The school board has a policy of praying at its regular meetings, routinely attended by students. The district court upheld the policy, based on a Supreme Court holding that Nebraska's practice of opening legislative sessions with a prayer was not a violation of the Establishment Clause. The Third Circuit reversed, holding that a school board may not claim the exception established for legislative bodies and that traditional Establishment Clause principles governing prayer in public schools apply. View "Doe v. Indian River Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs a pro-life, non-profit corporation engaged in anti-abortion activities, including publicity campaigns, and an individual, challenged government policies that, they allege, target individuals defendants deem to be "rightwing extremists" for disfavored treatment. The district court dismissed claims under the First and Fifth Amendments. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, noting that despite many conclusory and irrelevant allegations, plaintiffs did not identify any policy aimed at their constitutionally-protected rights. Plaintiffs did not address affirmative conduct undertaken by defendants, did not allege any time, place, or manner restrictions imposed on speech, did not allege that they were taxed or punished for First Amendment activities, did not allege any prior restraint on protected, and did not allege any form of retaliation for exercise of protected speech on identified occasions. There was no plausible evidence of disparate treatment View "Center for Bio-Ethical Reform, Inc. v. Napolitano" on Justia Law

The company fired a worker, claiming poor performance and misconduct; the union claimed that the termination was based on union support and filed an NLRB charge. The union also began a campaign against the company that included auto-generated calls and e-mail that clogged the company's systems. The company filed suit under the Federal Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. 1030. The court denied the company's motion for a preliminary injunction, finding that it lacked jurisdiction to enter an injunction under the Norris-LaGuardia Act (29 U.S.C. 101, 104) because the suit involves a labor dispute and the union's attempts to publicize that dispute. The court later dismissed the suit. The Sixth Circuit affirmed with respect to the preliminary injunction, noting that the company had not made "reasonable efforts" to settle the dispute, but remanded the dismissal. The company adequately alleged that the union knowingly caused "transmission" of a program, information, code, or command, and as a result of such conduct, intentionally caused damage without authorization, to a protected computer. The union did not adequately allege an "unauthorized access" claim. View "Pulte Homes, Inc. v. Laborers' Int'l Union" on Justia Law

The school district and chief of police sent an e-mail to officials and citizens instructing them "if you see this person in or around the district schools, please contact the police." Plaintiff claimed that the email used his real name and stated that he had been known to hang around schools, had not approached any kids, and that his mental status was unknown. It contained his picture, home address, the make, model, and license plate number of his vehicle, and his driver's license number. His suit, under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleged deprivation of freedom of movement, illegal seizure of personal records, violation of right to privacy, conspiracy, and failure to train, supervise and discipline agents. The district court denied plaintiff's motion to proceed anonymously and, after a deadline for filing in his own name passed, dismissed. The Third Circuit affirmed. The district court provided two independently sufficient reasons for dismissal: refusal to prosecute in compliance with court orders and consideration of factors concluding that plaintiff would not suffer substantial harm that might sufficiently outweigh the public interest in an open trial. View "Doe v. Megless" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a resident of Los Angeles, filed a class action lawsuit on behalf of himself and similarly situated individuals challenging the city's telephone users tax (TUT) and seeking refund of funds collected under the TUT over the previous two years. At issue was whether the Government Code section 910 allowed taxpayers to file a class action claim against a municipal government entity for the refund of local taxes. The court held that neither Woosley v. State of California, which concerned the interpretation of statutes other than section 910, nor article XIII, section 32 of the California Constitution, applied to the court's determination of whether section 910 permitted class claims that sought the refund of local taxes. Therefore, the court held that the reasoning in City of San Jose v. Superior Court, which permitted a class claim against a municipal government in the context of an action for nuisance under section 910, also permitted taxpayers to file a class claim seeking the refund of local taxes under the same statute. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded the judgment of the Court of Appeals. View "Ardon v. City of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

Inmates filed a class action lawsuit claiming that the Indiana Department of Corrections violated their First Amendment Rights by prohibiting them from advertising for pen-pals and receiving materials from websites and publications that allow persons to advertise for pen-pals. The prohibition was enacted in response to an investigation of the link between pen-pal correspondence and inmate fraud. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the IDOC. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The plaintiffs conceded that preventing prisoners from developing relationships with outsiders in order to defraud them by inducing financial contributions is a legitimate governmental objective. The prohibitions are reasonably related to that objective; viable alternative means of communication are available. View "Woods v. Comm'r of Ind. Dept. of Corrs." on Justia Law

Defendant, a technology company that sold data centers, appealed the district court's judgment on a jury verdict in favor of plaintiff, a company that purchased defendant's fiber management systems and intelligent fiber systems, in plaintiff's suit for breach of contract and fraudulent inducement. At issue was whether the district court erred in denying its motion for judgment as a matter of law. The court held that because plaintiff failed to present sufficient evidence that defendant had no intent to perform under the "best efforts" provision of the contract and failed to present any evidence of damages on its other claim, the judgment of the district court was reversed and remanded to the district court to enter judgment in favor of defendant. Accordingly, the court did not reach the other issues raised by defendant on appeal. View "Kevin M. Ehringer Enter., Inc. v. McData Serv. Corp." on Justia Law

In a 2004 decision, the Third Circuit affirmed the Federal Communications Commission‘s authority to regulate media ownership but remanded aspects of the Commission‘s 2003 Order that were not adequately supported by the record, including numerical limits for local television ownership, local radio ownership rule, rule on cross-ownership of media within local markets, and repeal of the failed station solicitation rule. A 2008 FCC rule retained radio/television cross-ownership rule, local television and radio ownership rules in existence prior to the 2003 order, a failed station solicitation rule, and set out a series of other measures to address broadcast ownership diversity, in a separate order. The Third Circuit affirmed the order, excepting the newspaper/broadcast cross-ownership rule, for which the Commission failed to meet the notice and comment requirements of the APA, and remanded provisions of the diversity ordered that relied on a revenue-based "eligible entity" definition. The court also remanded the FCC decision to defer consideration of other proposed definitions (such as for a socially and economically disadvantaged business), so that it may adequately justify or modify its approach to advancing broadcast ownership by minorities and women. View "Prometheus Radio Project v. Fed.Commc'n Comm'n" on Justia Law

This action stemmed from the Federal Communications Commission's ("FCC") "ISP Remand Order", which imposed a new compensation regime for ISP-bound traffic, i.e., internet service provider-bound traffic. Plaintiff, which was a competitive local exchange carrier ("CLEC"), maintained that the ISP Remand Order applied when the carrier originating the call and the carrier terminating the call were both CLECs. Defendant and the California Public Utilities Commission ("CPUC") contended that the ISP Remand Order's compensation regime applied only to traffic between a CLEC and an incumbent local exchange carrier ("ILEC"). CPUC agreed with defendant's limited reading of the reach of the compensation regime, finding it inapplicable to the ISP-bound traffic originating with plaintiff and terminated by defendant, and so it assessed against plaintiff charges consistent with defendant's state-filed tariff. Plaintiff then sued defendant and the CPUC in federal district court, alleging that the ISP Remand Order preempted their attempts to assess plaintiff charges for ISP-bound traffic based on state-filed tariffs. The district court granted summary judgment to defendant and CPUC, agreeing with their argument that the ISP Remand Order did not apply to CLEC-CLEC traffic. The court agreed with plaintiff and with the analysis contained in an amicus brief filed upon its request by the FCC, that the ISP Remand Order's compensation regime applied to ISP-bound traffic exchanged between two CLECs. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment. View "AT&T Communications of CA, Inc., et al. v. Pac-West Telecomm, Inc., et al." on Justia Law

In 2006 the photographer took a picture of radio personalities for use in a magazine. An employee of the radio station scanned the picture, cutting off credit lines, and posted it on the internet. After the photographer's attorney contacted the station, the personalities made disparaging remarks about the photographer on the air. The photographer alleged violations of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. 1201, the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. 101, and defamation under New Jersey law. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The Sixth Circuit reversed. A cause of action under the DMCA may arise whenever the types of information listed in the statute and conveyed in connection with copies of a work, including in digital form, is falsified or removed, regardless of the form in which that information is conveyed. The fact that the photographer's name appeared in a printed gutter credit near the image rather than in an "automated copyright protection or management system" does not remove it from the protection of the Act. The trial court erred in finding "fair use" in the station's commercial use of a commercial photographer's copyrighted image. The photographer was given inadequate opportunity for discovery on the defamation claim. View "Murphy v. Millennium Radio Grp" on Justia Law