Justia Communications Law Opinion Summaries

A group of petitioners, including a telecommunications reseller and several consumers, challenged the Federal Communications Commission’s calculation of the Universal Service Fund’s Fourth Quarter 2025 contribution factor. The FCC collects billions of dollars from telecommunications companies each year to subsidize communication services for underserved communities, using a private corporation, the Universal Service Administrative Company (USAC), to administer the fund and calculate the contribution factor. Petitioners argued, among other things, that the FCC’s creation and reliance on USAC violated federal law.Previously, after USAC submitted its projections for the fourth quarter, the FCC issued a public notice adopting USAC’s data (with a minor adjustment) to set a 38.1% contribution factor. The petitioners filed timely comments with the FCC and, after the FCC’s inaction, sought judicial review. The Supreme Court had recently rejected a broader nondelegation challenge to the universal service statute, but left open other statutory and constitutional questions. The current challenge centered on whether the FCC had statutory authority to establish USAC.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. It concluded that the FCC established USAC to act as an instrumentality for administering the Universal Service Fund and that Congress had not specifically authorized the FCC to create such a corporation, as required by the Government Corporation Control Act. The court found that neither the general statutory provisions cited by the FCC nor subsequent congressional actions amounted to the necessary specific authorization. As a result, the court held that the FCC exceeded its statutory authority by relying on USAC’s projections in setting the contribution factor. The court granted the petition for review, vacated the Fourth Quarter 2025 contribution factor, and remanded the matter to the FCC for further proceedings. View "Consumers' Research v. FCC" on Justia Law

Several congressional candidates challenged a public notice issued by the Media Bureau of the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) regarding the lowest unit charge (LUC) requirements for campaign advertisements. The notice expanded LUC eligibility to include political candidates, joint fundraising committees with noncandidate members, and political parties engaged in coordinated activity. The candidates argued that only political candidates should be entitled to the LUC, seeking review from the full FCC and, while their application was still pending, filed a petition for review in federal court.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit heard the petition for review and found jurisdiction to consider the challenge. The panel granted the petition and set aside the FCC’s public notice, reasoning that the statutory text and legislative history limited LUC eligibility to political candidates. Subsequently, the Fourth Circuit issued a mandamus order requiring the FCC to resolve the candidates’ application within 48 hours, believing this was necessary to facilitate judicial review.The Supreme Court of the United States reviewed this case following an application by the FCC to stay the Fourth Circuit’s mandamus order. The Court found that the FCC had met the requirements for a stay, including a likelihood of irreparable harm and a fair prospect of success on the merits. It held that the issuance of a writ of mandamus was inappropriate, as the Communications Act does not require the FCC to act within a specific timeframe, and the agency retains discretion over its procedures. The Supreme Court stayed the Fourth Circuit’s order pending disposition of a petition for a writ of certiorari, and clarified that the stay would terminate if certiorari is denied or upon the Court’s judgment if granted. View "FCC v. Brown" on Justia Law

A recently enacted Georgia law restricts minors’ ability to create accounts on social media platforms. The statute requires covered platforms to verify users’ ages, prohibits minors under sixteen from creating accounts without parental consent, and limits how personal data may be used for advertising to minors. The law defines “social media platform” broadly, but includes numerous exceptions for platforms with different primary functions. An internet trade association, representing major social media companies, challenged the law before its effective date, arguing that it violates the First Amendment, is unconstitutionally vague, and is preempted by Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia granted a preliminary injunction, preventing enforcement of the law. The court found that the association had associational and third-party standing, that the law was likely a content-based speech restriction failing strict scrutiny, was unconstitutionally vague, and was preempted by federal law.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed whether the association had standing and whether it demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits. The circuit court held that the association had associational standing to challenge the law on behalf of its members. However, the court concluded that the association failed to meet the burden required for a facial First Amendment challenge under the standard set forth in Moody v. NetChoice, LLC, because it did not adequately address the full range of the law’s applications and did not demonstrate that unconstitutional applications substantially outweighed constitutional ones. The court also found that the vagueness and Section 230 preemption claims were unlikely to succeed. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the standing determination, vacated the preliminary injunction, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "NetChoice v. Attorney General, State of Georgia" on Justia Law

Florida enacted a statute (HB3) restricting minors’ access to social media platforms that employ certain “addictive features,” such as infinite scrolling, push notifications, and auto-play. Platforms meeting defined criteria—including algorithmic content selection and significant minor usage—must prohibit account creation by those under 14 and require parental consent for those aged 14–15. The Computer & Communications Industry Association and NetChoice, representing affected platforms, challenged the law on First Amendment grounds, asserting both facial and as-applied claims.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida initially denied a preliminary injunction for lack of associational standing, but after the plaintiffs amended their complaint and renewed their motion, the court granted a preliminary injunction. The district court found that the trade groups had standing, abstention under Younger v. Harris was unwarranted, and that although HB3 was a content-neutral regulation, it was insufficiently tailored to survive intermediate scrutiny, thus likely unconstitutional.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit first held that the plaintiffs had associational standing to challenge HB3 on behalf of their members. The court also determined that the district court properly declined to abstain under Younger because substantial proceedings had already occurred in federal court before the state enforcement action was initiated. Addressing the merits, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that HB3 is a content-neutral regulation implicating the First Amendment, but it likely survives intermediate scrutiny due to its age-based tailoring and focus on addictive features. The court rejected the facial challenge, holding that the plaintiffs had not demonstrated, as required by Moody v. NetChoice, LLC, that HB3’s unconstitutional applications substantially outweighed its constitutional ones. The disposition affirmed in part, reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Computer & Communications Industry Association v. Attorney General, State of Florida" on Justia Law

The case involves challenges to a 2024 order issued by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) regulating communications services provided to incarcerated individuals, following statutory amendments in 2022. The FCC's order imposed rate caps for intrastate, interstate, and international prison communications, regulated the reimbursement of facility costs, excluded site commission payments from rate calculations, prohibited service providers from paying site commissions, preempted state and local laws requiring such payments, allowed alternate pricing plans, and required clearer consumer disclosures. These actions prompted petitions for review from nonprofit organizations, service providers, and state governments, consolidated by the United States Multidistrict Judicial Panel on Litigation and transferred to the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit.In the lower proceedings, the FCC's imposition of rate caps and prohibition of site commissions were challenged, and the parties disputed whether the First Circuit was the proper venue. The FCC then issued a new order in late 2025, modifying certain aspects of the 2024 order, notably by increasing rate caps to include more safety and security costs. This led to supplemental briefing on mootness. Service providers requested voluntary dismissal of their petitions, state governments argued portions of their petitions were moot, and nonprofit organizations maintained some challenges remained live.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit granted the voluntary dismissal of service providers' petitions, dismissed portions of state governments' petitions as moot or for lack of jurisdiction (including constitutional challenges not raised before the FCC), and denied other state challenges to the FCC's authority and rulemaking. The court denied most nonprofit organizations’ challenges except for those related to the FCC’s treatment of certain costs in rate caps, which it held in abeyance pending review of the 2025 order. The court’s disposition was to dismiss, deny, or hold in abeyance the various petitions as appropriate. View "Direct Action for Rights and Equality v. FCC" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, who was the CEO of a private company with government contracts and a security clearance, was arrested in December 2021 for felony domestic violence. Although no charges were filed, police prepared an investigative report. In February 2022, the San Francisco Superior Court ordered the arrest and related records sealed under California Penal Code sections 851.91 and 851.92. Despite this, the police department released the incident report to a third party without restriction, and it was later sent anonymously to an independent journalist who published articles about the plaintiff’s arrest online, including the report. The plaintiff sought to have the posts removed and subsequently sued the journalist, the platform hosting the articles, and another entity associated with the journalist, alleging multiple causes of action including privacy violations and statutory breaches.The San Francisco County Superior Court reviewed anti-SLAPP motions filed by all defendants, which argued the suit arose from constitutionally protected activity and was barred by the First Amendment and the Communications Decency Act (CDA). The court found that the plaintiff’s claims were based on the defendants’ speech—specifically, online publication in a public forum about a matter of public interest, given the plaintiff’s role and the company's government work. It also determined that statutory protections for sealing did not override constitutional protections, and rejected the argument that defendants’ actions were illegal as a matter of law. The court granted the anti-SLAPP motions and awarded attorney fees to the defendants.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, First Appellate District, Division Four affirmed the trial court’s orders. The main holding was that the First Amendment protects the lawfully obtained, truthful publication of information of public significance, even if the information was originally subject to statutory sealing, and that section 230(c)(1) of the CDA bars claims against interactive computer service providers for hosting such content. The attorney fee award was also affirmed. View "Blackman v. Substack" on Justia Law

A company that operates a website hosting digitized yearbooks, allowing users to search for names and view yearbook pages, was sued by a California resident whose name and photo appeared in a yearbook on the site. The plaintiff alleged that the company violated California’s right-of-publicity statute by using individuals’ names without consent to advertise paid subscriptions. The plaintiff advanced a theory that simply making individuals’ names searchable on the site, even if no one actually searched for them, constituted a commercial use requiring consent under the statute.Previously, the United States District Court for the Northern District of California denied the company’s motion to dismiss, finding the plaintiff plausibly alleged a direct commercial use. The court then conditionally certified both damages and injunctive classes consisting of California residents whose names were searchable on the site, had never registered as users, and had not donated yearbooks. The company challenged class certification, arguing that individual issues predominated and that the lead plaintiff would not adequately represent the classes.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that, for class certification purposes, whether being “searchable” is sufficient for liability under the statute is a merits question not to be resolved at the certification stage. The court further found that injury could be shown by common evidence of economic harm, and that the district court did not abuse its discretion in managing potential individualized issues regarding class membership. The appellate court also rejected the company’s adequacy challenges, noting that the lead plaintiff could represent both classes. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s order certifying the classes. View "NOLEN V. PEOPLECONNECT, INC." on Justia Law

The case concerns the Federal Communications Commission’s (FCC) “lowest unit charge” (LUC) requirements, which mandate that broadcasting stations offer candidates for public office favorable advertising rates during pre-election periods. In March 2026, the FCC’s Media Bureau issued a public notice clarifying that not only political candidates, but also joint fundraising committees with noncandidate members and political parties engaged in coordinated activity, could qualify for the LUC under certain conditions. Four Democratic congressional candidates challenged this interpretation, arguing only candidates should receive the LUC.The candidates first filed an application for review with the FCC, requesting the full Commission to set aside the notice. While their application remained unresolved, they initiated a petition for review in the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, naming the FCC and the United States as respondents. The Fourth Circuit expedited proceedings due to the impending midterm elections and permitted the National Republican Congressional Committee and the National Republican Senatorial Committee to intervene. The FCC, the United States, and the party committees argued that the Fourth Circuit lacked statutory jurisdiction because the candidates’ application for review was still pending before the Commission.A divided Fourth Circuit panel held that it had jurisdiction, granted the candidates’ petition, and set aside the FCC’s public notice. The court denied a motion for a stay and issued its mandate. The party committees then sought a stay from the Supreme Court of the United States.The Supreme Court granted the stay, finding a strong likelihood that the Fourth Circuit lacked statutory jurisdiction since the Communications Act requires parties to await resolution of their administrative application before seeking judicial review. The Court also determined the party committees would likely suffer irreparable harm absent a stay. The mandate of the Fourth Circuit is recalled and stayed pending disposition of a certiorari petition. View "National Republican Congressional Committee v. Brown" on Justia Law

A trade association representing internet companies challenged the enforcement of a new Tennessee statute designed to protect minors from social media risks. The law requires social media companies to verify the ages of all prospective account holders and secure parental consent before allowing minors to create accounts. It also mandates that parents be given tools to supervise their children’s accounts. The association argued that its members would suffer unrecoverable compliance costs and that the law would restrict their and their users’ First Amendment rights.The United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee denied the association’s motion for a preliminary injunction. The district court concluded that the association had not established irreparable harm, finding that the alleged loss of First Amendment freedoms was not sufficiently certain or imminent, and that unrecoverable compliance costs did not qualify as irreparable harm. Because the court found no irreparable harm, it did not consider the other preliminary injunction factors.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial. The appellate court disagreed with the lower court’s analysis of irreparable harm, holding that both unrecoverable compliance costs and the loss of First Amendment freedoms can satisfy the threshold requirement for irreparable harm. The court explained that compliance costs need not be extraordinary to be considered irreparable and that the chilling effect on speech, even before enforcement, can constitute irreparable harm if enforcement is likely and imminent. The Sixth Circuit vacated the district court’s order and remanded the case for further consideration of all preliminary injunction factors, directing the lower court to weigh the harm asserted and address the remaining legal standards as appropriate. View "NetChoice, LLC v. Skrmetti" on Justia Law

A local news publisher brought suit against a technology company that operates a news aggregation app and website. The publisher alleged that the aggregator, through its app, displayed the publisher’s articles either by framing them within the aggregator’s interface (so that users viewed the publisher’s website content within an app frame) or by reproducing the full text of articles under the aggregator’s own URL due to a technical glitch. The publisher claimed this conduct violated its exclusive right to publicly display its content under the Copyright Act, and further alleged that the removal or alteration of its website’s URLs—when articles were shown under the aggregator’s URLs—constituted improper removal of copyright management information (CMI) under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA).The United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi addressed the publisher’s claims through cross-motions for summary judgment. Relying on the “server test” from Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., the district court held that the aggregator’s framed linking did not infringe the publisher’s display right, because the content was not stored on the aggregator’s servers but only linked to the publisher’s own server. The court also held that URLs do not constitute CMI under the DMCA, as they function merely as locational addresses and do not inherently convey protected copyright information.On interlocutory appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed two questions: whether the server test is the proper standard for evaluating copyright display right infringement, and whether URLs can be CMI under the DMCA. The Fifth Circuit rejected the server test as inconsistent with the text of the Copyright Act, and instead adopted a “transmit requirement”—finding infringement only if the alleged infringer actually transmits (rather than merely links to) the copyrighted content. The court also held that the DMCA does not categorically foreclose URLs from being CMI, but for a URL to qualify as CMI, it must clearly convey the characteristics specified by statute. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with these holdings. View "Emmerich Nwspr v. Particle Media" on Justia Law