Petitioner's son was charged with assault and battery on a person over 60 years of age and with resisting arrest. The petitioner is the alleged victim. The son unsuccessfully moved to suppress a recording made by a third party, allegedly in violation of the wiretapping statute, G.L. c. 272, 99. The recording includes statements made by the defendant and the petitioner. The motion was denied. Petitioner sought relief under G.L. c. 211, 3, on the ground that the introduction of the recording into evidence in the defendant's trial would violate her privacy rights. The Massachusetts Supreme Court affirmed. Nothing in G.L. c. 211, 3, or rule 2:21 grants a nonparty to a criminal case standing to obtain review of an interlocutory order. The Legislature has expressly provided a civil remedy, including compensatory and punitive damages as well as attorney's fees, for any aggrieved person whose oral or wire communications are unlawfully intercepted, disclosed, or used, or whose privacy is violated by means of an unauthorized interception. G.L. c. 272, 99 Q. The petitioner does not address this remedy or explain why it would not be adequate to vindicate her privacy interests. View "In re Wadja" on Justia Law

MCI sued CMES on theories of negligence and trespass, and sought damages consisting of the costs to repair a severed cable, compensation for the loss of use of the cable during the time it took to repair it, and punitive damages. The district court granted partial summary judgment in favor of CMES, holding that MCI could not recover loss of use damages. On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit certified the following question: "Under Georgia law, may a telecommunications service provider whose cable is severed recover loss-of-use damages measured by the rental value of substitute cable when it has not rented such cable or otherwise incurred any monetary loss apart from the cost of repair?" The court concluded that a telecommunications carrier was not entitled to loss of use damages measured by the hypothetical cost to rent a replacement system where it suffered no actual loss of use damages and did not need to rent a replacement system because it was able to reroute calls within the existing redundant cable system the carrier necessarily installed in order to operate its business.View "MCI Communications Services v. CMES, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff and defendant, both women, met in 2005 through a chatroom connected with a television series. Defendant, in Illinois, used her own name and aliases to communicate with plaintiff, in Los Angeles. One alias was that of a man, and a romantic relationship developed through the Internet, telephone, and mail. Defendant disguised her female identity using a voice-altering device. Plaintiff purchased airline tickets for a meeting in Denver, but her new “boyfriend” cancelled the plans. Plaintiff was informed that he had attempted suicide. In 2006 the two planned to live together in Colorado, but defendant subsequently informed plaintiff, using another alias, that the man had died of cancer. The deception continued for seven more months until plaintiff’s real friends confronted defendant and obtained a videotaped admission as to what had occurred. Plaintiff’s third amended complaint, alleging fraudulent misrepresentation and seeking damages for the cost of a therapist, lost earnings, and emotional distress, was dismissed. The appellate court affirmed, holding that claims made in the previous complaint, but not incorporated into the third amended complaint, had been abandoned. The supreme court affirmed, holding that a claim for fraudulent misrepresentation does not apply to a personal relationship with no commercial component.View "Bonhomme v. St. James" on Justia Law

Two appeals are were consolidated from chancery-court cases. In the first case, Diamondhead Country Club and Property Owners Association, Inc. sued Thomas R. Alfonso, III, and Anne Scafidi Cordova,1 d/b/a Bay Jourdan Publishing Co. (BJP) for breach of a contract to publish "The Diamondhead News." In 1997, the chancery court entered a preliminary injunction order preventing BJP from publishing "The Diamondhead News," selling advertising, collecting or disposing of advertising revenues derived from the publication the paper, and interfering with the printing, publication, or distribution of "The Diamondhead News." The chancery court also found that an arbitration clause in the publishing contract was inapplicable to the lawsuit. The chancery court denied BJP’s two subsequent motions to compel arbitration of the breach-of-contract dispute. BJP appealed the chancery court’s latest denial of arbitration. In the second case, BJP sued Diamondhead and Gulf Publishing Co., Inc., d/b/a "The Sun Herald" (“Gulf Publishing”), for intentional interference with the publishing contract. Gulf Publishing filed a motion for summary judgment. The court granted summary judgment to Gulf Publishing and directed the entry of a final judgment as to Gulf Publishing pursuant to Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b). BJP appealed the grant of summary judgment. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the chancery court’s order denying BJP’s third motion to compel arbitration because the issue was ruled upon previously, and no appeal was taken. Finding genuine issues of material fact for trial, the Court reversed the chancery court’s order granting summary judgment to Diamondhead and Gulf Publishing, and remanded the second case for further proceedings. View "Alfonso v. Gulf Publishing Co., Inc." on Justia Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit certified a question to the Washington Supreme Court concerning whether an "early termination fee" (ETF) in a broadband internet service contract constituted an "alternative performance provision" or as a liquidated damages clause. Appellants are all customers who either incurred this ETF for canceling early or were threatened with this ETF for attempting to cancel early. All Appellants were dissatisfied with Clearwire’s service, alleging that instead of the fast and reliable service promised, they received inconsistent and painstakingly slow speeds. Plaintiff Chad Minnick sued Clearwire in King County Superior Court in April 2009, claiming that Clearwire was committing false advertising and was imposing ETFs unlawfully. He then filed the first amended complaint in May, which added the other 11 plaintiffs through class certification. In July, Clearwire removed the case to the federal district court where it filed a motion to dismiss all of Appellants' claims. The district court granted Clearwire's motion. Appellants then appealed to the Ninth Circuit, arguing that the ETF was a liquidated damages provision and not an alternative performance provision as the trial court found. Under Washington law, an alternative performance provision is distinguishable from a liquidated damages provision because it provides a "real option" to the promisor and the alternatives are reasonably equal to each other. Here, the ETF provided a "real option" at the time of contracting because Appellants wanted to retain the control and flexibility that the early cancellation allowed them. Further, the ETF was less expensive than the remaining payments for the majority of the contract's life, thereby indicating the options were reasonably related. The ETF also allowed Appellants to benefit from reduced monthly premiums under the fixed-term contract but also enjoy some of the flexibility of the month-to-month subscription. Therefore, the ETF is an alternative performance provision that is not subject to a penalty analysis.View "Minnick v. Clearwire US, LLC" on Justia Law

Qwest Corporation and the Colorado Public Utilities Commission (PUC) appealed a district court's judgment in favor of the Colorado Office of Consumer Counsel (OCC) that reversed the PUC's decision setting the maximum rate for certain telephone services. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the PUC regularly pursued its authority because it considered all of the statutorily-mandated factors and its decision is supported by substantial evidence. The Court therefore reversed the judgment of the district court.View "Ofc. of Consumer Counsel v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court received a certified question from the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. The issue centered on whether under RCW 82.04.500 a seller may upon disclosure, recoup its business and occupation (B&O) tax by collecting a surcharge to recover gross receipts taxes in addition to its monthly service fee. The matter stems from Plaintiff-Appellant James Bowden's purchase of three cell phones and a monthly service plan for each phone at a kiosk. The phone company's monthly service fee did not include Washington's B&O tax. However, the tax was listed as a "State B and O Surcharge" on Plaintiff's monthly bills, for which he was charged various amounts for each of the phones. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the phone company's monthly service fee, the sales price of its service contract, did not include the B&O surcharge. Rather, on the Agreement, the surcharge was listed separately under the "Regulatory Recovery Fee" provision described as a gross receipts surcharge. Further, the company's billing statements listed the surcharge separately like it was a sales tax, and both the sales tax and B&O fee were added on to the service fee. The Court therefore answered "no": even if disclosed under RCW 82.04-500, a seller is prohibited from recouping its B&O taxes by collecting a surcharge in addition to its monthly service fee.View "Peck v. AT&T Mobility" on Justia Law

This case arose from a physical struggle between Defendant Angel Moreno, Jr. and two Holland police officers when the officers sought to enter Defendant's home without a warrant. As a result, Defendant was charged with resisting and obstructing a police officer and causing injury under MCL 750.81d. The issue before the Supreme Court was whether Defendant was properly charged after trial. It was determined that the officers entered his home illegally. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that MCL 750.81d did not abrogate Defendant's common-law right to resist illegal police conduct. As such, the Court instructed the trial court to grant Defendant's motion to quash the charges against him on the basis that the officers' conduct was unlawful.View "Michigan v. Moreno" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellee the Rutland Herald appealed a trial court's decision to grant summary judgment to Defendants the Vermont State Police (VSP) and the Office of the Attorney General (collectively the State), and to deny disclosure of records related to a criminal investigation of possession of child pornography by employees of the Criminal Justice Training Council at the Vermont Police Academy. The court concluded that the records sought by the Herald, which included inquest records, were exempt from disclosure as "records dealing with the detection and investigation of crime." The Herald asserted on appeal that a strong policy in favor of public oversight of law enforcement actions should have lead to a different result. It argued that the Legislature could not have intended that records relating to the investigation and detection of crime be confidential forever. The Supreme Court rejected the Herald's arguments, finding the investigatory records were entitled to a blanket exemption under 1 V.S.A. 317(c)(5) and upheld the trial court's decision.View "Rutland Herald v. Vermont State Police" on Justia Law

The court considered three petitions for relief under G.L.c. 211, section 3, that related to the OpenCourt pilot project, which broadcasts live by "streaming" over the Internet video and audio recordings of certain proceedings taking place in the Quincy District Court. Each petition challenged one or more orders of a judge in the Quincy District Court concerning the broadcasts and online posting of particular proceedings in two different criminal cases. The court concluded that any order restricting OpenCourt's ability to publish -- by "streaming live" over the Internet, publicly archiving on the Web site or otherwise -- existing audio and video recordings of court room proceedings represented a form of prior restraint on the freedoms of the press and speech protected by the First Amendment and art. 16 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, as amended by art. 77 of the Amendments to the Massachusetts Constitution. Such an order could be upheld only if it was the least restrictive, reasonable measure necessary to protect a compelling governmental interest. In the Barnes case, the court vacated the order of the district court judge requiring the redaction of the minor alleged victim. In the Diorio case, the court concluded that Diorio had not met the heavy burden of justifying an order of prior restraint with respect to the specific proceedings at issue in his petition for relief. The court requested the Supreme Judicial Court's judiciary-media committee submit a set of guidelines of the operation of the OpenCourt project.View "Commonwealth v. Barnes" on Justia Law