The Association of American Physicians and Surgeons maintains a website and publishes the Journal of American Physicians and Surgeons, both of which host information concerning “important medical, economic, and legal issues about vaccines,” The Association, joined by an individual, sued a Member of Congress (Schiff) who wrote to several technology and social media companies before and during the COVID-19 pandemic expressing concern about vaccine-related misinformation on their platforms and inquiring about the companies’ policies for handling such misinformation. The Association alleged that the inquiries prompted the technology companies to disfavor and deprioritize its vaccine content, thereby reducing traffic to its web page and making the information more difficult to access.The D.C. Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the complaint for lack of Article III standing. The Association has not plausibly alleged injury-in-fact; it maintains that Schiff’s actions interfered with its “free negotiations” with the technology companies but never alleged that it has made any attempts at such negotiations, nor that it has concrete plans to do so in the future. The Association’s other claimed injuries, to its financial prospects and to its speech and associational interests, are not adequately supported by allegations that any injury is “fairly traceable” to Schiff’s actions. View "Association of American Physicians & Surgeons, Inc. v. Schiff" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted a writ of mandamus sought by The Cincinnati Enquirer, a Division of Gannett GP Media, Inc., and directed at two judges of the Kentucky Court of Appeals who presided over separate trials in which the Enquirer was denied leave to intervene, holding that the Court of Appeals erred.These matters concerned constitutional challenges to Casey's Law, Ky. Rev. Stat. 222.430. Because all proceedings in such actions are confidential and not open to the general public the Court of Appeals entered orders in each action directing the record to remain confidential and restricting access to the Court. The Enquirer moved to intervene in each action to obtain access in order to court records. Intervention was denied. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Court of Appeals erroneously denied access to the record. View "Cincinnati Enquirer v. Honorable Dixon" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the trial court in favor of Hamilton Southeastern Schools (HSE) and dismissing WTHR-TV's complaint seeking documents in a HSE employee's personnel file, holding that HSE's factual basis for the employee's discipline was insufficient.Rick Wimmer, a teacher at an HSE high school, was disciplined for an unknown reason. WTHR requested access to and copies of the portions of Wimmer's personnel file that contained disclosable information under Ind. Code 5-14-3-4(b)(8), which requires public agencies to disclose certain information in public employee personnel files, including the "factual basis" for the disciplinary actions. HSE responded by providing a compilation of the requested information but did not provide copies of the underlying documents in the personnel file. WTHR sued, and the trial court ruled for HSE. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part, holding (1) WTHR was not entitled to the underlying documents because an agency may compiled the required information into a new document; and (2) a "factual basis" must be a fact-based account of what caused the discipline instead of a bald conclusion, which is what HSE provided in this case. View "WTHR-TV v. Hamilton Southeastern Schools" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit concluded that an unsolicited faxed invitation to participate in a market research survey in exchange for money does not constitute an "unsolicited advertisement" under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's order granting Focus Forward's motion to dismiss plaintiff's complaint. The court reviewed all of the remaining arguments raised by plaintiff on appeal and found them to be without merit. View "Bruce Katz, M.D., P.C., v. Focus Forward, LLC" on Justia Law

The First Circuit held that a Maine statute requiring cable operators to grant subscribers pro rata credits or rebates for the days remaining in the billing period after the termination of cable service is not preempted by the Cable Communications Act of 1984 (Cable Act).The Cable Act preempts stat laws that regulate rates for the provision of cable service if the Federal Communications Commission determines that cable operators in that state are subject to effective competition. See 42 U.S.C. 543(a)(2), 556(c). In 2020, Maine, a state that has effective competition, adopted into law the statute at issue in this case, the Pro Rata Act. Plaintiffs filed suit requesting a declaratory judgment that the law was preempted by the Cable Act. The district court concluded that the Pro Rata Act was preempted by the Cable Act as a matter of law. The First Circuit reversed, holding that Maine's Pro Rata Act is not preempted by federal law because it is not a law governing rates for the provision of cable service and is, rather, a consumer protection law that is not preempted. View "Spectrum Northeast, LLC v. Frey" on Justia Law

In 2020, the FCC opened the 6 gigahertz (GHz) band of radiofrequency spectrum to unlicensed devices—routers and the devices they connect to, such as smartphones, laptops, and tablets. In doing so, the Commission required that such unlicensed devices be designed and operated to prevent harmful interference with licensees now using the 6 GHz band. Licensees, emphasizing that existing uses of the band involve vital public safety and critical infrastructure, argue that harmful interference could nonetheless occur and that the Order therefore runs afoul of both the Communications Act of 1934 and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).The DC Circuit concluded that petitioners have failed to provide a basis for questioning the Commission's conclusion that the Order will protect against a significant risk of harmful interference, just the kind of highly technical determination to which the court owed considerable deference. Therefore, the court denied the petitions for review in all respects except one that is related to the petition brought by licensed radio and television broadcasters using the 6 GHz band. The court concluded that the Commission failed adequately to respond to their request that it reserve a sliver of that band exclusively for mobile licensees and thus remanded for further explanation as to that issue. View "AT&T Services, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission" on Justia Law

Alexander Hood, a Colorado resident, appealed the dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction of his putative class-action claim against American Auto Care (AAC) in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado. AAC, a Florida limited liability company whose sole office was in Florida, sold vehicle service contracts that provided vehicle owners with extended warranties after the manufacturer’s warranty expires. Hood’s complaint alleged AAC violated the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA) and invaded Hood’s and the putative class members’ privacy by directing unwanted automated calls to their cell phones without consent. Although he was then residing in Colorado, the calls came from numbers with a Vermont area code. He had previously lived in Vermont, and his cell phone number had a Vermont area code. Hood was able to trace one such call to AAC. Although it determined that Hood had alleged sufficient facts to establish that AAC purposefully directs telemarketing at Colorado, the trial court held that the call to Hood’s Vermont phone number did not arise out of, or relate to, AAC’s calls to Colorado phone numbers. In light of Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Judicial District Court, 141 S. Ct. 1017 (2021), the Tenth Circuit determined the trial court's dismissal could not stand. "The argument regarding 'purposeful direction' ... is implicitly rejected by Ford, and the argument regarding 'arise out of or relate to' ... is explicitly rejected. ... We also determine that AAC has not shown a violation of traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." View "Hood v. American Auto Care, et al." on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal for want of jurisdiction of plaintiff's action against HuffPost, alleging that it libeled him by calling him a white nationalist and a Holocaust denier. Plaintiff filed suit against HuffPost in the Southern District of Texas, but HuffPost is a citizen of Delaware and New York. Furthermore, HuffPost has no physical ties to Texas, has no office in Texas, employs no one in Texas, and owns no property there. In this case, plaintiff identifies only one link to Texas that relates to the dispute: the fact that HuffPost's website and the alleged libel are visible in Texas. The court stated that mere accessibility cannot demonstrate purposeful availment. The court explained that although HuffPost's site shows ads and sells merchandise, neither act targets Texas specifically. Even if those acts did target Texas, the court concluded that neither relates to plaintiff's claim, and thus neither supports specific jurisdiction. Finally, plaintiff has not met his burden to merit jurisdictional discovery. View "Johnson v. TheHuffingtonpost.com, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the district court applying the catalyst theory in denying Plaintiff's request for attorney fees in this public records dispute, holding that the district court misconstrued one of the factors in the catalyst-theory analysis and neglected to conduct more than a summary analysis of several other factors.Plaintiff submitted a public records request to the City of Henderson under the Nevada Public Records Act (NPRA) for certain documents. When the City requested a payment from Plaintiff to cover the cost of a review of the documents for privilege Plaintiff sought mandamus relief. Thereafter, the City reviewed the documents for privilege and provided to Plaintiff copies of non-privileged records while the privilege-review fee issue was being litigated. The district court concluded that the City satisfied its requirements under the NPRA. The Supreme Court remanded the case, but before the issue was addressed on remand, the City voluntarily disclosed eleven documents it had withheld pursuant to the deliberative-process privilege. At issue was whether Plaintiff was entitled to recovery of attorneys fees as the prevailing party under the catalyst theory. The district court denied attorney fees. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court abused its discretion in applying the catalyst theory. View "Las Vegas Review-Journal v. City of Henderson" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the circuit court ordering certain messages to be released because they constituted "public records" pursuant to the Arkansas Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), Ark. Code Ann. 25-19-101 et seq., holding that the circuit court clearly erred.While Mark Myers was employed as director of the Department of Information Systems (DIS) and Jane Doe was employed by a company that did business with DIS the two developed an intimate personal relationship. After legislative audit disclosed that Myers was under investigation for improperly authorizing $8.2 million for the purchase of equipment from a vendor represented by Doe, the Arkansas Democrat-Gazette, Inc. submitted its FOIA request seeking correpondence between Myers and any representatives of Cisco Systems. Myers filed suit seeking a temporary restraining order to prevent the Secretary of Transportation and Shared Services from releasing Blackberry Messenger between Myers and Doe. The circuit court concluded that the messages were public records and that the public had a right to their content. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court clearly erred by not determining whether each individual message met the definition of a "public record." View "Myers v. Fecher" on Justia Law