In 2012, Eureka Police Sergeant Laird and others arrested a minor, after a chase in which the minor “was pushed to the ground, fell to the ground, or just gave up and laid on the ground.” A patrol car’s mobile audio-video recording system produced videos of the arrest. A citizen lodged a complaint regarding the handling of the minor. The Department conducted an investigation. Laird was charged with misdemeanor assault by a police officer without lawful necessity and making a false report. After reviewing the evidence, including the arrest video, experts determined Laird did not use excessive force. The prosecution dismissed the charges. In 2013-2014, Greenson wrote articles in local newspapers about the arrest and subsequent litigation. Greenson's request under the California Public Records Act (Gov. Code 6250), seeking disclosure of the arrest video, was denied. The city cited discretionary exemptions for personnel records and investigative files,”Penal Code sections 832.7, 832.8. Greenson then filed a request under Welfare and Institutions Code section 827, which authorizes public disclosure of confidential juvenile records under limited circumstances. The court of appeal affirmed that the arrest video is not a personnel record protected by the statutes. and the order requiring the video's release. View "City of Eureka v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

In 2012, Eureka Police Sergeant Laird and other officers arrested a minor, after a chase in which the minor “was pushed to the ground, fell to the ground, or just gave up and laid on the ground.” A patrol car’s mobile audio-video recording system produced videos of the arrest. A citizen lodged a complaint regarding the handling of the minor. The Department conducted an investigation. Sergeant Laird was charged with misdemeanor assault by a police officer without lawful necessity and making a false report. After reviewing the evidence, including the arrest video, experts determined Laird did not use excessive force. The prosecution dismissed the charges. In 2013-2014, Greenson wrote articles in local newspapers about the arrest and subsequent litigation. Greenson filed a California Public Records Act (Gov. Code 6250) request seeking disclosure of the arrest video. The city denied the request, citing discretionary exemptions for personnel records and investigative files, Penal Code sections 832.7, 832.8. Greenson then filed a request under Welfare and Institutions Code section 827, which authorizes public disclosure of confidential juvenile records under limited circumstances. The court of appeal affirmed that the arrest video is not a personnel record protected by the statutes. and an order requiring release of the video. View "City of Eureka v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

The Oregon Tax Court set aside a determination by the Department of Revenue (the department) that taxpayer DIRECTV’s property in Oregon was subject to central assessment under ORS 308.505 to 308.665. The department argued that, contrary to the Tax Court’s opinion, DIRECTV was a “communications” business whose property is subject to central assessment under ORS 308.515(1). The Supreme Court agreed and, therefore, reversed and remanded. View "DIRECTV, Inc. v. Dept. of Rev." on Justia Law

Microsoft appealed from the district court's order denying its motion to quash a warrant issued under section 2703 of the Stored Communications Act (SCA), 18 U.S.C. 2701 et seq., and holding Microsoft in contempt of court for refusing to execute the warrant on the government’s behalf. The warrant directed Microsoft to seize and produce the contents of an e‐mail account - an account believed to be used in furtherance of narcotics trafficking - that it maintains for a customer who uses the company’s electronic communications services. Microsoft produced its customer’s non‐content information to the government, as directed. That data was stored in the United States. But Microsoft ascertained that, to comply fully with the warrant, it would need to access customer content that it stores and maintains in Ireland and to import that data into the United States for delivery to federal authorities. The court concluded that Congress did not intend the SCA’s warrant provisions to apply extraterritorially. The focus of those provisions is protection of a user’s privacy interests. Accordingly, the SCA does not authorize a United States court to issue and enforce an SCA warrant against a United States‐based service provider for the contents of a customer’s electronic communications stored on servers located outside the United States. Therefore, the court concluded that the district court lacked authority to enforce the warrant against Microsoft. The court reversed the denial of the motion to quash because Microsoft has complied with the warrant’s domestic directives and resisted only its extraterritorial aspect; vacated the finding of civil contempt; and remanded with instructions to the district court to quash the warrant insofar as it directs Microsoft to collect, import, and produce to the government customer content stored outside the United States. View "Microsoft v. United States" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Stanley Cottrell, Jr. appealed the grant of judgment notwithstanding the verdict (“JNOV”) and earlier grants of directed verdicts in this action alleging defamation and related torts, and potentially implicating the constitutionality of portions of the Georgia Computer Systems Protection Act (“GCSPA”) in favor of five defendants: Glenn and Marian Crocker (“Crockers”), Hugh Johnson (“Johnson”), Peggy Smith (“Peggy”), and Karen Smith (“Karen”). This matter arose out of some online postings and other communications by Defendants about Cottrell. For a number of years, Cottrell participated in a number of solo running exhibitions with a Christian evangelical emphasis, some of which have been portrayed in the media, and was subsequently involved in various multi-level marketing endeavors, executive leadership positions, and motivational speaking. Cottrell’s notoriety grew along with media controversy relating to his character, which questioned the authenticity and integrity of his claims and achievements. The Crockers worked for Cottrell planning two running exhibitions; Johnson was a long-time friend of Cottrell’s who came to know some women with whom Cottrell was involved outside of his marriage; Peggy is one of the women with whom Cottrell had an extra-marital affair; and Karen is Peggy’s daughter-in-law. Karen located and contacted several people she believed had information about Cottrell, including the Crockers and Johnson. Karen and her husband created a “WordPress” blog and posted stories based on this information, which portrayed Cottrell as having a long history of misrepresentation and deception for personal gain. Karen sent emails to a “list serve” group criticizing Cottrell and sharing links to the Blog posts, and Peggy sent messages to multiple Cottrell Facebook “friends” along the same lines. Cottrell sued, primarily alleging defamation and several associated claims (invasion of privacy, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and violation of the GCSPA). After review of Cottrell's arguments on appeal of the JNOV, the Supreme Court concluded JNOV was indeed warranted in this case, and affirmed the trial court's judgments. View "Cottrell v. Smith" on Justia Law

Attorney Turza sent fax advertisements to accountants. In 2013, the Seventh Circuit affirmed that these faxes violated the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA), 47 U.S.C. 227, but reversed a plan to distribute a $4.2 million fund to the class members and donate any remainder to charity. Meanwhile, Turza posted a $4.2 million supersedeas bond. Invoking the common-fund doctrine, the district judge awarded class counsel about $1.4 million. TCPA authorizes an award of up to $500 per improper fax. The court ordered two-thirds of that sent to every class member. If some members fail to cash their checks or cannot be found, there would be a second distribution. The maximum paid out per fax would be $500. If money remains, the residue returns to Turza. The Seventh Circuit reversed in part. This is not a common-fund case; suits under TCPA seek recovery for discrete wrongs. If a recipient cannot be located, or spurns the money, counsel are not entitled to be paid for that fax. TCPA is not a fee-shifting statute. Turza is not required to pay the class’s attorneys just because he lost the suit. Distributing more than $500 per fax ($333 to the recipient and $167 to counsel) would either exceed the statutory cap or effectively shift legal fees to Turza. The $4.2 million represents security for payment, so once the debt is satisfied, the surplus can be returned to Turza. View "Holtzman v. Turza" on Justia Law

Peter Deacon, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, brought an action in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California against Pandora Media, Inc., which operated an Internet-based music-streaming program. In relevant part, Deacon claimed that Pandora violation of the Michigan preservation of personal privacy act (PPPA) by publically disclosing personal information concerning his music preferences. The federal district court ruled in favor of defendant, and under MCR 7.305(B), the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit certified a question of Michigan law to the Michigan Supreme Court: "Has Deacon stated a claim against Pandora for violation of the VRPA by adequately alleging that Pandora is [in] the business of 'renting' or 'lending' sound recordings, and that he is a 'customer' of Pandora because he 'rents' or 'borrows' sound recordings from Pandora? " Having heard oral argument and considered the issues involved, the Michigan Supreme Court granted the Ninth Circuit’s request to answer its question. However, the Michigan Court limited the question to whether Deacon could be characterized under the PPPA as a "customer" of Pandora because at the relevant time he was a person who "rent[ed]" or "borrow[ed]" sound recordings from defendant. The Supreme Court concluded that Deacon was not such a "customer." View "In re Certified Question (Deacon v. Pandora)" on Justia Law

The Tennis Channel filed a complaint alleging that Comcast violated Section 616 of the Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. 536, by giving preferential treatment to its affiliated networks in programming tier placement. Tennis Channel prevailed before the FCC, but the district court held that the Commission and Tennis Channel had failed to identify substantial evidence of unlawful discrimination based on affiliation (Tennis I). On remand, the Commission resolved the entirety of Tennis Channel’s complaint in Comcast’s favor and denied Tennis Channel’s petition for further proceedings. The court concluded that Tennis Channel fails to show that the Commission acted arbitrarily and capriciously when it interpreted Tennis I consistently with that administrative law precedent; under the circumstances, the Commission correctly concluded that Tennis I left no room for it to find discrimination on the existing administrative record; and Tennis Channel’s reliance on Section 402(h) is misplaced. Regarding the request for further briefing, because the Commission correctly determined that Tennis I concluded the administrative record contained insufficient evidence to support a finding of Section 616 discrimination by Comcast, the Commission’s rejection of Tennis Channel’s request for further briefing was hardly a clear abuse of discretion. The Commission already had the opportunity to review the record evidence that Tennis Channel claimed in its petition for further proceedings was critical to showing affiliate discrimination. Regarding the request to reopen the record to allow submission of additional evidence, although the Commission’s explanation for denying Tennis Channel’s request was brief, it was sufficient. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review. View "The Tennis Channel, Inc. v. FCC" on Justia Law

The district court dismissed a consolidated class action in which plaintiffs, children younger than 13, alleged that Viacom and Google unlawfully collected personal information about them on the Internet, including what webpages they visited and what videos they watched on Viacom’s websites. The claims alleged invasion of privacy under New Jersey law and cited the 1988 Video Privacy Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. 2710 which prohibits the disclosure of personally identifying information relating to viewers’ consumption of video-related services. The Third Circuit affirmed in part, holding that the Act permits plaintiffs to sue only a person who discloses such information, not a person who receives such information, and that the prohibition on the disclosure of personally identifiable information applies only to the kind of information that would readily permit an ordinary person to identify a specific individual’s video-watching behavior, so that digital identifiers, like IP addresses, fall outside the Act. The court vacated dismissal of a claim of intrusion upon seclusion that alleged that Viacom explicitly promised not to collect any personal information about children who browsed its websites and then did so. The 1998 Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. 6501,authorizing the FTC to regulate websites that target children, does not preempt the state-law privacy claim. View "In Re: Nickleodeon Consumer Privacy Litig." on Justia Law

Indiana Rules for the Admission to the Bar and the Discipline of Attorneys state: “No person who advocates the overthrow of the government of the United States or this state by force, violence or other unconstitutional or illegal means, shall be certified to the Supreme Court of Indiana for admission to the bar of the court and a license to the practice of law.” Plaintiff intends to engage in “revolutionary advocacy,” as by distributing the Charter of Carnaro and Marx and Engels’ Communist Manifesto. He challenged the Rule, without stating that he intends to advocate the overthrow of the government. The Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal of the suit as premature. Plaintiff has not applied for admission to the Indiana bar and lacks standing. The rule will harm him only if he would be admitted to the Indiana bar were the rule to be invalidated: “that is highly unlikely,” given “his tempestuous relations with the Illinois bar authorities,” who deemed him unfit to practice law, citing his failure to acknowledge on his applications his multiple arrests and firings over the previous decade. View "Otrompke v. Skolnik" on Justia Law