Fans of the musical group Insane Clown Posse, who call themselves “Juggalos,” frequently display, on person or property, insignia representative of the band. In 2011, the National Gang Intelligence Center—an informational center operating under the Federal Bureau of Investigation—released a congressionally-mandated report on gang activity that included a section on Juggalos. The report identified Juggalos as a “hybrid gang” and relayed information about criminal activity committed by Juggalo subsets. Juggalos allege that they subsequently suffered violations of their First and Fifth Amendment constitutional rights at the hands of state and local law enforcement officers who were motivated to commit the injuries in question due to the identification of Juggalos as a criminal gang. They filed suit against the Department of Justice and FBI under the Administrative Procedure Act and the Declaratory Judgment Act. The SIxth Circuit reversed dismissal for lack of standing. The Juggalos sufficiently alleged that the reputational harm and chill was caused by the 2011 Report and, where reputational harm and chill will likely be alleviated by the relief sought, redressability exists. View "Parsons v. Dep't of Justice" on Justia Law

Brown, convicted of raping adult women and diagnosed with paraphilia (specifically, sexual attraction to non-consenting women) and personality disorder with antisocial and narcissistic traits, was civilly committed to the Rushville Treatment and Detention Center under Illinois’s Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act. Brown and 17 others sued the facility’s officials and clinical staff under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that policies restricting their access to movies, video games, and video game consoles violate the First Amendment. Rushville prohibited its residents from watching all R-rated movies and playing M-rated video games (may “contain intense violence, blood and gore, sexual content and/or strong language”). The policy was later changed to prohibit 353 specific movies and 232 specific games. Rushville subsequently discovered that two residents were using a video game console to access the internet to view forbidden material and banned residents from possessing video game consoles capable of accessing the internet. Brown contended that the new restrictions were retaliation against him for suing. The district court entered summary judgment for the defendants. The Seventh Circuit vacated in part, finding that the record did not contain a sufficient basis to conclude that the ban on movies and video games is reasonably related to the state’s interests in security and rehabilitation, View "Brown v. Phillips" on Justia Law

Allison, an elderly woman, suffering from dementia, had two daughters. For several years, a team of paid caregivers, consisting of personal friends, tended to Allison, including Barker. A rift developed between Allison’s daughters, and Wagner was appointed conservator of the person and estate of Allison. Wagner made changes to Allison’s care, began paying caregivers legitimately and reporting their wages as employees, and hired Fox, a registered nurse, as Allison’s case manager. Fox determined that Allison required nursing oversight, as none of the caregivers had any background or training in nursing or home healthcare. While being tended to by Newell, an employee of Fox, Allison “became combative and a quarrel resulted,” causing injuries to Allison. A series of emails followed, some critical of those involved in caregiving, and Barker was eventually terminated as a caregiver. Barker sued for defamation and intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress. Fox and Wagner filed an anti-SLAPP (strategic lawsuit against public participation) motion to dismiss. The trial court denied the motion. The court of appeal reversed, holding that Barker had not met his burden to show that his complaint was legally sufficient and supported by a sufficient prima facie showing to support a favorable judgment. View "Barker v. Fox & Assocs." on Justia Law

Hunter and Sullivan were indicted on murder, weapons, and gang-related charges stemming from a drive-by shooting. Each served a subpoena duces tecum on Facebook, Instagram, or Twitter, seeking both public and private content from user accounts of the murder victim and a witness. The companies moved to quash the subpoenas, citing the federal Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. 2702(a), which provides that electronic communication services “shall not knowingly divulge” the contents of a user communication to anyone, with limited exceptions). Defendants responded that the requested information is necessary to properly defend against the pending charges, and that any statutory privacy protections afforded a social media user must yield to a criminal defendant’s constitutional rights to due process, presentation of a complete defense, and effective assistance of counsel. The trial court denied the motions to quash and ordered the companies to produce responsive material for in camera review. The court of appeal directed the trial court to issue an order quashing the subpoenas. View "Facebook, Inc. v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Munroe was an English teacher, generally considered to be effective and competent. The District granted Munroe tenure in 2010. In 2009, Munroe began a blog, using the name “Natalie M.” She did not expressly identify where she worked or lived, the name of the school or the names of her students. According to Munroe, her blog was meant to be viewed by friends that she had asked to subscribe. There were fewer than 10 subscribed readers, but no password was required for access. Most of the blog posts were unrelated to her school or work. Some postings included complaints about students, her working conditions, and related matters. The District administration first learned of Munroe’s blog in February 2011 when a reporter from a local newspaper began to ask questions; students apparently were commenting on social media.” Munroe was placed on paid suspension and, later, fired. The District had no regulation specifically prohibiting a teacher from blogging on his or her own time. The Third Circuit affirmed dismissal of Munroe’s 42 U.S.C. 1983 suit; under the Pickering balancing test, Munroe’s speech, in both effect and tone, was sufficiently disruptive so as to diminish any legitimate interest in its expression, and did not rise to the level of constitutionally protected expression. View "Munroe v. Central Bucks Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

Advertisements featuring three minor girls, J.S., S.L., and L.C. (collectively J.S.), allegedly were posted on a website owned and maintained by Village Voice Media Holdings, d/b/a Backpage.com, Backpage.com LLC and New Times Media LLC, d/b/a/ Backpage.com (collectively Backpage). J.S. allegedly was raped multiple times by adult customers who responded to the advertisements. J.S. filed a complaint alleging state law claims for damages against Backpage and Baruti Hopson, asserting claims for negligence, outrage, sexual exploitation of children, ratification/vicarious liability, unjust enrichment, invasion of privacy, sexual assault and battery, and civil conspiracy. Backpage moved to dismiss on the theory that it was immune from suit in relation to J.S. 's state law claims under the federal Communications Decency Act of 1996 (CDA). Plaintiffs alleged that the defendants did more than just provide a forum for illegal content; plaintiffs alleged defendants helped develop it. Taking the complaint as true, the Washington Supreme Court found that plaintiffs alleged sufficient facts that, if proved, would show that defendants helped to produce the illegal content and therefore were subject to liability under state law. Accordingly, the Court affirmed and remanded this case back to the trial court for further proceedings. View "J.S. v. Vill. Voice Media Holdings, LLC" on Justia Law

The government obtained a warrant to search the email account of Fattah, a U.S. Congressman, who is the subject of an investigation involving federal criminal laws relating to fraud, extortion, and bribery. Fattah alleged that he used the “gmail” account for both personal matters and official business relating to his congressional duties and challenged the unexecuted search warrant on Speech or Debate Clause grounds. The court declined to invalidate the unexecuted search warrant. The Third Circuit dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Because an unexecuted search warrant is not separate from the merits of the case and is reviewable on appeal, if a defendant is convicted, it does not qualify for review under the collateral order doctrine. View "In the Matter of the Search of Elec Commc'ns" on Justia Law

Dr. Meinders sued United Healthcare in Illinois state court, alleging that in 2013, United sent him and a number of similarly-situated persons an unsolicited “junk fax” advertising United’s services, which violated the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA), 47 U.S.C. 227, the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Practices Act, and amounted to common law conversion. United removed the case to federal court and successfully moved to dismiss for improper venue under Federal Rule of Procedure 12(b)(3), claiming that Meinders had entered into a “Provider Agreement” with a United-owned entity, ACN, in 2006, which bound him to arbitrate his “junk fax” claims in Minnesota. Meinders unsuccessfully moved to strike or, in the alternative, for leave to file a sur-reply addressing the assumption theory and declaration. The Seventh Circuit reversed because the district court premised its dismissal order on law and facts to which Meinders did not have a full and fair opportunity to respond. View "Dr. Robert L. Meinders, D.C. v. UnitedHealthcare, Inc." on Justia Law

HP sued Oracle, based on Oracle's announcement that it would no longer make software products compatible with HP hardware products. After the court found that Oracle was obligated to adapt its products to the HP systems. Oracle announced that it would appeal. Oracle brought a motion under the anti-SLAPP statute, Code of Civil Procedure 425.16, asserting that HP had “changed its damages theory” by relying on “customer uncertainty" resulting from Oracle’s announcement and refusal to accept the ruling. Oracle contended that this theory of damages arose in substantial part from its announced intention to appeal, which announcement was protected under the anti-SLAPP act because it constituted an exercise or attempt to exercise Oracle’s rights to freedom of speech and to petition the government for redress. The court denied the motion as untimely. Oracle appealed. The court of appeal affirmed, finding the appeal and underlying motion ”utterly without merit.” The motion was late under any reasonable construction of the facts and was properly denied because it could not possibly achieve the purposes for which the anti-SLAPP statute was enacted. The court declined to assess sanctions against Oracle “only because we do not wish to further delay the long-overdue trial of the merits.” View "Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Oracle Corp." on Justia Law

The Telephone Consumer Protection Act prohibits companies from making automated calls to a person’s cellphone without that person’s prior express consent, 47 U.S.C. 227(b)(1)(A)(iii). Hill claims he received more than 100 prohibited phone calls from his creditor, Homeward, in connection to a debt he owed. Hill had given the company his cell number and knew that this number would be used if Homeward needed to reach him about his mortgage. He also listed the number on a loan modification document. While behind on his payments, Hill told Homeward not to call him at work anymore, instructing Homeward to call his cellphone instead. He also provided express written consent for Homeward to call his cellphone. The district court rejected Hills’s claims under the Act. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. A person gives his “prior express consent” when he gives his creditor his cellphone number in connection with a debt he owes. View "Hill v. Homeward Residential, Inc." on Justia Law