Plaintiff filed this action alleging trademark infringement under Section 32(1) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. 114(1); federal unfair competition under Section 43(a) of the Act, 15 U.S.C. 1125(a); unfair competition and deceptive trade practices under the North Carolina Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices Act (UDTPA), N.C.Gen. Stat. 75-1.1, thereby challenging the use of its federally-registered AGRI-NET trademark by defendants. Plaintiff appealed the district court's order granting summary judgment to defendants on its affirmative defense of laches. The court concluded that the district court erred in determining that defendants established its defense as a matter of law, and, separately, in failing to consider whether laches barred plaintiff's claim for prospective injunctive relief. Accordingly, the court vacated the judgment and remanded for further proceedings. View "Ray Communications, Inc. v. Clear Channel Comm., Inc., et al." on Justia Law

Redbox rents DVDs, Blu-ray discs, and video games from automated retail kiosks and was sued under the Video Privacy Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. 2710. The district court held that Act provisions requiring destruction of records containing personally identifiable information can be enforced by suit for damages. After deciding to accept the interlocutory appeal because it will materially advance the ultimate termination of the class action, the Seventh Circuit reversed. The court noted the placement of the damages remedy in the statute, after description of a prohibitions on knowing disclosure of personally identifiable information, but before prohibition on use of such information before tribunals or the record-destruction mandate. The court also noted the "unsuitability" of those provisions to damage awards.View "Redbox Automated Retail, LLC v. Sterk" on Justia Law

In 2006, U.S. Marshals worked with officers in 24 states on a fugitive round-up that led to arrests of 10,733 people, including plaintiff, who was wrongfully arrested because of clerical mistakes. All charges were eventually dropped, but news reporters had filmed her arrest and aired the story, including plaintiff's name and a statement that she was wanted for identity theft, after the dismissal. One station also placed the video on its website, along with a written story. Plaintiff's attorney faxed a cease and desist letter to the station, which removed the story, although it remained accessible by keyword search for several days. Most of plaintiffs' claims against the federal and city governments, the U.S. Marshals Service, the broadcast company and employees, and various named and unnamed Marshals, were resolved. The district court rejected defamation and false light claim against the broadcast company, based on the fair report privilege requirement of proof of actual malice, and a Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. 1346(b)(1), claim against the U.S. for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, citing the discretionary function exception. Investigating and apprehending plaintiff was discretionary and not within the safe harbor for intentional torts. View "Milligan v. United States" on Justia Law

In 2009, AT&T sought to introduce a video service in Hopkinsville, Kentucky, relying on authority provided by its perpetual, Commonwealth-wide, telephone franchise granted in 1886. The city sued, claiming the telephone franchise did not allow AT&T to offer such services over its telephone wires. After Hopkinsville and AT&T settled, Mediacom, an incumbent cable provider in Hopkinsville, intervened and asserted that AT&T was required under the Kentucky Constitution and local law to obtain a new cable franchise. The district court dismissed. The Sixth Circuit reversed. Before resolving the legal question, the district court must determine whether the video service is more analogous to a one-way television service, or a two-way telephone service. View "Mediacom SE LLC v. Bellsouth Telecomm., Inc." on Justia Law

T-Mobile filed a complaint in the district court against the Board, asserting that the Board's denials of T-Mobile's applications to construct a wireless service facility on an existing transmission pole violated certain provisions of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. 332(c)(7)(B), which placed limitations on a local governing body's decisional authority regarding the placement and modification of personal wireless service facilities. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Board and T-Mobile appealed. The court held that the district court did not err in concluding that T-Mobile failed to establish that the Board effectively prohibited personal wireless services, as proscribed by subsection (B)(i)(II), or unreasonably discriminated against T-Mobile, as proscribed by subsection (B)(i)(I). Therefore, the court affirmed the judgment in favor of the Board. View "T-Mobile Northeast LLC v. Fairfax County Board" on Justia Law

Several company operators filed a complaint against petitioner with the FCC, which ruled that petitioner's increased pole attachment rates violated the Pole Attachment Act, 47 U.S.C. 224(d), and the FCC's implementing regulations. Petitioner now sought review of that order, arguing that the Act failed to provide for just compensation under the Fifth Amendment and that the FCC's decision was arbitrary and capricious, or was otherwise not supported by substantial evidence. The court found the doctrine of collateral estoppel a fatal bar to petitioner's assertion of the constitutional issue, and its remaining arguments unavailing. Accordingly, the court denied the petition. View "Gulf Power Co. v. FCC, et al." on Justia Law

The Festival is an annual event at a 200-acre public park. Two private organizations rent the park. The city provides a number of facilities and services and the park remains open to the public. The organizations rent booth space to exhibitors; the application prohibits sales or solicitation outside the booth. Plaintiffs are Christians who attended the Festival to speak on their religious beliefs and carry sandwich board signs. After lengthy discussions, with Festival workers and police, plaintiffs decided to avoid arrest and leave. They sought declaratory relief, an injunction, and nominal damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983 and 1988. The district court denied a preliminary injunction. The Sixth Circuit reversed. City officials engaged in state action by supporting and actively enforcing the solicitation policy. The policy was content-neutral, but not narrowly-tailored to serve a significant governmental interest. View "Bays v. City of Fairborn" on Justia Law

CMES was performing excavation work in Stone Mountain, Georgia when it severed an underground fiber-optic cable, owned by MCI, which caused an outage. MCI subsequently filed suit against CMES, seeking loss-of-use damages measured by the theoretical rental value of substitute equipment for the duration of the outage. On appeal, MCI challenged the district court's grant of summary judgment defeating its claim for loss-of-use damages. Because this case involved an unsettled question of Georgia law, the court certified the following question to the Supreme Court of Georgia: "Under Georgia law, may a telecommunications service provider whose cable is severed recover loss-of-use damages measured by the rental value of substitute cable when it has not rented such cable or otherwise incurred any monetary loss apart from the cost of repair?" View "MCI Communications Services, Inc. v. CMES, Inc." on Justia Law

Having lost his bid for a Maine Senate seat, plaintiff sued Republican party leadership for defamation libel, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and publicly placing him in a false light. The complaint referred to flyers, brochures, and radio and TV ads days before the election that conjured up imaginary wrongs that he had supposedly done as a selectman for the town of Blue Hill, primarily concerning discontinuance of fireworks on the Fourth of July. The complaint referred to "actual malice." The district court dismissed. The First Circuit affirmed, finding that false statements were made negligently, not with actual malice. Defamation law "does not require that combatants for public office act like war-time neutrals, treating everyone evenhandedly and always taking the high road. Quite the contrary. Provided that they do not act with actual malice, they can badmouth their opponents, hammering them with unfair and one-sided attacks" View "Schatz v. Republican State Leadership Comm." on Justia Law

Among other provisions, the ordinance prohibited door-to-door canvassing and soliciting between 6 P.M. and 9 A.M. The district court struck licensing requirements as unconstitutional, invalidated a requirement that those going door-to-door honor a "do-not-solicit" list, but upheld the requirement that would-be canvassers obtain a copy of the list before going door to door. The court upheld the 6 P.M. curfew and held that that plaintiff lacked standing to challenge a provision allowing the city manager to extend the curfew upon good cause. The Sixth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. Plaintiff, an environmental advocacy organization, had standing to challenge the curfew. The curfew was unconstitutional as applied. The curfew is not narrowly tailored to serve city's interests in protecting residential privacy, allocating public safety resources, and preventing crime. View "Ohio Citizen Action v. City of Englewood" on Justia Law