability to access customer rental histories and Stream’s use of customer records during employee training exercises as violating the Video Privacy Protection Act, which prohibits “video tape service provider[s]” like Redbox from “disclos[ing], to any person, personally identifiable information concerning any consumer of such provider,” 18 U.S.C. 2710(b)(1). The Act includes an exception for disclosure incident to the video tape service provider’s ordinary course of business, defined as debt collection activities, order fulfillment, request processing, and the transfer of ownership. The district court granted Redbox summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, concluding that Redbox’s actions fall within the exception for disclosures in the ordinary course of business: disclosures incident to “request processing.” View "Sterk v. Redbox Automated Retail, LLC" on Justia Law

Navalimpianti, suing its former officers and employees (including Negro) in Florida, sought to obtain copies of e-mail messages stored by Google in California. Navalimpianti caused a subpoena to be served on Google, which Negro moved to quash. The California trial court ordered Google to produce the e-mails, based on its conclusion that Negro had consented, or was deemed to have consented, to their production. The court of appeal held that, at the time it was entered the order constituted an abuse of discretion. Since then, however, Negro has been ordered by a Florida court to give his express consent to disclosure, and he has complied with that order by e-mailing Google; the express consent takes the contemplated production outside of the Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. 2702 and permits Google to make the requested disclosure. View "Negro v. Superior Ct." on Justia Law

The attorneys filed suit on behalf of Carabello, who was injured in a collision while acting in the course of his employment. Old Republic, the workers’ compensation insurer, intervened to seek reimbursement. Casby, the other driver, raised a defense that limits the ability of an employer, or its insurer, to obtain reimbursement out of an injured worker’s recovery against a third party where the employer’s own negligence contributed to the injuries. The drivers settled for her $100,000 policy limits. The check was deposited in the attorneys’ account, with signatures of both parties required to withdraw any money” Old Republic sought apportionment, claiming the entire settlement, but later withdrew its motion and filed a notice of lien seeking $111,026.33. It is not clear that the attorneys were notified of the dismissal. The attorneys later dismissed the Carabello complaint with prejudice and took the position that by dismissing its pleading, Old Republic had forfeited any right to litigate employer negligence and to recover on its lien. The attorneys later moved, under the anti-SLAPP law (Code Civ. Proc., 425.16), to strike claims that they wrongfully withdrew the settlement. The trial court concluded that dismissal of all affirmative pleadings had deprived it of jurisdiction. The court of appeal affirmed. In determining whether a claim arises from conduct protected by the anti-SLAPP law, the focus is on the wrongful, injurious acts or omissions identified in the complaint and whether they fit the statute’s description of protected conduct. Because the withdrawal of funds was neither communicative nor related to an issue of public interest, the trial court properly denied the motion. View "Old Republic Constr. Program Grp. v. Boccardo Law Firm" on Justia Law