Advertisements featuring three minor girls, J.S., S.L., and L.C. (collectively J.S.), allegedly were posted on a website owned and maintained by Village Voice Media Holdings, d/b/a Backpage.com, Backpage.com LLC and New Times Media LLC, d/b/a/ Backpage.com (collectively Backpage). J.S. allegedly was raped multiple times by adult customers who responded to the advertisements. J.S. filed a complaint alleging state law claims for damages against Backpage and Baruti Hopson, asserting claims for negligence, outrage, sexual exploitation of children, ratification/vicarious liability, unjust enrichment, invasion of privacy, sexual assault and battery, and civil conspiracy. Backpage moved to dismiss on the theory that it was immune from suit in relation to J.S. 's state law claims under the federal Communications Decency Act of 1996 (CDA). Plaintiffs alleged that the defendants did more than just provide a forum for illegal content; plaintiffs alleged defendants helped develop it. Taking the complaint as true, the Washington Supreme Court found that plaintiffs alleged sufficient facts that, if proved, would show that defendants helped to produce the illegal content and therefore were subject to liability under state law. Accordingly, the Court affirmed and remanded this case back to the trial court for further proceedings. View "J.S. v. Vill. Voice Media Holdings, LLC" on Justia Law

The government obtained a warrant to search the email account of Fattah, a U.S. Congressman, who is the subject of an investigation involving federal criminal laws relating to fraud, extortion, and bribery. Fattah alleged that he used the “gmail” account for both personal matters and official business relating to his congressional duties and challenged the unexecuted search warrant on Speech or Debate Clause grounds. The court declined to invalidate the unexecuted search warrant. The Third Circuit dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Because an unexecuted search warrant is not separate from the merits of the case and is reviewable on appeal, if a defendant is convicted, it does not qualify for review under the collateral order doctrine. View "In the Matter of the Search of Elec Commc'ns" on Justia Law

Dr. Meinders sued United Healthcare in Illinois state court, alleging that in 2013, United sent him and a number of similarly-situated persons an unsolicited “junk fax” advertising United’s services, which violated the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA), 47 U.S.C. 227, the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Practices Act, and amounted to common law conversion. United removed the case to federal court and successfully moved to dismiss for improper venue under Federal Rule of Procedure 12(b)(3), claiming that Meinders had entered into a “Provider Agreement” with a United-owned entity, ACN, in 2006, which bound him to arbitrate his “junk fax” claims in Minnesota. Meinders unsuccessfully moved to strike or, in the alternative, for leave to file a sur-reply addressing the assumption theory and declaration. The Seventh Circuit reversed because the district court premised its dismissal order on law and facts to which Meinders did not have a full and fair opportunity to respond. View "Dr. Robert L. Meinders, D.C. v. UnitedHealthcare, Inc." on Justia Law

HP sued Oracle, based on Oracle's announcement that it would no longer make software products compatible with HP hardware products. After the court found that Oracle was obligated to adapt its products to the HP systems. Oracle announced that it would appeal. Oracle brought a motion under the anti-SLAPP statute, Code of Civil Procedure 425.16, asserting that HP had “changed its damages theory” by relying on “customer uncertainty" resulting from Oracle’s announcement and refusal to accept the ruling. Oracle contended that this theory of damages arose in substantial part from its announced intention to appeal, which announcement was protected under the anti-SLAPP act because it constituted an exercise or attempt to exercise Oracle’s rights to freedom of speech and to petition the government for redress. The court denied the motion as untimely. Oracle appealed. The court of appeal affirmed, finding the appeal and underlying motion ”utterly without merit.” The motion was late under any reasonable construction of the facts and was properly denied because it could not possibly achieve the purposes for which the anti-SLAPP statute was enacted. The court declined to assess sanctions against Oracle “only because we do not wish to further delay the long-overdue trial of the merits.” View "Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Oracle Corp." on Justia Law

The Telephone Consumer Protection Act prohibits companies from making automated calls to a person’s cellphone without that person’s prior express consent, 47 U.S.C. 227(b)(1)(A)(iii). Hill claims he received more than 100 prohibited phone calls from his creditor, Homeward, in connection to a debt he owed. Hill had given the company his cell number and knew that this number would be used if Homeward needed to reach him about his mortgage. He also listed the number on a loan modification document. While behind on his payments, Hill told Homeward not to call him at work anymore, instructing Homeward to call his cellphone instead. He also provided express written consent for Homeward to call his cellphone. The district court rejected Hills’s claims under the Act. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. A person gives his “prior express consent” when he gives his creditor his cellphone number in connection with a debt he owes. View "Hill v. Homeward Residential, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a putative class action against DCI, alleging that DCI violated the Telephone Communications Practice Act, 47 U.S.C. 227, by sending plaintiff two text messages. The court concluded that plaintiff gave his prior express consent to be contacted by voluntarily providing his cell phone number to DCI. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's claims because plaintiff’s complaint alleges, on its face, facts that demonstrate prior express consent. View "Murphy v. DCI Biologicals Orlando, LLC" on Justia Law

To obtain a driver’s license or motor vehicle registration from a state motor vehicle department (DMV), individuals must disclose personal information. The 1994 Driver’s Privacy Protection Act (DPPA), 18 U.S.C. 2721-2725, prohibits disclosure of personal information, “that identifies an individual, including an individual’s photograph, social security number, driver identification number, name, address (but not the 5-digit zip code), telephone number, and medical or disability information,” except for use by a government agency, in carrying out its functions; by a private person acting on behalf of a government agency in carrying out its functions; in connection with any civil, criminal, administrative, or arbitral proceeding; or for investigation in anticipation of litigation. DPPA establishes penalties for improper use. Drivers alleged that the Minnesota Department of Public Safety databases were accessible to law enforcement officers, government agents, and other individuals through an internet portal, and that the information was being accessed for improper purposes. Drivers requested audits detailing past accesses of their motor vehicle records. Audits showed that each Driver’s’ personal information had been accessed hundreds of times, primarily through police departments, sheriff’s offices, or other agencies. District courts dismissed Drivers’ suits. The Eighth Circuit affirmed in part, noting that several claims were untimely, but reversed in part, finding that certain claims alleged patterns of access sufficient to establish improper purpose. View "McDonough v. Anoka Cnty." on Justia Law

Powell contends that his Christian beliefs compel him to publicly share his faith with others. Powell went to the Iowa State Fairgrounds and positioned himself on a sidewalk outside the paid admission area, close to a heavily-traveled intersection near the fair’s main gate. Uniformed Iowa State Fair Patrol Officers told him to leave the fairgrounds. The next day, Powell returned to the fairgrounds and stood in front of public restrooms outside the paid admission area. Fair Patrol Officers told him to leave. Powell brought a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and 1988 and sought a preliminary injunction, which the district court granted in part, prohibiting defendants from “arresting or threatening to arrest [Powell] solely for engaging in protected speech on the Fairgrounds in locations where [appellees] have already conceded that he is not impeding or would not be likely to impede the flow of traffic.” The Eighth Circuit affirmed denial of Powell’s motion based on his First Amendment claim and remanded the case for consideration of Powell’s request for preliminary injunctive relief based on his due process claim. View "Powell v. Noble" on Justia Law

Under the Telecommunications Act of 1996, local exchange carriers such as Windstream must connect calls made to their customers by the customers of national telecommunications companies such as Sprint. Until 2009, Sprint paid Windstream state access charges for connecting non-nomadic intrastate long-distance VoIP calls-- made by cable telephone customers over the Internet in Iowa, delivered to Sprint for format conversion, and transferred to Windstream for delivery to its Iowa telephone customers. Beginning in 2009, Sprint withheld state access charges for these calls, claiming that VoIP calls were “information services” and that payment should be governed by a reciprocal compensation agreement, not by state access charges. In 2011, the Iowa Utilities Board found that the calls were telecommunications services subject to state regulation, not information services. Sprint sought state court review and filed a federal action, seeking to enjoin the Board’s decision. The district court abstained because of the parallel state proceedings. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, but the Supreme Court reversed. By the time the case returned to the district court, the state court had upheld the Board’s decision. The district court dismissed Sprint’s complaint, holding that issue preclusion barred Sprint from raising the same arguments in federal court. The Eighth Circuit reversed, reasoning that Congress did not intend that issue-preclusion principles bar federal-court review of the issue of whether the non-nomadic intrastate long-distance VoIP calls at issue are information services, payment for which should be governed by a reciprocal compensation agreement, or telecommunications services subject to state access charges. View "Sprint Commc'ns Co. v. Jacobs" on Justia Law

In 1996 (Free Press I), the Sixth Circuit held that the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. 552, requires government agencies to honor requests for the booking photographs of criminal defendants who have appeared in court during ongoing proceedings. Despite that holding, the U.S. Marshals Service denied the Free Press’s 2012 request for the booking photographs of Detroit-area police officers indicted on federal charges. The district court, bound by Free Press I, granted summary judgment to the newspaper in the ensuing lawsuit. A Sixth Circuit panel affirmed, while urging the full court to reconsider the merits of Free Press I. The court noted FOIA Exemption 7(C) which protects a non-trivial privacy interest in keeping “personal facts away from the public eye,” and that individuals do not forfeit their interest in maintaining control over information that has been made public in some form. Criminal defendants do not forfeit their interest in controlling private information while their cases remain pending. View "Detroit Free Press, Inc v. Dept. of Justice" on Justia Law