Bob has been the pastor of Visalia’s Calvary Chapel Church for 35 years; he wrote a book, “A Common Miracle,” runs a website to teach the Bible, hosts a radio show, and volunteers as a police chaplain. Bob has been married since 1977 and has four children, including Alex, a stepson who Bob raised since Alex was three years old. In 2004-2005, Alex accused Bob of emotionally and physically abusing him and his brothers. Tim joined the Church in 2005 and began an online discussion about Bob. Alex added comments. In 2010, Alex created his own website/blog where he writes about Bob and Calvary Chapel. Tim contributes comments. The two referred to Bob’s drug dealing, drug smuggling, child abuse, stealing money from the church, and spiritual abuse. Denying a motion to dismiss Bob’s defamation suit as a strategic lawsuit against public participation under Code of Civil Procedure 425.16, the trial court concluded that the alleged defamatory statements concerned an issue of public interest and that Bob was a limited purpose public figure, but that Bob had shown a probability of prevailing on the merits. The court of appeal affirmed, while holding that Bob is not a limited purpose public figure. View "Grenier v. Taylor" on Justia Law

The Driver’s Privacy Protection Act (DPPA), 18 U.S.C. 2721, prohibits individuals from knowingly obtaining or disclosing “personal information” from a motor vehicle record. Chicago police officers brought suit against Sun-Times Media, alleging that the publishing company violated the DPPA by obtaining each officer’s birth date, height, weight, hair color, and eye color from the Illinois Secretary of State’s motor vehicle records, and publishing that information in a newspaper article that criticized a homicide investigation lineup in which the officers participated. Sun-Times unsuccessfully moved to dismiss the officers’ complaint, arguing that the published information does not constitute “personal information” within the meaning of the DPPA, or, in the alternative, that the statute’s prohibition on acquiring and disclosing personal information from driving records violates the First Amendment’s guarantees of free speech and freedom of the press. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. DPPA’s definition of “personal information” extends to the details Sun-Times published here; Sun-Times possesses no constitutional right either to obtain the officers’ personal information from government records or to subsequently publish that unlawfully obtained information. View "Dahlstrom v. Sun-Times Media, LLC" on Justia Law

MVH and Holy Family Communications each applied to the Federal Communications Commission for a license to operate a noncommercial educational radio station in the vicinity of Buffalo, New York. To do so, the agency used its comparative selection criteria, which it had promulgated through a notice-and-comment rulemaking. By application of those criteria, the Commission found Holy Family had the superior application and awarded it the license. The D.C. Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the criterion upon which the outcome turned--the weight given to an applicant’s plan to broadcast to underserved populations-- either violated the Communications Act of 1934, which requires the Commission to distribute licenses fairly, or was arbitrary and capricious. That criterion is part of a reasonable framework for achieving goals consistent with the Commission’s statutory mandate, and because MVH offered no support for a waiver except that it came close to the threshold it needed to get the license. View "Mary V. Harris Found. v. Fed. Commc'n Comm'n" on Justia Law

The Foundation, a non-profit corporation, acts as a conduit for tax exempt gifts to benefit UCLA. Luskin, a director, pledged $40 million to support construction of a UCLA campus conference center. Save Westwood sought to rescind the donation and to require the Regents of the University of California to pay the city taxes allegedly owing, alleging that the Foundation is “mandated by its by-laws and incorporation documents to exclusively fund charitable undertakings,” that this limitation “applies to the financing of the construction of buildings for exempt purposes,” and that the Luskin grant was applied toward activities that exceed the Foundation’s powers. The defendants filed an anti-SLAPP motion, Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16. Save Westwood argued that neither free speech rights, nor rights of petition were implicated because the claims sought enforcement of the Regents’s fiduciary duties, citing an exemption for public interest lawsuits. It voluntarily dismissed Luskin and the Foundation. The trial court granted the motion to strike. The court of appeal affirmed, noting that claims against Luskin were based on letters about the donation and constructon, which constituted an exercise of free speech on a matter of public interest. The Foundation’s pledge toward the conference center was also an exercise of free speech. Neither Luskin nor the Foundation was a governmental entity, so their actions cannot be “an illegal expenditure or waste.” They owed no mandatory duty to avoid donating funds in a manner that might jeopardize the Foundation’s tax exempt status. View "Save Westwood Vill. v. Luskin" on Justia Law

Roswell’s city council held a public hearing to consider T-Mobile’s application to build a cell phone tower on residential property. Council members expressed concerns about the tower’s impact on the area. The council unanimously denied the application. Two days later, the city informed T-Mobile by letter that the application had been denied and that minutes from the hearing would be made available. Detailed minutes were published 26 days later. The district court held that the city, by failing to issue a written decision stating its reasons for denial, had violated the Telecommunications Act, which provides that a locality’s denial “shall be in writing and supported by substantial evidence contained in a written record,” 47 U. S. C. 332(c)(7)(B)(iii). The Eleventh Circuit found that the Act’s requirements were satisfied. The Supreme Court reversed. It would be difficult for a reviewing court to determine whether denial was “supported by substantial evidence contained in a written record,” or whether a locality had “unreasonably discriminate[d] among providers of functionally equivalent services,” or regulated siting “on the basis of the environmental effects of radio frequency emissions,” if localities were not obligated to state reasons for denial. Those reasons need not appear in the denial notice itself, but may be stated with sufficient clarity in some other written record issued essentially contemporaneously with the denial. Because an applicant must decide whether to seek judicial review within 30 days from the date of the denial, the locality make available its written reasons at essentially the same time as it communicates its denial. View "T-Mobile South, LLC v. City of Roswell" on Justia Law

Plaintiff controls the Fig Garden Village outdoor shopping center, which has approximately 60 retailers. Plaintiff has a policy of prohibiting solicitation of donations on the shopping center property; it allows other forms of expressive activity, such as gathering petition signatures, in a designated public forum area only. Solicitors for Nu Creation solicited donations on sidewalk areas adjacent to the entrances of stores within the shopping center. Plaintiff explained its policy regarding solicitation and asked the solicitors to leave, but they refused. Officers would not arrest them without a court order. Plaintiff sought declaratory relief and a temporary restraining order. The trial court granted the ex parte application and issued a TRO. After a hearing, the court issued a preliminary injunction, which did not prohibit all solicitation on plaintiff’s property, but restricted it to a designated public forum area marked on a map attached to the preliminary injunction. The court of appeal affirmed, agreeing that the store entrances and aprons are not a public forum. View "Donahue Schriber Realty Grp., Inc. v. Nu Creation Outreach" on Justia Law

Desloge has a population of 5,054; 97.4% are white. The Ku Klux Klan regularly distributes leaflets on streets and sidewalks, wearing robes and hoods. Imperial Wizard Ancona contacted city officials about plans to distribute leaflets in 2012 and learned that an ordinance prohibited "solicitation activities" on public streets. The district court issued an injunction, concluding that the ordinance was not narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest. In 2013 Ancona and the Klan returned to distribute leaflets concerning gun rights. They stood along a sidewalk at a four way stop, holding up leaflets. If a vehicle’s occupant signaled for a leaflet, a Klan member would step into the street to supply one. A police officer told them about a 2013 traffic ordinance , which prohibited "stand[ing] in or enter[ing] upon a roadway for the purpose of soliciting rides, employment, business or charitable contributions from, or distribut[ing] anything to, the occupant of any vehicle." The Klan left. While litigation was pending, the city amended the ordinance, adding a preamble and defining terms to explain that it sought to address "public safety concerns," distracted drivers, and resulting collisions. "Roadway" was defined as the entire road, from one curb or pavement edge to another, including parking lanes. The district court granted an injunction, concluding that some provisions were not narrowly tailored. The Eighth Circuit reversed. There was no evidence that the ordinance was created to curtail the Klan's message or its speech in Desloge; it is not impermissibly underinclusive. View "Traditionalist Am. Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. City of Desloge" on Justia Law

In 2006, Cable One, Inc., which offers cable television and internet access, began offering Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) service to its residential customers in Sioux City. In 2008 and 2009, the Iowa Department of Revenue determined that Cable One should be assessed based on the value of its telephone operating property in the state. Cable One appealed, arguing that it was not a telephone company subject to taxation under Iowa Code chapter 433 because VoIP is not the equivalent of telephone service. An administrative law judge (ALJ) in the Iowa Department of Inspections and Appeals entered summary judgment in favor of Cable One, concluding that the company did not fit the “historical context of a ‘telephone company.’” The Iowa State Board of Tax Review agreed with the ALJ that Cable One was not subject to assessment under chapter 433. The district court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) wiring that was originally installed for cable television purposes but is now also used to provide VoIP service is a “telephone line”; and (2) therefore, Cable One, which operates these lines, is subject to central assessment for property tax purposes as a telephone company. View "Kay-Decker v. Iowa State Bd. of Tax Review" on Justia Law

“Musical work” and the owner’s exclusive right to perform the work in public are protected by 17 U.S.C. 106(4). Broadcast of a musical work is a performance and requires a license from the copyright owner. Copyright Act amendments afford the copyright owner of a sound recording “the narrow but exclusive right ‘to perform the copyrighted work publicly by means of a digital audio transmission.’” The law requires “certain digital music services . . . to pay recording companies and recording artists when they transmit[] sound recordings” and provides for appointment of three Copyright Royalty Judges. If sound recording copyrights owners are unable to negotiate a royalty with digital music services, the Judges may set reasonable rates and terms. The Judges set royalty rates and defined terms for statutorily defined satellite digital audio radio services (SDARS) and preexisting subscription services (PSS). SoundExchange, which collects and distributes royalties to copyright owners, argued that the Judges set rates too low and erred in defining “Gross Revenues” and eligible deductions for SDARS. A PSS that provides music-only television channels appealed, arguing that PSS rates were set too high. The D.C. Circuit affirmed, concluding that the Judges of the Board acted within their broad discretion and on a sufficient record. View "Music Choice v. Copyright Royalty Bd." on Justia Law

Virgin Mobile USA (Virgin) began doing business in Kentucky as a commercial mobile radio service (CMRS) provider in 2002. In 2006, Virgin asked the Commercial Mobile Radio Emergency Service Telecommunications Board (the Board) to refund $286,807 it claimed it had overpaid before the CMRS service charge statutes were amended in July 2006. The Board did not promptly respond and so Virgin made no CMRS payment to the Board until it had recaptured from post-July 2006 collections the $286,807 it claimed it had erroneously overpaid. In 2008, the Board filed suit to recover the disputed amount. The circuit court entered summary judgment against Virgin for $547,945. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s conclusion that as a “CMRS provider,” Virgin had a statutory duty to collect the CMRS service charge from its customers during the pre-July 2006 time frame and remit them to the Board. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) Virgin was indebted to the Board in the sum of $286,807, not $547,945; and (2) the Board was entitled to attorneys fees. View "Virgin Mobile U.S.A., L.P. v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law