Justia Communications Law Opinion Summaries

A Canadian company that creates and publishes online content used several Facebook pages and Meta’s self-serve advertising service for more than ten years. Over that period, the company submitted more than 500,000 ads to Meta, of which over 18,000 were rejected for reasons such as sensational content, focusing excessively on body parts, or using deceptive practices. In October 2020, Meta canceled the company’s Facebook pages for repeatedly violating its terms and policies.After Meta’s cancellation of its pages, the company brought suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, raising claims including conversion and fraudulent inducement. The conversion claim was based on Meta’s decision to “unpublish” the company’s Facebook pages, which the company argued amounted to interfering with its property right. The district court dismissed the conversion claim, ruling that Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act shielded Meta from liability for publishing third-party content.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The appellate court held that Section 230 barred the conversion claim because Meta acted as a publisher when it terminated the company’s Facebook account. The court clarified that simply framing a claim in contractual terms does not create an exception to Section 230 if the claim still rests on publishing activity. The court distinguished this case from others where a distinct contractual promise unrelated to publishing was at issue, and concluded that Meta’s actions fell squarely within its editorial discretion as a publisher protected by Section 230. The dismissal of the conversion claim was therefore affirmed. View "SHARED PARTNERSHIP V. META PLATFORMS, INC." on Justia Law

A retired law enforcement officer in West Virginia initiated five separate lawsuits against several data broker companies, alleging they published his home address and unpublished telephone number online without his consent. He claimed these disclosures, made via “people search” services, also affected thousands of other similarly situated officials protected under West Virginia’s Daniel’s Law. The statute prohibits the dissemination of home addresses or unpublished phone numbers of certain judicial and law enforcement officials if a reasonable person would believe such disclosure would expose them to harassment or harm.The United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia reviewed consolidated motions to dismiss by the defendants. The district court found that the challenged provision of Daniel’s Law was a content-based restriction on speech, necessitating strict scrutiny under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The court recognized the compelling state interest in protecting officials’ safety but concluded the statute was not narrowly tailored, as it imposed liability without requiring notice or knowledge of the protected status of individuals whose information was disclosed. The district court thus dismissed the actions, determining the law was facially unconstitutional.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The appellate court held that the statute regulated speech protected by the First Amendment, was content-based, and therefore subject to strict scrutiny. The court agreed that the law was not the least restrictive means to serve the state’s compelling interest because it lacked a notice requirement and imposed automatic liability. As a result, the Fourth Circuit held that the provision of West Virginia’s Daniel’s Law at issue violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments and affirmed the dismissal of the lawsuits. View "Jackson v. Thomson Reuters America Corp." on Justia Law

Several patients brought class action lawsuits against Indiana health care providers, alleging that their medical information was improperly shared with Facebook through the use of the Meta Pixel embedded in online patient portals. The plaintiffs asserted state law claims including breach of implied contract, unjust enrichment, and violations of the Indiana Deceptive Consumer Sales Act and Indiana Wiretapping Act. The health care providers had established these online portals to comply with federal regulations encouraging electronic health records, which offered incentive payments and imposed penalties for non-compliance.The health care providers removed the cases from Indiana state court to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana, arguing that federal jurisdiction was proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1). They claimed they were “acting under” the Department of Health and Human Services when creating and maintaining their portals. District courts in multiple consolidated cases rejected this argument, finding that the providers did not meet the statutory requirements for removal under § 1442(a)(1). The courts concluded that while the providers were highly regulated and incentivized by federal policies, their actions did not amount to performing basic governmental tasks or operating under the direction of a federal officer.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the consolidated appeals de novo. It held that compliance with federal regulations and incentives for patient portals did not constitute “acting under” a federal officer. The court found that the health care providers’ relationship to the federal government lacked the unusually close supervision and delegation required for federal officer removal. The court affirmed the district courts’ remand orders, holding that federal subject matter jurisdiction was not established under § 1442(a)(1). View "Chiaro v Methodist Hospitals, Inc." on Justia Law

A group of petitioners, including a telecommunications reseller and several consumers, challenged the Federal Communications Commission’s calculation of the Universal Service Fund’s Fourth Quarter 2025 contribution factor. The FCC collects billions of dollars from telecommunications companies each year to subsidize communication services for underserved communities, using a private corporation, the Universal Service Administrative Company (USAC), to administer the fund and calculate the contribution factor. Petitioners argued, among other things, that the FCC’s creation and reliance on USAC violated federal law.Previously, after USAC submitted its projections for the fourth quarter, the FCC issued a public notice adopting USAC’s data (with a minor adjustment) to set a 38.1% contribution factor. The petitioners filed timely comments with the FCC and, after the FCC’s inaction, sought judicial review. The Supreme Court had recently rejected a broader nondelegation challenge to the universal service statute, but left open other statutory and constitutional questions. The current challenge centered on whether the FCC had statutory authority to establish USAC.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. It concluded that the FCC established USAC to act as an instrumentality for administering the Universal Service Fund and that Congress had not specifically authorized the FCC to create such a corporation, as required by the Government Corporation Control Act. The court found that neither the general statutory provisions cited by the FCC nor subsequent congressional actions amounted to the necessary specific authorization. As a result, the court held that the FCC exceeded its statutory authority by relying on USAC’s projections in setting the contribution factor. The court granted the petition for review, vacated the Fourth Quarter 2025 contribution factor, and remanded the matter to the FCC for further proceedings. View "Consumers' Research v. FCC" on Justia Law

Several congressional candidates challenged a public notice issued by the Media Bureau of the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) regarding the lowest unit charge (LUC) requirements for campaign advertisements. The notice expanded LUC eligibility to include political candidates, joint fundraising committees with noncandidate members, and political parties engaged in coordinated activity. The candidates argued that only political candidates should be entitled to the LUC, seeking review from the full FCC and, while their application was still pending, filed a petition for review in federal court.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit heard the petition for review and found jurisdiction to consider the challenge. The panel granted the petition and set aside the FCC’s public notice, reasoning that the statutory text and legislative history limited LUC eligibility to political candidates. Subsequently, the Fourth Circuit issued a mandamus order requiring the FCC to resolve the candidates’ application within 48 hours, believing this was necessary to facilitate judicial review.The Supreme Court of the United States reviewed this case following an application by the FCC to stay the Fourth Circuit’s mandamus order. The Court found that the FCC had met the requirements for a stay, including a likelihood of irreparable harm and a fair prospect of success on the merits. It held that the issuance of a writ of mandamus was inappropriate, as the Communications Act does not require the FCC to act within a specific timeframe, and the agency retains discretion over its procedures. The Supreme Court stayed the Fourth Circuit’s order pending disposition of a petition for a writ of certiorari, and clarified that the stay would terminate if certiorari is denied or upon the Court’s judgment if granted. View "FCC v. Brown" on Justia Law

A recently enacted Georgia law restricts minors’ ability to create accounts on social media platforms. The statute requires covered platforms to verify users’ ages, prohibits minors under sixteen from creating accounts without parental consent, and limits how personal data may be used for advertising to minors. The law defines “social media platform” broadly, but includes numerous exceptions for platforms with different primary functions. An internet trade association, representing major social media companies, challenged the law before its effective date, arguing that it violates the First Amendment, is unconstitutionally vague, and is preempted by Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia granted a preliminary injunction, preventing enforcement of the law. The court found that the association had associational and third-party standing, that the law was likely a content-based speech restriction failing strict scrutiny, was unconstitutionally vague, and was preempted by federal law.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed whether the association had standing and whether it demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits. The circuit court held that the association had associational standing to challenge the law on behalf of its members. However, the court concluded that the association failed to meet the burden required for a facial First Amendment challenge under the standard set forth in Moody v. NetChoice, LLC, because it did not adequately address the full range of the law’s applications and did not demonstrate that unconstitutional applications substantially outweighed constitutional ones. The court also found that the vagueness and Section 230 preemption claims were unlikely to succeed. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the standing determination, vacated the preliminary injunction, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "NetChoice v. Attorney General, State of Georgia" on Justia Law

Florida enacted a statute (HB3) restricting minors’ access to social media platforms that employ certain “addictive features,” such as infinite scrolling, push notifications, and auto-play. Platforms meeting defined criteria—including algorithmic content selection and significant minor usage—must prohibit account creation by those under 14 and require parental consent for those aged 14–15. The Computer & Communications Industry Association and NetChoice, representing affected platforms, challenged the law on First Amendment grounds, asserting both facial and as-applied claims.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida initially denied a preliminary injunction for lack of associational standing, but after the plaintiffs amended their complaint and renewed their motion, the court granted a preliminary injunction. The district court found that the trade groups had standing, abstention under Younger v. Harris was unwarranted, and that although HB3 was a content-neutral regulation, it was insufficiently tailored to survive intermediate scrutiny, thus likely unconstitutional.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit first held that the plaintiffs had associational standing to challenge HB3 on behalf of their members. The court also determined that the district court properly declined to abstain under Younger because substantial proceedings had already occurred in federal court before the state enforcement action was initiated. Addressing the merits, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that HB3 is a content-neutral regulation implicating the First Amendment, but it likely survives intermediate scrutiny due to its age-based tailoring and focus on addictive features. The court rejected the facial challenge, holding that the plaintiffs had not demonstrated, as required by Moody v. NetChoice, LLC, that HB3’s unconstitutional applications substantially outweighed its constitutional ones. The disposition affirmed in part, reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Computer & Communications Industry Association v. Attorney General, State of Florida" on Justia Law

The case involves challenges to a 2024 order issued by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) regulating communications services provided to incarcerated individuals, following statutory amendments in 2022. The FCC's order imposed rate caps for intrastate, interstate, and international prison communications, regulated the reimbursement of facility costs, excluded site commission payments from rate calculations, prohibited service providers from paying site commissions, preempted state and local laws requiring such payments, allowed alternate pricing plans, and required clearer consumer disclosures. These actions prompted petitions for review from nonprofit organizations, service providers, and state governments, consolidated by the United States Multidistrict Judicial Panel on Litigation and transferred to the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit.In the lower proceedings, the FCC's imposition of rate caps and prohibition of site commissions were challenged, and the parties disputed whether the First Circuit was the proper venue. The FCC then issued a new order in late 2025, modifying certain aspects of the 2024 order, notably by increasing rate caps to include more safety and security costs. This led to supplemental briefing on mootness. Service providers requested voluntary dismissal of their petitions, state governments argued portions of their petitions were moot, and nonprofit organizations maintained some challenges remained live.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit granted the voluntary dismissal of service providers' petitions, dismissed portions of state governments' petitions as moot or for lack of jurisdiction (including constitutional challenges not raised before the FCC), and denied other state challenges to the FCC's authority and rulemaking. The court denied most nonprofit organizations’ challenges except for those related to the FCC’s treatment of certain costs in rate caps, which it held in abeyance pending review of the 2025 order. The court’s disposition was to dismiss, deny, or hold in abeyance the various petitions as appropriate. View "Direct Action for Rights and Equality v. FCC" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, who was the CEO of a private company with government contracts and a security clearance, was arrested in December 2021 for felony domestic violence. Although no charges were filed, police prepared an investigative report. In February 2022, the San Francisco Superior Court ordered the arrest and related records sealed under California Penal Code sections 851.91 and 851.92. Despite this, the police department released the incident report to a third party without restriction, and it was later sent anonymously to an independent journalist who published articles about the plaintiff’s arrest online, including the report. The plaintiff sought to have the posts removed and subsequently sued the journalist, the platform hosting the articles, and another entity associated with the journalist, alleging multiple causes of action including privacy violations and statutory breaches.The San Francisco County Superior Court reviewed anti-SLAPP motions filed by all defendants, which argued the suit arose from constitutionally protected activity and was barred by the First Amendment and the Communications Decency Act (CDA). The court found that the plaintiff’s claims were based on the defendants’ speech—specifically, online publication in a public forum about a matter of public interest, given the plaintiff’s role and the company's government work. It also determined that statutory protections for sealing did not override constitutional protections, and rejected the argument that defendants’ actions were illegal as a matter of law. The court granted the anti-SLAPP motions and awarded attorney fees to the defendants.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, First Appellate District, Division Four affirmed the trial court’s orders. The main holding was that the First Amendment protects the lawfully obtained, truthful publication of information of public significance, even if the information was originally subject to statutory sealing, and that section 230(c)(1) of the CDA bars claims against interactive computer service providers for hosting such content. The attorney fee award was also affirmed. View "Blackman v. Substack" on Justia Law

A company that operates a website hosting digitized yearbooks, allowing users to search for names and view yearbook pages, was sued by a California resident whose name and photo appeared in a yearbook on the site. The plaintiff alleged that the company violated California’s right-of-publicity statute by using individuals’ names without consent to advertise paid subscriptions. The plaintiff advanced a theory that simply making individuals’ names searchable on the site, even if no one actually searched for them, constituted a commercial use requiring consent under the statute.Previously, the United States District Court for the Northern District of California denied the company’s motion to dismiss, finding the plaintiff plausibly alleged a direct commercial use. The court then conditionally certified both damages and injunctive classes consisting of California residents whose names were searchable on the site, had never registered as users, and had not donated yearbooks. The company challenged class certification, arguing that individual issues predominated and that the lead plaintiff would not adequately represent the classes.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that, for class certification purposes, whether being “searchable” is sufficient for liability under the statute is a merits question not to be resolved at the certification stage. The court further found that injury could be shown by common evidence of economic harm, and that the district court did not abuse its discretion in managing potential individualized issues regarding class membership. The appellate court also rejected the company’s adequacy challenges, noting that the lead plaintiff could represent both classes. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s order certifying the classes. View "NOLEN V. PEOPLECONNECT, INC." on Justia Law