A California local exchange carrier ("LEC") filed a complaint with the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC") alleging a violation of 47 C.F.R. 20.11(b) when the LEC unilaterally set a rate and began billing petitioner, a provider of commercial mobile radio services ("CMRS") in California, for the cost of terminating its traffic. At issue was whether the FCC erred in allowing a state agency to determine the rate for traffic that was wholly intrastate pursuant to section 20.11(b). The court held that the FCC's policy of allowing state agencies to set such rates was consistent with the dual regulatory scheme assumed in the Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. 151, which granted the FCC authority over interstate communications but reserved wholly intrastate matters for the states.

Plaintiffs, and its wholly owned subsidiary, proposed to split off as a new publicly traded company ("SplitCo") the businesses, assets, and liabilities attributed to plaintiffs' Capital Group and Starz Group (the "Capital Splitoff"). At issue was whether plaintiffs pursued a "disaggregation strategy" designed to remove assets from the corporate structure against which the bondholders had claims and shifted the assets into the hands of plaintiffs' stockholders. The court held that plaintiffs were entitled to judgment declaring that the Capital Splitoff, as currently structured, complied with the Successor Obligor Provision in an indenture dated July 7, 1999 and therefore, plaintiffs were entitled to a declaration that the Capital Splitoff did not violate the Successor Obligor Provision.

Plaintiff filed suit against defendants, Wayne Hagan and James Joubert, alleging that Joubert was negligently excavating on a backhoe and severed plaintiff's underground fiber-optic cable in violation of the Louisiana Damage Prevention Act, LA. REV. STAT. ANN 40:1749,11 et seq., and that Hagan was vicariously liable because Joubert was acting as his agent at the time. At issue was whether the district court erred when it refused to give the jury plaintiff's proposed instruction on trespass. Also at issue was whether the district court erred when it excluded statements made by Hagan's attorney to plaintiff's employee under Federal Rule of Evidence 408; when it refused to certify plaintiff's witness as an expert; and when it held that defendants were entitled to attorneys' fees and costs. The court certified the first issue where the Louisiana Supreme Court had not previously determined what standard of intent was used for trespass to underground utility cables and the issue was determinative of whether plaintiff was entitled to a new trial on its trespass claim. The court held that the statements made by Hagan's attorney to plaintiff's employer could have been excluded on other grounds given that it was inadmissible hearsay against Joubert and therefore, the court declined to remand for a new trial on this ground. The court also held that the district court did not commit a reversible error where plaintiff did not proffer the substance of plaintiff's witness' excluded testimony. Finally, the court deferred addressing the attorneys' fees issue pending the Louisiana Supreme Court's decision on the first issue.

The company is being sued for sending commercial fax messages without consent from the recipients in violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. 227(b). Its insurers deny that coverage for "making known to any person or organization covered material that violates a personâs right of privacy" extends to liability under the Act. The First Circuit applied Massachusetts law and reversed the district court's declaratory judgment in favor of the insured company. The policy covers disclosure, not intrusion into privacy described by the Act.

U.S. South Communications, Inc. ("U.S.South"), an issuer of prepaid calling cards, appealed from the judgment entered against it and in favor of GCB Communications, Inc. and Lake Country Communications, Inc. (collectively "GCB"), a payphone service provider ("PSP"), where the district court held that U.S. South owed GCB dial-around compensation for disputed calls "regardless of whether the proper Flex-ANI digits were transmitted." After addressing threshold issues, the court determined that the issue was whether U.S. South was required to pay GCB for completed coinless payphone calls, dial-around calls, if U.S. South did not receive coding digits that would identify the calls as GCB payphone calls. The court concluded that GCB, through its local exchange carrier ("LEC"), must assure that the Flex-ANI was transmitted in the system. Therefore, because the district court did not make findings on this issue because it did not deem it relevant, the question of whether the Flex-ANI codes for the disputed calls were sent into the system by GCB and its LEC must be decided. Accordingly, the court vacated the judgment and remanded for further proceedings.

Defendant was convicted of five electronic communications offenses when she began an anonymous electronic campaign of harassment against a former romantic partner. Defendant challenged her convictions and sentence on numerous grounds. The court held that the felony convictions of Count 2 and Count 4 must be vacated and reduced to misdemeanors where both Counts created a merger problem which implicated double jeopardy principles and where the indictment failed to establish any crime in Count 4. The court also held that there was sufficient evidence to convict defendant on Count 1 and Count 6 where the record showed that she conspired unlawfully to access computers and electronic storage facilities containing unopened e-mails for the purpose of accessing other computers and harassing, annoying, and harming the victim and his family and where the illegal access to voicemail facilitated the harassing telephone calls by supplying the ammunition that made the calls harassing and threatening. The court rejected defendant's claim that her Sixth Amendment rights were violated where the district court granted her request to represent herself. The court further rejected defendant's remaining sentencing arguments and affirmed the judgment of the district court. Finally, in light of Count 2 and Count 4, the court vacated defendant's sentence and remanded for resentencing.

The former mayor of Seven Hills, Ohio sued for defamation, based on publication of a statement that he "routinely tries to pull off stunts like limiting residentsâ feedback at meetings and barring government employees from running for officeâ and an article that, he claimed, falsely implied that he sought personal information about constituents, including young women, for illicit purposes. The court denied an extension, struck the complaint for failure to prosecute, and entered summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that the articles constituted protected opinion, as a matter of law. The article concerning the mayor's letter to young residents does not expressly state or clearly imply illicit motive. The statement about limiting feedback appears to be a statement of objective, verifiable fact, but in the context of an article that contains statements like âpolitical IQ of Quiznosâ lettuce,â it would be unreasonable to read it as impartial reporting. The court did not abuse its discretion in imposing a sanction for failure to prosecute.

The city amended its code to prohibit sexually-oriented businesses in downtown and planned development districts and later published notice of intent to prohibit such uses in a development authority district and imposed a temporary ban on issuance of new licenses. While the ban was in place, the owner sought permission to operate a topless bar in the area. The ordinance requires the clerk to act within 20 days; the clerk rejected the application after 24 days. The amendment prohibiting the use was enacted about two weeks later. The district court rejected the owner's civil rights claims (42 U.S.C. 1983) on summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The city's evidence showed that the ordinance was narrowly tailored to deal with secondary effects, blight and deterioration of property values, and leaves open reasonable opportunity to operate an adult business. Even if only 27 sites are available, rather than 39 as the district court concluded, the number is adequate in a city that had only two applications in five years. The 24-day decision period did not amount to an unconstitutional prior restraint; prompt judicial review was available.

Appellant, a shareholder and former chief executive officer of Tama Broadcasting, Inc. ("Tama"), filed an application for review with the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC") challenging the FCC Media Bureau's approval of the assignment applications made by Tama's receiver after a judicial foreclosure action was brought against Tama. At issue was whether appellant had standing under Article III to file an application for review. The court held that appellant lacked standing where his injuries could not be traced to the FCC's approval of the license assignments and where the alleged injuries were caused by Tama's default on its loan payments, the foreclosure action against Tama, and the New York court's appointment of a receiver.