Justia Communications Law Opinion Summaries

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A Virginia statute established procedures for internet broadband service providers to access railroad property and lay cable across tracks. The Association of American Railroads (AAR) challenged the statute, arguing it was preempted by federal law and violated the Takings Clause of the U.S. Constitution. The district court dismissed the case, ruling that AAR lacked standing to bring the claims because they required the participation of individual member railroads.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia held that AAR lacked associational standing for both its preemption and Takings Clause claims. The court found that the preemption claim required a fact-intensive inquiry into whether the statute unreasonably burdened rail transportation, necessitating individual member participation. Similarly, the Takings Clause claim required individualized proof of inadequate compensation for each crossing, which also required member participation.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that AAR had standing to pursue its preemption claims, as these could be litigated without the participation of individual members. The court reasoned that the preemption claims involved general judgments about the statute's nature and operation, not specific operations of individual railroads. However, the court affirmed the district court's ruling on the Takings Clause claim, agreeing that it required individualized proof of compensation for each crossing, necessitating member participation.The Fourth Circuit thus affirmed the district court's judgment in part, reversed it in part, and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Association of American Railroads v. Hudson" on Justia Law

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The case involves the Stored Communications Act, which allows the government to subpoena electronic communication service providers for user records and seek court orders to prohibit disclosure of such subpoenas. The government requested and obtained a court order allowing it to prohibit disclosure of any subpoena related to a particular investigation for one year, provided the government determined that disclosure would risk one of the harms specified in the Act. The government then served a subpoena on X Corp. with the nondisclosure order attached. X Corp. moved to vacate the nondisclosure order, arguing it did not comply with the Act. The district court denied X Corp.'s motion.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia issued the nondisclosure order and denied X Corp.'s motion to vacate it. X Corp. appealed the decision, arguing that the order did not comply with the Stored Communications Act and violated the First Amendment. The district court relied on ex parte evidence in its decision, which X Corp. also challenged.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that the nondisclosure order did not conform to the Stored Communications Act because the court did not find "reason to believe" that disclosure of the subpoena would risk a statutory harm. The court emphasized that the statute requires the court, not the government, to make this determination. The appellate court did not address X Corp.'s First Amendment argument or the issue of the district court's reliance on ex parte evidence, as the statutory ruling was sufficient to resolve the case. View "In re Sealed Case" on Justia Law

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Energy Transfer LP, involved in the Dakota Access Pipeline (DAPL) project, filed a lawsuit in North Dakota against Greenpeace International and others, alleging various tort claims related to the 2016 Standing Rock Protests. Unicorn Riot, a Minnesota-based news organization, and its journalist Niko Georgiades, who reported on the protests, were subpoenaed by Energy Transfer for documents and communications related to the protests. Unicorn Riot objected, citing the Minnesota Free Flow of Information Act (MFFIA), which protects newsgatherers from disclosing unpublished information.The Hennepin County District Court denied Energy Transfer's motion to compel Unicorn Riot to produce the requested documents but ordered Unicorn Riot to produce a privilege log. Both parties appealed. The Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of the motion to compel but reversed the order requiring a privilege log, concluding that the MFFIA prohibits such an order.The Minnesota Supreme Court reviewed the case. It held that the MFFIA applies to newsgatherers even if they engage in unlawful or tortious conduct, as long as the conduct does not fall within the statutory exceptions of Minn. Stat. §§ 595.024–.025. The court also held that the MFFIA does not prevent district courts from ordering the production of a privilege log, but district courts should consider whether producing such a log would impose an undue burden on the responding party.The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision in part, reversed in part, and remanded the case to the district court to determine the appropriate scope of the privilege log, considering potential undue burdens. View "Energy Transfer LP v. Greenpeace International" on Justia Law

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The case involves the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) and its universal-service contribution scheme, which requires telecommunications carriers to contribute to a fund that subsidizes communications services for underserved communities. The FCC uses a formula to determine the contribution amount, and the Universal Service Administrative Company, a private entity, assists in managing the fund and projecting financial needs.The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reviewed the case and found the contribution scheme unconstitutional due to a "double-layered delegation" of authority. The court expressed skepticism about Congress's delegation of power to the FCC and the FCC's delegation to the Administrator, suggesting that the combination of these delegations violated the Constitution's nondelegation doctrine.The Supreme Court of the United States reviewed the case and reversed the Fifth Circuit's decision. The Court held that the universal-service contribution scheme does not violate the nondelegation doctrine. It found that Congress provided sufficient guidance to the FCC through the Communications Act of 1934 and its amendments, which set clear policies and boundaries for the FCC's actions. The Court also determined that the FCC retained decision-making authority and that the Administrator's role was advisory, not a delegation of governmental power. The Court rejected the Fifth Circuit's combination theory, stating that the separate delegations did not compound to create a constitutional violation. View "FCC v. Consumers' Research" on Justia Law

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Radio Communications Corporation (RCC), a telecommunications and media company, petitioned for review of a final order issued by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) implementing the Low Power Protection Act (LPPA). The LPPA allows low power television (LPTV) stations to apply for an upgrade to a Class A license if they meet certain criteria, including operating in a Designated Market Area (DMA) with not more than 95,000 television households. The FCC's order adopted this limitation and used Nielsen’s Local TV Report to determine a station’s DMA.RCC operates an LPTV station, W24EZ-D, in Connecticut, which is licensed to serve Allingtown, a neighborhood of West Haven with fewer than 15,000 television households. However, the station is part of the Hartford-New Haven DMA, which has approximately one million television households. RCC challenged the FCC's order, arguing that the size limitation should apply to a station’s community of license, not its DMA. RCC also raised other statutory and constitutional arguments, including claims that the order contravenes section 307(b) of the Communications Act, violates the Commerce Clause, improperly delegates legislative authority to Nielsen, and restricts programming content in violation of the First Amendment.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the FCC's order adheres to the best reading of the LPPA, which clearly limits Class A license eligibility to LPTV stations operating in a DMA with not more than 95,000 television households. The court found that the FCC properly defined DMA according to Nielsen’s data, as authorized by Congress, and that the statute does not reference "community of license." The court also rejected RCC's constitutional arguments, finding that the FCC's interpretation did not violate the Commerce Clause or the nondelegation doctrine. Consequently, the court denied RCC's petition for review. View "Radio Communications Corporation v. FCC" on Justia Law

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Sacramento Television Stations Inc. (Sac TV) sought additional audio and video recordings from the City of Roseville (City) under the California Public Records Act (CPRA) related to an incident on April 6, 2023, where Roseville Police Department (Roseville PD) officers discharged firearms at a suspect, Eric J. Abril. The City provided limited footage, arguing that further disclosure would interfere with an active investigation. Sac TV filed a petition for writ of mandate to compel the City to release more recordings.The Superior Court of Placer County denied Sac TV's petition, finding that the City had shown by clear and convincing evidence that further disclosure would substantially interfere with an active investigation, specifically Abril's ongoing criminal case. The court acknowledged that more footage was required under CPRA but did not determine the extent due to the active investigation exemption.The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court concluded that the Superior Court's finding of an active investigation was not supported by substantial evidence. The court noted that a pending criminal prosecution alone does not constitute an active investigation under CPRA. The court also found that the City’s interpretation of the required disclosure was too narrow and that more context was needed to understand the incident involving the discharge of a firearm.The Court of Appeal vacated the Superior Court's ruling and directed it to hold further proceedings, including an in camera review of the City’s recordings, to determine the extent of additional disclosure required. The court emphasized the importance of providing sufficient context to fully understand the events captured in the recordings. The petition for rehearing was denied, and the judgment remained unchanged. View "Sacramento Television Stations Inc. v. Superior Ct." on Justia Law

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A data breach occurred at Wawa convenience stores, affecting customers' payment information. Wawa discovered the breach in December 2019 and contained it within days. The breach led to a class action lawsuit filed in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, consolidating 15 actions into three tracks: financial institution, employee, and consumer. The consumer track, which is the focus of this case, alleged negligence, breach of implied contract, and violations of state consumer protection laws, seeking both damages and injunctive relief.The District Court preliminarily approved a settlement that included compensation through Wawa gift cards and cash for out-of-pocket losses, as well as injunctive relief to improve Wawa's data security. Class member Theodore Frank objected, arguing that the settlement's attorney's fees were excessive and that the settlement included a clear sailing agreement and a fee reversion clause. The District Court approved the settlement and the attorney's fees, but Frank appealed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit vacated the fee award and remanded the case, instructing the District Court to scrutinize the reasonableness of the attorney's fees and the presence of any side agreements. On remand, the District Court found no clear sailing agreement or collusion and determined that the fee reversion was unintentional. The court reaffirmed the attorney's fee award based on the funds made available to the class, considering the benefits provided, including the injunctive relief.The Third Circuit reviewed the District Court's findings and affirmed the judgment, holding that the attorney's fee award was reasonable and that the settlement process was free of collusion or improper side agreements. The court emphasized the meaningful benefits provided to the class members and the appropriateness of the fee award based on the amount made available rather than the amount claimed. View "In re: Wawa, Inc. Data Security Litigation" on Justia Law

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McKesson Corporation sent unsolicited fax advertisements to medical practices, including McLaughlin Chiropractic Associates, in 2009 and 2010. McLaughlin sued McKesson in 2014 in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California, alleging violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA) for sending unsolicited faxes without the required opt-out notices. McLaughlin sought damages and an injunction and aimed to represent a class of fax recipients who received the advertisements on traditional fax machines or through online fax services. The District Court certified the class without distinguishing between the two methods of receipt.During the lawsuit, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) issued the Amerifactors order, which interpreted "telephone facsimile machine" in the TCPA to exclude online fax services. The District Court, following Ninth Circuit precedent, deemed the Amerifactors order binding and granted summary judgment to McKesson for claims involving online fax services. The court then decertified the class, leaving McLaughlin with claims for only 12 faxes received on a traditional machine and damages of $6,000. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the District Court's decision.The Supreme Court of the United States reviewed the case and held that the Hobbs Act does not bind district courts in civil enforcement proceedings to an agency’s interpretation of a statute. District courts must independently determine the law’s meaning under ordinary principles of statutory interpretation while affording appropriate respect to the agency’s interpretation. The Court reversed the Ninth Circuit's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "McLaughlin Chiropractic Associates, Inc. v. McKesson Corp." on Justia Law

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Verizon Wireless sought permits from the City of Milwaukee to install small cells and matching utility poles in a downtown plaza next to a major arena. The City denied most of the permits, initially citing aesthetic concerns and proximity to existing poles. Later, it claimed it lacked authority to grant the permits because the plaza was leased to Deer District LLC. Verizon sued the City, arguing the denials violated the Telecommunications Act (TCA) and Wisconsin state law. The district court ruled in favor of Verizon, finding the City's justifications insufficient and ordered the City to issue the permits. Verizon installed the poles, and the City accepted the ruling.The district court found that the City's initial reasons for denial were not supported by substantial evidence and violated the TCA. It also found the City's later rationale, based on the lease with Deer District, untimely and unconvincing. The court held that the City violated Wisconsin state law as well, and ordered the City to issue the permits. The City complied and did not appeal the decision. Deer District, an intervening defendant, appealed, challenging the district court's interpretation of the lease and state law, but not the TCA holding.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court dismissed Deer District's appeal for lack of Article III standing, as Deer District could not demonstrate that its injury would be redressed by a favorable decision. The court noted that the City did not join the appeal and that the injunction ran exclusively against the City. Therefore, even if the court ruled in Deer District's favor, it would not change the City's obligations under the district court's order. The appeal was dismissed for want of jurisdiction. View "Cellco Partnership v Deer District LLC" on Justia Law

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The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) issued an order requiring most television and radio broadcasters to compile and disclose employment-demographics data to the FCC, which would then post the data on its website. Petitioners, a group of broadcasters and associations, challenged the order, arguing that the FCC lacked statutory authority for such a requirement, and that it violated their First and Fifth Amendment rights, and was arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act.The FCC reinstated the collection of employment-demographics data in February 2024, ending a 22-year hiatus. The data collection, through Form 395-B, was intended to monitor industry trends and report to Congress. The FCC had previously collected this data until 2002, when it was suspended following a court ruling that found certain FCC regulations unconstitutional. The FCC's new order also included amendments to Form 395-B, such as adding non-binary gender categories and expanding job categories.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the FCC lacked statutory authority to require broadcasters to submit Form 395-B. The court explained that the FCC's broad public-interest authority must be linked to a distinct grant of authority from Congress, which was not present in this case. The court also rejected the FCC's argument that the 1992 Cable Act ratified its authority to collect Form 395-B data, noting that the Act tied this authority to equal employment opportunity regulations that were no longer in effect.The Fifth Circuit granted the petition and vacated the FCC's order, concluding that the FCC did not have the statutory authority to mandate the collection and disclosure of employment-demographics data from broadcasters. View "National Religious Broadcasters v. FCC" on Justia Law