Plaintiff filed a putative class action against DCI, alleging that DCI violated the Telephone Communications Practice Act, 47 U.S.C. 227, by sending plaintiff two text messages. The court concluded that plaintiff gave his prior express consent to be contacted by voluntarily providing his cell phone number to DCI. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's claims because plaintiff’s complaint alleges, on its face, facts that demonstrate prior express consent. View "Murphy v. DCI Biologicals Orlando, LLC" on Justia Law

To obtain a driver’s license or motor vehicle registration from a state motor vehicle department (DMV), individuals must disclose personal information. The 1994 Driver’s Privacy Protection Act (DPPA), 18 U.S.C. 2721-2725, prohibits disclosure of personal information, “that identifies an individual, including an individual’s photograph, social security number, driver identification number, name, address (but not the 5-digit zip code), telephone number, and medical or disability information,” except for use by a government agency, in carrying out its functions; by a private person acting on behalf of a government agency in carrying out its functions; in connection with any civil, criminal, administrative, or arbitral proceeding; or for investigation in anticipation of litigation. DPPA establishes penalties for improper use. Drivers alleged that the Minnesota Department of Public Safety databases were accessible to law enforcement officers, government agents, and other individuals through an internet portal, and that the information was being accessed for improper purposes. Drivers requested audits detailing past accesses of their motor vehicle records. Audits showed that each Driver’s’ personal information had been accessed hundreds of times, primarily through police departments, sheriff’s offices, or other agencies. District courts dismissed Drivers’ suits. The Eighth Circuit affirmed in part, noting that several claims were untimely, but reversed in part, finding that certain claims alleged patterns of access sufficient to establish improper purpose. View "McDonough v. Anoka Cnty." on Justia Law

Powell contends that his Christian beliefs compel him to publicly share his faith with others. Powell went to the Iowa State Fairgrounds and positioned himself on a sidewalk outside the paid admission area, close to a heavily-traveled intersection near the fair’s main gate. Uniformed Iowa State Fair Patrol Officers told him to leave the fairgrounds. The next day, Powell returned to the fairgrounds and stood in front of public restrooms outside the paid admission area. Fair Patrol Officers told him to leave. Powell brought a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and 1988 and sought a preliminary injunction, which the district court granted in part, prohibiting defendants from “arresting or threatening to arrest [Powell] solely for engaging in protected speech on the Fairgrounds in locations where [appellees] have already conceded that he is not impeding or would not be likely to impede the flow of traffic.” The Eighth Circuit affirmed denial of Powell’s motion based on his First Amendment claim and remanded the case for consideration of Powell’s request for preliminary injunctive relief based on his due process claim. View "Powell v. Noble" on Justia Law

Under the Telecommunications Act of 1996, local exchange carriers such as Windstream must connect calls made to their customers by the customers of national telecommunications companies such as Sprint. Until 2009, Sprint paid Windstream state access charges for connecting non-nomadic intrastate long-distance VoIP calls-- made by cable telephone customers over the Internet in Iowa, delivered to Sprint for format conversion, and transferred to Windstream for delivery to its Iowa telephone customers. Beginning in 2009, Sprint withheld state access charges for these calls, claiming that VoIP calls were “information services” and that payment should be governed by a reciprocal compensation agreement, not by state access charges. In 2011, the Iowa Utilities Board found that the calls were telecommunications services subject to state regulation, not information services. Sprint sought state court review and filed a federal action, seeking to enjoin the Board’s decision. The district court abstained because of the parallel state proceedings. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, but the Supreme Court reversed. By the time the case returned to the district court, the state court had upheld the Board’s decision. The district court dismissed Sprint’s complaint, holding that issue preclusion barred Sprint from raising the same arguments in federal court. The Eighth Circuit reversed, reasoning that Congress did not intend that issue-preclusion principles bar federal-court review of the issue of whether the non-nomadic intrastate long-distance VoIP calls at issue are information services, payment for which should be governed by a reciprocal compensation agreement, or telecommunications services subject to state access charges. View "Sprint Commc'ns Co. v. Jacobs" on Justia Law

In 1996 (Free Press I), the Sixth Circuit held that the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. 552, requires government agencies to honor requests for the booking photographs of criminal defendants who have appeared in court during ongoing proceedings. Despite that holding, the U.S. Marshals Service denied the Free Press’s 2012 request for the booking photographs of Detroit-area police officers indicted on federal charges. The district court, bound by Free Press I, granted summary judgment to the newspaper in the ensuing lawsuit. A Sixth Circuit panel affirmed, while urging the full court to reconsider the merits of Free Press I. The court noted FOIA Exemption 7(C) which protects a non-trivial privacy interest in keeping “personal facts away from the public eye,” and that individuals do not forfeit their interest in maintaining control over information that has been made public in some form. Criminal defendants do not forfeit their interest in controlling private information while their cases remain pending. View "Detroit Free Press, Inc v. Dept. of Justice" on Justia Law

Springfield has an ordinance that prohibits panhandling in its “downtown historic district”—less than 2% of the city’s area, containing its principal shopping, entertainment, and governmental areas. The ordinance defines panhandling as an oral request for an immediate donation of money. Signs requesting money are allowed, as are oral pleas to send money later. Plaintiffs received citations for violating this ordinance and alleged that they will continue panhandling but fear liability. They unsuccessfully sought a preliminary injunction. The Seventh Circuit upheld the ordinance in 2014, but granted rehearing in light of the Supreme Court’s 2015 decision, Reed v. Gilbert, and reversed. The majority in Reed stated: “A law that is content based on its face is subject to strict scrutiny regardless of the government’s benign motive, content-neutral justification, or lack of ‘animus toward the ideas contained’ in the regulated speech” and “a speech regulation targeted at specific subject matter is content based even if it does not discriminate among viewpoints within that subject matter.” The Seventh Circuit opined that the majority opinion in Reed effectively abolishes any distinction between content regulation and subject-matter regulation. View "Norton v. City of Springfield" on Justia Law

Springfield has an ordinance that prohibits panhandling in its “downtown historic district”—less than 2% of the city’s area, containing its principal shopping, entertainment, and governmental areas. The ordinance defines panhandling as an oral request for an immediate donation of money. Signs requesting money are allowed, as are oral pleas to send money later. Plaintiffs received citations for violating this ordinance and alleged that they will continue panhandling but fear liability. They unsuccessfully sought a preliminary injunction. The Seventh Circuit upheld the ordinance in 2014, but granted rehearing in light of the Supreme Court’s 2015 decision, Reed v. Gilbert, and reversed. The majority in Reed stated: “A law that is content based on its face is subject to strict scrutiny regardless of the government’s benign motive, content-neutral justification, or lack of ‘animus toward the ideas contained’ in the regulated speech” and “a speech regulation targeted at specific subject matter is content based even if it does not discriminate among viewpoints within that subject matter.” The Seventh Circuit opined that the majority opinion in Reed effectively abolishes any distinction between content regulation and subject-matter regulation. View "Norton v. City of Springfield" on Justia Law

Chapman, proposed to represent a class, under 47 U.S.C. 227, the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, who received faxes from First Index despite not having given consent. First Index responded that it always had consent, though it may have been verbal (during trade shows or phone conversations). Discovery was conducted and experts’ reports submitted. Chapman asked the judge to certify a class of all persons who had received faxes from First Index since August 2005 (four years before the complaint was filed) without their consent. The court declined, ruling that the difficulty of deciding who had provided oral consent made it infeasible to determine the class. Chapman proposed a different class: All persons whose faxes from First Index either lacked an opt-out notice or contained one of three specific notices that Chapman believes violated FCC regulations. The court declined to certify that class, finding that Chapman had known about the potential notice issue from the outset of the litigation but had made a strategic decision not to pursue it earlier. Changing the focus of the litigation almost five years into the case was impermissible. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the decision not to certify a class, but vacated with respect to Chapman’s personal claim. View "Chapman v. First Index, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA), 18 U.S.C. 1030, and the Stored Communications Act (SCA), 18 U.S.C. 2701 et seq., alleging that defendant, her former boyfriend, had gained access to her e-mail and Facebook accounts without her permission and therefore in violation of the CFAA and the SCA. Plaintiff discovered that she could not log on to her AOL e-mail account on or about August 1, 2011 and plaintiff discovered that she could not log into her Facebook account on February 24, 2012. The district court granted defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint as untimely. While the CFAA and the SCA provided a civil cause of action, the statute of limitations to file under each statute is two years. The court concluded that plaintiff's claims relating to defendant's alleged unlawful access to her e-mail account are time-barred because she filed suit on January 2, 2014, after the two year statute of limitations had expired. However, the court concluded that plaintiff's claims relating to the alleged unlawful access of her Facebook account were timely filed, less than two years from the date they accrued. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Sewell v. Bernardin" on Justia Law

After obtaining terrorism convictions, then-Assistant U.S. Attorney Convertino came under investigation by the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR). An unidentified DOJ source leaked information about that investigation to Ashenfelter, a reporter. The Detroit Free Press published details, including allegations that Convertino withheld Brady materials and threatened a defense lawyer with a baseless criminal investigation. DOJ’s attempts to find the source were unsuccessful. The terrorism convictions were vacated. The defendants’ claims against Convertino under 42 U.S.C. 1983 were dismissed based on prosecutorial and qualified immunity. Convertino was found not guilty of obstruction of justice. Convertino sued DOJ, alleging that the investigation, leak, and disciplinary measures were in retaliation for his testimony before the Senate Finance Committee. Ultimately, a single claim remained--that DOJ violated the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. 552, when its unidentified official leaked confidential information to Ashenfelter. The district court granted the motion to compel production from Ashenfelter. Ashenfelter asserted his Fifth Amendment privilege at two depositions. The district court found that Ashenfelter had a reasonable basis for fearing that answering the questions would entail self-incrimination, sustained the assertion of privilege, and reduced its ruling to two written opinions—one public, and one sealed. Convertino unsuccessfully moved for reconsideration, citing a statement by then-Attorney General Holder that the DOJ “will not prosecute any reporter.” The Sixth Circuit affirmed, upholding the claims of privilege. View "Convertino v. Dep't of Justice" on Justia Law