
Justia
Justia Communications Law Opinion Summaries
Hepting, et al. v. AT&T Corp., et al.
These consolidated appeals arose from claims that major telecommunications carriers assisted the government with intelligence gathering following the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. Plaintiffs challenged the legality of the telecommunications companies' participation in the surveillance program. At issue was the constitutionality of section 802 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), 50 U.S.C. 1885a, which allowed for immunity for the telecommunications companies. The court concluded that the statute was constitutional and did not violate Articles I and III of the Constitution or the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Accordingly, the district court's grant of the government's motion to dismiss was affirmed as to the challenged section 802 claims. View "Hepting, et al. v. AT&T Corp., et al." on Justia Law
Johnson v. City of Philadelphia
The ordinance prohibits posting signs on utility poles, streetlights, sign posts, and trees in a public right-of-way. At the time their actions were brought, plaintiffs were both candidates for political office in an area of the city that contains "a classic urban landscape of row house neighborhoods, where most homes have no front yard." They claimed that, given their limited funds, they would have ordinarily relied heavily on signs posted on street poles to spread their political messages. Several political candidates received numerous tickets. The district court ruled in favor of the city. The Third Circuit affirmed, rejecting claims that the ordinance violated the First, Fourteenth, and Twenty-Fourth Amendments. Plaintiffs conceded that the ordinance is content-neutral. It is narrowly tailored to serve significant governmental interests and leaves open ample alternatives for communication. View "Johnson v. City of Philadelphia" on Justia Law
Vergara v. Hyde
In 2002 the city amended its ordinance to allow police to impound vehicles and impose a $500 fine on persons driving without a valid license or proof of insurance. The ordinance generated protests that it applied more harshly against minorities. The city had an outdoor assembly ordinance, requiring written application for a permit 20 days in advance, and providing discretion to require the event organizer to pay a cash deposit as a condition of permit issuance. In addition to enforcing the permit ordinance, city officials barred one protestor from speaking at a city council meeting concerning the towing ordinance. Plaintiffs sued the city, its mayor, and its police chief under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging violations of their First Amendment rights of free speech, of assembly, and to petition government for redress of grievances. The district court denied the mayor and police chief's claims of qualified immunity as to the First Amendment claims. The Seventh Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. The mayor barred anything and everything one of the protestors proposed to say at a public meeting, in retaliation for the protestor's prior statements. Other claims of immunity require resolution of factual issues.
View "Vergara v. Hyde" on Justia Law
United States v. Twenty MilJam-350 IED Jammers
Claimant appealed from a judgment of the district court ordering the forfeiture to plaintiff United States, pursuant to 22 U.S.C. 401(a), of certain communication-jamming devices, to wit, the defendant-in-rem Jammers, owned by claimant and a company of which he was the majority shareholder and CEO. On appeal, claimant contended that the district court erred in dismissing his claim, arguing principally that the stipulation he signed was void on the grounds that it was signed under duress and without consideration. The court held that, as a matter of New York law, no consideration for claimant's agreement to the release was needed; and thus, if consideration was absent, its absence did not make the stipulation invalid. The court also held that claimant's assertions did not meet any part of the test of duress. The court further held that the district court correctly granted the government's motion to strike or for summary judgment on the ground of claimant's lack of Article III standing. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed. View "United States v. Twenty MilJam-350 IED Jammers" on Justia Law
Worldnet Telecomm., Inc. v. PR Tel. Co., Inc.
After several failed attempts to establish a voluntary interconnection agreement, the two telecommunications companies went into arbitration with defendant, the Telecommunications Regulatory Board of Puerto Rico. Following a remand, the Board approved a final interconnection agreement pursuant to its authority under the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. 251. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of the Board. The First Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that various provisions were arbitrary. View "Worldnet Telecomm., Inc. v. PR Tel. Co., Inc." on Justia Law
Stepnes v. Ritschel, et al.
A police sergeant arrested plaintiff without a warrant for running a contest which allegedly violated Minnesota gambling laws. The sergeant later obtained a search warrant and seized several items from the house where plaintiff was running the contest. A reporter broadcasted a news story about the contest and plaintiff's arrest on a local CBS television station. Plaintiff subsequently sued the sergeant and the city of Minneapolis under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for civil rights violations for the arrest and search, and the reporter and CBS for defamation. Both sides moved for summary judgment and the district court granted the motion for defendants. The court held that because plaintiff failed to demonstrate that any of the sergeant's actions violated a constitutional right, he could not deprive the sergeant of qualified immunity, and thus summary judgment was appropriate. Summary judgment was also proper as to the city because municipalities could not be held liable under Section 1983 where plaintiff had not argued on appeal that any municipal policy or custom led to a deprivation of his constitutional rights. The court also held that plaintiff was a limited purpose public figure and it was not reckless disregard for the truth to conclude that plaintiff could face future incarceration related to the contests. The court further held that the district court did not abuse its substantial discretion in denying plaintiff's motion for spoliation sanctions. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "Stepnes v. Ritschel, et al." on Justia Law
CGM, LLC v. BellSouth Telecommunication, et al.
CGM, a billing agent for competitive local exchange carriers (competitive LECs), brought a declaratory judgment action against BellSouth, an incumbent local exchange carrier (incumbent LEC). CGM claimed that BellSouth offered long-term promotional discounts to its own customers but failed, in violation of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. 251(c)(2), 251(c)(4), and rules implementing it, to pass the full value of those discounts on to CGM's client competitive LECs, none of which was a party to the suit. Because CGM had no statutory standing under either the 1996 Act or a seemingly broadly worded but nonetheless inapplicable statute from the Federal Telecommunications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. 401(b), the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of CGM's complaint. View "CGM, LLC v. BellSouth Telecommunication, et al." on Justia Law
Posted in:
Communications Law, U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals
Westmoreland v. Sutherland
The city disbanded its dive team because of budget cuts, after which two children drowned. Plaintiff, a fire department employee and member of the disbanded dive team, spoke at a city council meeting, indicating that the budget cuts caused the deaths and would cause more deaths. Plaintiff was ordered to serve unpaid suspension, equivalent to three 24 hour shifts, on grounds of insubordination, malfeasance, misfeasance, dishonesty, failure of good behavior, and conduct unbecoming of an officer. After a grievance hearing the mayor affirmed the suspension, finding that plaintiff’s statements had been false. The district court granted summary judgment for the city. The Sixth Circuit remanded for determination of whether the statements were false; whether any false statements were knowingly or recklessly made; whether a reasonable official would have believed any false statements were knowingly or recklessly made; and, if necessary, whether plaintiff’s interest in speaking as a citizen on a matter of public concern outweighed the city’s interest in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees.
View "Westmoreland v. Sutherland" on Justia Law
Lluberes v. Uncommon Prod., LLC
Defendant, a film company, released a documentary, "The Price of Sugar," in 2007 that depicts treatment of Haitian laborers at sugar plantations in the Dominican Republic. The film mentions plaintiffs, senior executives of family plantations, by name. In a suit for defamation, the court entered summary judgment for defendant and denied a motion to compel production of discovery materials. The First Circuit affirmed in part. The plaintiffs are limited public figures in the entire United States, who used their access to the press to launch a PR blitz, thereby risking public scrutiny. Their conduct was beyond a reasonable reply to negative publicity. The court remanded for consideration of actual malice, based on communications between defendant and a fact-checker, hired at the suggestion of defense counsel.View "Lluberes v. Uncommon Prod., LLC" on Justia Law
Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Trudeau
Defendant, an "infomercialist," violated a court-approved settlement with the FTC by misrepresenting the content of his book, The Weight Loss Cure They Don't Want You to Know About. The district court held him in contempt, ordered him to pay $37.6 million to the FTC, and banned him from making infomercials for three years. The Seventh Circuit vacated the sanctions. On remand, the district court reinstated the $37.6 million remedial fine, explaining that it reached that figure by multiplying the price of the book by the 800-number orders, plus the cost of shipping, less returns, and instructing the FTC to distribute the funds to those who bought the book using the 800-number. Any remainder was to be returned to defendant. The district court also imposed a coercive sanction, a $2 million performance bond, effective for at least five years. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The district court order, the performance bond in particular, does not violate the First Amendment. View "Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Trudeau" on Justia Law