Plaintiffs provide in-home care through Medicaid-waiver programs run by the Illinois Department of Human Services; some work through a Rehabilitation Program and others through a Disabilities Program. In 2003, the Illinois Public Labor Relations Act was amended to designate personal care attendants and personal assistants working under the Home Services Program as state employees for purposes of collective bargaining. 20 ILCS 2405/3. Rehabilitation Program assistants designated a union, which negotiated an agreement that includes a "fair share" provision, requiring assistants who are not members to pay their proportionate share of costs of collective bargaining. Disabilities Program assistants voted against unionization. Rehabilitation Program plaintiffs claim that fair share fees violate the First Amendment by compelling association with, and speech through, the union. Disabilities Program plaintiffs argue that they are harmed by the threat of fair share fees. The district court dismissed both. The Seventh Circuit affirmed and remanded for dismissal of the Disabilities plaintiffs' case without prejudice because it was unripe. Because of the significant control the state exercises over all aspects of personal assistants' jobs, the assistants are employees of the state. The state's interests in collective bargaining are such that fair share fees withstand First Amendment scrutiny in a facial challenge to the imposition of the fees. View "Harris v. Quinn" on Justia Law

Plaintiff claimed that defendants placed 33 unsolicited telemarketing calls to his home over a three-month period in 2008, in violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. 227, and the Ohio Consumer Sales Practices Act, Ohio Rev. Code Ann. 1345.02. Thirty calls were made after he asked to be put on defendant's do-not-call registry. He also alleged invasion of privacy. The district court dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The Sixth Circuit reversed. Federal courts have federal-question jurisdiction over private TCPA and plaintiff alleged damages exceeding $75,000, as required for diversity jurisdiction over state-law claims. View "Charvat v. NMP, LLC," on Justia Law

Plaintiff Qwest Corporation (Qwest) and Defendants Colorado Public Utilities Commission (CPUC), individual commissioners, and Cbeyond Communications, LLC (Cbeyond) (together, defendants), cross-appealed the district court’s decision construing 47 C.F.R. 51.5, a Federal Communications Commission (FCC) regulation relating to local telephone service providers. In order to facilitate competition in the local telephone service market, federal law requires incumbent local exchange carriers (ILECs), such as Qwest, to lease certain parts of their telecommunications networks to competitive local exchange carriers (CLECs), such as Cbeyond. ILECs are relieved of this obligation if, among other circumstances, the number of “business lines” in a local exchange reaches a certain threshold because, in the FCC’s view, a sufficient number of business lines shows that it would be economic for CLECs to invest in their own infrastructure. The term “business line” and the method of counting business lines are defined in the regulation. The parties disagree as to which types of a particular network element—UNE loops—are included in the business line count. The district court held that UNE loops serving non-business customers are included in the business line count and that non-switched UNE loops are not included in the business line count. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the portion of the district court ruling that the business line count includes nonbusiness UNE loops; the Court reversed the district court's decision that the business line count does not include non-switched UNE loops. View "Qwest Corporation v. Colorado Public Utilities Comm, et al" on Justia Law

A regional television personality was discharged from his employment with Comcast Network after he publicly protested the selection of political commentator Bill O'Reilly for a prestigious broadcasting award. He filed a claim of speech-motivated retaliation under the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 12, 11H, 11I. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of Comcast. The First Circuit affirmed. Plaintiff's employment agreement permitted Comcast to terminate him for any reason, or no reason at all; termination, or threatened termination, of an employee under such a contract is not coercive in the relevant sense under the MCRA. View "Nolan v. CN8" on Justia Law

This case was remanded from the U.S. Supreme Court. Appellants Keith Litman and Robert Watchel asked the Third Circuit to reverse a district court order that compelled them to arbitrate their contract dispute with Cellco Partnership (d/b/a Verizon Wireless) on an individual rather than class-wide basis. In an unpublished opinion, the Third Circuit vacated the district court order because a recent Third Circuit precedent bound the Court to conclude that class arbitration should have been available to Appellants. Verizon responded by seeking a stay of the mandate and seeking review by the Supreme Court. Having reviewed the supplemental briefing and applicable legal authority, the Third Circuit concluded that the applicable law at issue that required the availability of classwide arbitration created a scheme inconsistent with the Federal Arbitration Act. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the district court’s order compelling individual arbitration in accordance with the terms of the individual Appellants’ contracts with Verizon. View "Litman v. Cellco Partnership" on Justia Law

As the governing body for middle and high school athletic programs, WIAA sponsors post-season tournaments. In 2005, WIAA gave a video production company exclusive rights to stream nearly all tournament events online; if the company elects not to stream a game, other broadcasters may do so after obtaining permission and paying a fee. The contract does not prohibit media coverage, photography, or interviews before or after games. Private media may also broadcast up to two minutes of a game, or write or blog about it, so long as they do not engage in "play-by-play." Defendant newspapers decided to stream four WIAA tournament games without obtaining consent or paying the fee. The district court entered declaratory judgment in favor of WIAA. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Streaming or broadcasting an event is not the same thing as reporting on or describing it. The court noted the distinction between state-as-regulator and state-as- proprietor, and that tournament games are a performance product of WIAA that it has the right to control. View "WI Interscholastic Athletic Assoc. v. Gannett Co., Inc., " on Justia Law

Plaintiff claims that defendants are billing aggregators engaged in "cramming" by placing unauthorized charges on telephone bills, arranged unauthorized charges on plaintiff's telephone bill, and were responsible for unauthorized charges on the telephone bills of more than one million Indiana telephone numbers. Defendants produced evidence that plaintiff actually ordered the services in question. Plaintiff argued that the service was not legally authorized if defendants did not possess all customer authorization documentation required by the Indiana anti-cramming regulation, 170 IAC 7-1.1-19(p). That law does not provide a private right of action, but plaintiff argued that defendants' failure to comply proved unjust enrichment and provided a basis for suit under Indiana's Deceptive Commercial Solicitation Act, Ind. Code 24-5-19-9. The district court denied class certification and granted defendants' motions for summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The anti-cramming regulation does not apply to these defendants, which are not telephone companies and did not act in this case as billing agents for telephone companies. There was no unjust enrichment and the DCSA does not apply; plaintiff ordered and received services. Common issues do not predominate over individual issues, as required for a class under FRCP 23(b)(3). View "Lady Di's Inc. v. Enhanced Servs. Billing, Inc." on Justia Law

National Organization for Marriage challenged the constitutionality of Maine election laws (Me.Rev.Stat. title 21A sec. 1052) as overbroad under the First Amendment and so vague in its terms, particularly with respect to the phrase "for the purpose of influencing," as to violate due process. The laws govern registration of political action committees and reporting of independent expenditures. The district court upheld the law. The First Circuit affirmed, first holding that the organization had standing. The record showed that its fears were objectively reasonable and led to self-censorship. With respect to the overbreadth claim, the court rejected an argument based on the distinction between issue discussion and express advocacy, characterizing the distinction as irrelevant and applying the "exacting scrutiny" standard because the law does not prohibit, limit, or impose any onerous burdens on speech, but merely requires maintenance and disclosure of certain financial information. There is a "substantial relation" between Maine's informational interest and each of the laws at issue. The terms "promoting," "support," "opposition," "influencing," "expressly advocate" and "initiation" are sufficiently clear. View "Nat'l Org. For Marriage v. Adam" on Justia Law

National Organization for Marriage challenged the constitutionality of Rhode Island election laws as overbroad under the First Amendment and so vague in its terms as to violate due process. The laws govern registration of political action committees, contributions to and expenditures on behalf of candidates, and reporting of independent expenditures. The organization claimed that it would refrain from certain political activities if required to register as a PAC, but would comply with independent expenditures under protest. After receiving assurances that the organization could engage in its planned speech without registering as a PAC, the district court denied a preliminary injunction, noting the minimal burden imposed by the law and the valuable governmental interest underlying it. The First Circuit affirmed, finding that the organization had not demonstrated likelihood of success on the merits. View "Nat'l Org. For Marriag v. Daluz" on Justia Law

Unlike many states, Pennsylvania allows felons to vote immediately upon release from prison. To correct widespread misunderstanding, public-interest organizations planned an advertisement encouraging ex-prisoners to vote. The Port Authority denied a request to place the ad on buses, based on a written policy, prohibiting noncommercial ads. Evidence indicated that, despite the policy, the Authority had accepted many noncommercial ads in recent years. The district court found viewpoint discrimination in violation of the First Amendment. The Third Circuit affirmed, noting that the rejection was based on hostility to the ad's message and that the Authority is not now required to accept all noncommercial messages. View "Pittsburgh League of Young Voters Ed. Fund v. Port Auth Allegheny Cnty." on Justia Law