Defendant, convicted of interstate stalking, cyberstalking, and mailing a threatening communication (18 U.S.C. 2261A(1)-(2), 876(c)), based on communications with his estranged wife and minor child, was sentenced to 137 months. The First Circuit affirmed. The district court acted within its discretion in denying a change of venue or transfer. There was sufficient evidence to support the convictions. Defendant waived challenge to the indictment under FRCP 12(e); he did not show good cause for failing to raise the challenge before trial. The court acted within its discretion in allowing evidence of prior bad acts and imposing the sentence. View "United States v. Walker" on Justia Law

Indiana University had an Instructional Television Fixed Service license, issued by the FCC, that authorized broadcast on specified frequencies. A not-for-profit ITFS licensee can lease unused frequencies to a for-profit entity. The university was contemplating assigning frequencies to PBS, but before it did, PBS quitclaimed its rights to the debtor. Thinking that the transfer was final, debtor modified equipment at a cost of $350,000. The bankruptcy trustee filed a claim against the university, contending that it had promised PBS the license, that debtor had reasonably relied on the promise, and that the doctrine of promissory estoppel entitled debtor to damages of $116,000. The claim settled for $100,000. Because the settlement left the estate with insufficient assets to pay unsecured creditors, a creditor challenged it. The bankruptcy court, district court, and Seventh Circuit affirmed. The trustee decided that pursuing a claim for the license was hopeless and made a reasonable decision. View "In re: Fort Wayne Telsat, Inc." on Justia Law

The district court certified a class in a suit under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (as amended by the Junk Fax Prevention Act of 2005), 47 U.S.C. 227. The Seventh Circuit vacated and remanded for the court re-evaluate the gravity of class counsel’s misconduct and its implications for the likelihood that class counsel will adequately represent the class. The district court concluded that "only the most egregious misconduct" by the law firm representing the class "could ever arguably justify denial of class status." The court must weigh the firm's misleading statements and the risk that the firm is in this case purely for itself and not for the benefits that the suit if successful might confer on the class. View "Creative Montessori Learning Centers v. Ashford Gear LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was banned from the senior center because she repeatedly violated the code of conduct by yelling, making threats, and making frivolous complaints to police. She sued the city under 42 U.S.C. 1983 claiming violation of free-speech and due-process rights and that the code is facially unconstitutional. A magistrate judge granted summary judgment for the city. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that the director and board of the center are not final policymakers for purposes of enforcing the code of conduct. Under state and local law, plaintiff could ask the city council to overturn the expulsion. She had been informed of her right to appeal and failure to do so precludes municipal liability to the extent that claimed constitutional violations stem from the ban. The court stated that it was not imposing a requirement of exhaustion of administrative remedies under Section 1983, but recognizing the council's role as policymaker. The board has authority to make rules for the center, so the code of conduct itself is city policy. The court rejected a facial challenge to the code, which consists of reasonable "time, place, or manner" restrictions and is neither unconstitutionally vague nor overbroad. View "Milestone v. City of Monroe" on Justia Law

In 2005, Appellant CCCOK, Inc. filed a complaint at the Oklahoma Corporation Commission (OCC) against Southwestern Bell Telephone, L.P.(SWBT). CCCOK sought an order directing SWBT to pay it over two-million dollars in compensation for SWBT's alleged breach of a contract between them. The OCC rejected CCCOK’s claim, concluding that CCCOK was not entitled to compensation under the "clear and unambiguous" language of the Parties' contract. The federal district court affirmed the OCC's ruling. CCCOK appealed. On appeal, CCCOK contended that the OCC's ruling was arbitrary and capricious because it: (1) disregarded the terms of the parties' contract; (2) contradicted record evidence; and (3) violated CCCOK's rights under state and federal law. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit concluded that the OCC's ruling was not arbitrary and capricious and it affirmed the district court's decision. View "CCCOK Inc. v. Southwestern Bell, et al" on Justia Law

This case involved the FCC's Universal Service Program, which provided subsidies to ensure that low-income consumers, schools, health care providers, and libraries have access to advanced telecommunications services and that rates and services in rural areas were "reasonably comparable" to rates and services in urban areas pursuant to the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. 254. At issue was the FCC's order declining to increase subsidies under the rural rates and services component of the Universal Services Program. Here, the FCC explained that "reasonable comparability" between rural and urban areas had been largely accomplished and that expansion of the high-cost support fund would "jeopardize other statutory mandates," such as extending services to schools, hospitals, and libraries, and "ensuring affordable rates in all parts of the country." Because of this, and because the FCC had promised to address state-specific issues, like those presented by Vermont and Maine, through the waiver process, its decision to leave the high-cost support mechanism unchanged was neither arbitrary nor capricious. Thus, the court denied the petition for review. View "Vermont Public Service Board, et al. v. FCC, et al." on Justia Law

Petitioner appealed a licensing order of the FCC affirming a decision of the Wireless Bureau denying reconsideration of licensing actions taken by the Wireless Bureau's Mobility Division. The Mobility Division granted Thomas Kurian's request to withdraw a radio spectrum assignment application and dismissed petitioner's notification of consummation of that same assignment. Petitioner argued that the FCC's order should be reversed because the FCC and Kurian engaged in unlawful ex parte communications; the FCC failed to give proper public notice of its decisions to grant Kurian's withdrawal request; and the FCC acted arbitrarily and capriciously in rendering the order. The court held that petitioner waived its ex parte and public notice arguments, and the FCC acted neither arbitrarily nor capriciously in rendering its order affirming the Wireless Bureau's order. View "Environmentel, LLC v. FCC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. 227, seeking to enjoin defendant from sending unsolicited text messages to cellphone users and damages. He estimated that more than 1,000 people had received these messages and requested damages fixed by the Act, $500 for each violation. The court could award three times that amount, up to $1,500 for each violation, if it determined that defendant acted "willfully and knowingly." Within a month, defendant sent a letter offering to settle the case by giving plaintiff and up to 10 other affected people $1,500 for each text message received, plus court costs, and offering to stop sending unsolicited text messages to mobile subscribers. Plaintiff did not respond. The district court dismissed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the offer mooted the claim. To allow a case, not certified as a class action and with no motion for class certification even pending, to continue in federal court when the sole plaintiff no longer maintains a personal stake would defy the limits on federal jurisdiction. View "Damasco v. Clearwire Corp." on Justia Law

PRTC, telecommunications local exchange carrier under the jurisdiction of the Telecommunications Regulatory Board of Puerto Rico and the FCC, entered into an interconnection agreement with Sprint. In a dispute concerning compensation, the Board held that under the agreement''s change-of-law provision PRTC and Sprint were to reciprocally compensate each other for internet-service-provider bound traffic in accordance with an interim compensation order set forth by the FCC in its ISP Remand Order. The Board dismissed Sprint's claim that PRTC had overcharged for termination of transit traffic. The district court upheld the Board. The First Circuit reversed in part. The ISP Remand Order did not alter existing contractual obligations and, therefore, did not trigger the change-of-law provision. The court affirmed dismissal of the overbilling claim. View "PR Tel. Co., Inc. v. Sprintcom, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2003, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) sought a preliminary injunction against ClearOne Communications, Inc. based on suspicions of irregular accounting practices and securities law violations. During a hearing on the preliminary injunction, Defendant and former CEO Susie Strohm was asked if she was involved in a particular sale by ClearOne that was the focus of the SEC’s case. She said she was not and approximated that she learned of the sale either before or after the end of ClearOne’s fiscal year. Based on this testimony, Defendant was later convicted of one count of perjury. She argued on appeal to the Tenth Circuit that her conviction should be reversed because (1) the questioning at issue was ambiguous, (2) her testimony was literally true, and (3) even if false, her testimony was not material to the court’s decision to grant the preliminary injunction. The Tenth Circuit disagreed on all three points. The Court found the questions were not ambiguous and there was sufficient evidence to demonstrate Defendant knowingly made false statements. Also, Defendant's testimony was material to the preliminary injunction hearing because it related to a transaction the SEC believed demonstrated ClearOne’s accounting irregularities. The Court therefore affirmed Defendant's conviction. View "United States v. Strohm" on Justia Law