Justia Communications Law Opinion Summaries

The City of Lakewood, Colorado enacted a business and occupation tax on certain telecommunications providers in 1969, which initially applied only to utility companies maintaining a telephone exchange and supplying local service within the city. Following changes in state and federal law promoting competitive neutrality and prohibiting barriers to entry, the city amended its tax ordinances in 1996 and again in 2015. The 1996 amendment expanded the tax to cover all providers of basic local telecommunications service, including some cellular services, while the 2015 amendment further broadened the scope to include all cellular and wireless voice service providers. Lakewood did not seek voter approval before enacting either amendment.After Lakewood audited MetroPCS California, LLC and assessed more than $1.6 million in unpaid business and occupation taxes, MetroPCS sued in the Jefferson County District Court. The district court granted summary judgment to MetroPCS, ruling that both the 1996 and 2015 Ordinances constituted "new taxes" under Colorado's Taxpayer's Bill of Rights (TABOR), and thus required advance voter approval. The court found the ordinances expanded the tax to previously untaxed providers and services, generating revenue that was not merely incidental or de minimis. Lakewood’s arguments that the ordinances simply clarified or updated the existing tax and did not produce significant new revenue were rejected. The district court declared both ordinances void and unenforceable for lack of voter approval.The Supreme Court of Colorado reviewed the case directly. Applying de novo review, it affirmed the district court’s judgment. The Court held that both the 1996 and 2015 Ordinances imposed new taxes within the meaning of TABOR, as they expanded the tax base to include new classes of providers and services, and the resulting revenue increases were not incidental. Because Lakewood failed to obtain voter approval prior to enacting these ordinances, both were held void and unenforceable. The Court remanded the case for consideration of MetroPCS’s request for appellate fees and costs. View "MetroPCS Cal., LLC v. City of Lakewood" on Justia Law

Law enforcement authorities investigating a graduate student at a university for rape served a search warrant on a major electronic service provider seeking data linked to the student’s university email account. Along with the warrant, the authorities obtained a nondisclosure order (NDO) that prohibited the provider from disclosing the existence of the warrant or the investigation to the target, the university, or others for 90 days. The provider did not contest the restriction as it applied to the target, but sought to modify the NDO so it could inform a trusted contact at the university about the warrant, arguing that doing so would not compromise the investigation and was required under state law and the First Amendment.In the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, the provider’s motion to modify the NDO was denied. The court based its decision on a sealed affidavit supporting the warrant and NDO, finding that several statutory criteria justifying nondisclosure were satisfied. The court also rejected the provider’s proposal to notify a university contact, expressing concern about its lack of jurisdiction over the university and the possibility of unauthorized disclosure. The NDO was later extended, but ultimately lifted after the student was arrested.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed the provider’s petition for a writ of mandate. The court held that the trial court complied with the California Electronic Communications Privacy Act by making the required findings before issuing the NDO, and that the NDO satisfied strict scrutiny under the First Amendment. The court reasoned that the NDO served a compelling governmental interest in protecting an ongoing criminal investigation and was narrowly tailored, as allowing disclosure to a university contact posed unacceptable risks. The petition for writ of mandate was denied, and each party was ordered to bear its own costs on appeal. View "Microsoft Corp. v. Superior Ct." on Justia Law

Several subsidiaries of a major entertainment company providing video streaming services were notified by the City of Santa Barbara that they owed significant sums in unpaid video users’ taxes, penalties, and interest for the period from 2018 to 2020. The City’s demand was based on a 2008 ordinance, approved by local voters, which imposed a tax on those using “video services” in the city. The ordinance defined “video services” broadly, including services delivered by Internet Protocol. The companies argued that their streaming services did not fall under the ordinance because streaming platforms do not provide a “channel” as contemplated by the ordinance, instead relying on customers’ independently obtained Internet services.Following the City’s deficiency notice, the companies appealed administratively. An independent hearing officer upheld the City’s position, concluding that the ordinance applied to video streaming. The companies then sought judicial review in the Superior Court of Santa Barbara County by filing a petition for a writ of administrative mandate. The trial court denied their petition, determining that the ordinance was intended to apply to streaming, that its enforcement did not violate federal or state law, and that the City was not required to provide additional notice before enforcement.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Six, affirmed the lower court’s judgment. The appellate court held that the ordinance, as approved by the electorate, applies to providers of video streaming services and that the ordinary, non-technical meaning of “channel” should govern. The court further held that applying the tax to streaming services does not violate the Internet Tax Freedom Act, the First Amendment, or the California Constitution, nor did the City’s delayed enforcement require additional voter approval or special notice under state law. The judgment denying the companies’ petition was affirmed. View "Disney Platform Distribution, Inc. v. City of Santa Barbara" on Justia Law

A law enforcement agency served an electronic service provider with a search warrant for data associated with an email account belonging to a university graduate student under investigation for rape. The warrant was accompanied by a nondisclosure order (NDO) prohibiting the provider from notifying the student or anyone at the university about the warrant for 90 days. The provider did not contest the restriction against notifying the account holder but sought permission to inform a trusted contact at the university about the warrant's existence, citing concerns under the California Electronic Communications Privacy Act (CalECPA) and the First Amendment.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County reviewed a sealed affidavit and found that several statutory criteria for “adverse results” under CalECPA were present, justifying the NDO. When the provider requested to modify the order to allow notification of a university contact, the court considered the proposal but ultimately declined after law enforcement objected, noting the court lacked jurisdiction over the university and could not ensure compliance with the NDO. The order was extended once and later lifted after the target was arrested. The provider’s initial petition for writ of mandate was summarily denied by the California Court of Appeal. The California Supreme Court then granted review and transferred the matter back to the appellate court for further consideration.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case de novo and held that the trial court made the required findings under CalECPA before issuing the NDO and that the NDO did not violate the provider’s First Amendment rights. The court found the NDO served a compelling government interest and was narrowly tailored to protect the integrity of an ongoing investigation. The petition for writ of mandate was denied. View "Microsoft Corp. v. Superior Ct." on Justia Law

The case involves a Nevada-domiciled trust, managed by a Nevada family trust company, whose trustee petitioned the Second Judicial District Court of Nevada to seal confidential information and close all court proceedings under NRS 164.041 and NRS 669A.256. The district court sealed nearly all documents and concealed the existence of the case, citing concerns over revealing personal, financial, and business information, and later provided limited case information after media inquiries. Several media organizations, having reported on the matter—especially due to its connection to Rupert Murdoch and control over major media holdings—sought intervention to access court records and proceedings, arguing that the First Amendment presumption of public access applied.The probate commissioner recommended allowing media intervention but denying access, and the district court entered an order adopting this recommendation. The court interpreted the statutes as granting automatic and comprehensive confidentiality, finding that privacy and security concerns—heightened by the parties’ public profiles—constituted a compelling interest for sealing and closure. The district court also concluded it lacked discretion to consider redaction as an alternative and held that the statutes’ confidentiality provisions justified the broad closure, even after the Nevada Supreme Court’s decision in Falconi v. Eighth Judicial District Court recognized a First Amendment presumption of access in civil and family court proceedings.The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed the district court’s decision, holding that NRS 164.041 and NRS 669A.256 permit only provisional sealing and require judicial discretion. The statutes do not automatically justify blanket sealing or closure, nor do they displace the common law or constitutional presumption of openness. The court found that the district court failed to make specific, non-speculative factual findings to justify the sealing and closure and did not adequately consider less restrictive alternatives. The Supreme Court granted the petition for a writ of mandamus, directing the district court to vacate its sealing order and conduct the required analysis for each document and hearing transcript. View "New York Times Co. v. District Court" on Justia Law

Two individuals brought a class action against Amazon, alleging that its Virtual Try-On (VTO) feature—used to preview makeup and eyewear products by rendering them on users’ faces via their mobile devices—violated the Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act (BIPA). The VTO software, developed both in-house and by a third party, captured users’ facial geometry to overlay products for virtual preview. The plaintiffs claimed Amazon collected, stored, and used their facial data and that of many others in Illinois without proper notice, informed consent, or the creation of required data retention and destruction policies as mandated by BIPA.After removal from Illinois state court to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, the plaintiffs moved for class certification under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3). The district court certified a class of all individuals who used Amazon’s VTO feature in Illinois after September 7, 2016. The district court found the class satisfied the requirements of numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy, and that common questions—primarily concerning the VTO’s functionality and Amazon’s use of biometric data—predominated over individual questions such as location and damages. It also found a class action was superior due to the size and cost of potential individual litigation.On interlocutory appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed only the class certification decision, focusing on predominance and superiority. The court affirmed the district court’s certification, holding that common questions about Amazon’s alleged statutory violations predominated and that individual questions regarding user location and damages were manageable. The court also agreed that a class action was superior to individual suits, given the complexity and cost of litigation, and affirmed the district court’s discretion. View "Svoboda v Amazon.com Inc." on Justia Law

Disney Platform Distribution, BAMTech, and Hulu, subsidiaries of the Walt Disney Company, provide video streaming services to subscribers in the City of Santa Barbara. In 2022, the City’s Tax Administrator notified these companies that they had failed to collect and remit video users’ taxes under Ordinance 5471 for the period January 1, 2018, through December 31, 2020, resulting in substantial assessments. The companies appealed to the City Administrator, and a retired Associate Justice served as hearing officer, ultimately upholding the Tax Administrator’s decision.Following the administrative appeal, the companies sought judicial review by filing a petition for a writ of administrative mandate in the Superior Court of Santa Barbara County. The trial court denied their petition, finding that the Ordinance does apply to video streaming services and rejecting arguments that the Ordinance violated the Internet Tax Freedom Act, the First Amendment, and Article XIII C of the California Constitution. The trial court also found there was no violation of Public Utilities Code section 799’s notice requirements, as the City’s actions did not constitute a change in the tax base or adoption of a new tax.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Six, affirmed the trial court’s judgment. The court held that the Ordinance applies to video streaming services, interpreting the term “channel” in its ordinary, non-technical sense and finding that the voters intended technological neutrality. The court further held that the Ordinance does not violate the Internet Tax Freedom Act because video streaming subscriptions and DVD sales/rentals are not “similar” under the Act. Additionally, the court concluded the tax is not a content-based regulation of speech under the First Amendment, and that delayed enforcement did not constitute a tax increase requiring additional voter approval or notice under the California Constitution or Public Utilities Code section 799. View "Disney Platform Distribution v. City of Santa Barbara" on Justia Law

A company operating movie theaters in several Midwestern states offered free movie trailers on its website to attract customers. After a website visitor viewed these trailers, she began to receive targeted advertisements on her Facebook page. She alleged that the company had installed a program, Meta Pixel, which tracked her activity and shared her personal information with Meta (Facebook’s parent company). She claimed that the company, as a “video tape service provider,” had a duty under the Video Privacy Protection Act not to disclose her personally identifiable information without consent.The United States District Court for the District of Minnesota dismissed the complaint. The district court found that the company was not a “video tape service provider” as defined by the statute, because it was not engaged in the business of renting, selling, or delivering prerecorded video cassette tapes or similar audio visual materials. As a result, the court concluded that the company had no statutory obligation to withhold the plaintiff’s personal information under the Act.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the district court’s dismissal de novo. The appellate court agreed with the district court, holding that movie theaters are not “engaged in the business” of renting, selling, or delivering prerecorded video cassette tapes or similar audio visual materials. The court reasoned that the statutory definition requires a physical medium similar to video cassette tapes, which does not include theatrical screenings or free online trailers. The court further determined that offering trailers online did not constitute a separate business of delivering audio visual materials for livelihood or gain. Accordingly, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Christopherson v. Cinema Entertainment Corp." on Justia Law

The State of Nevada brought a consumer protection action against TikTok, Inc. and related entities, alleging violations of the Nevada Deceptive Trade Practices Act (NDTPA). The State claimed that TikTok knowingly designed its social media platform to addict young users, causing various harms to minors in Nevada, and made misrepresentations and material omissions about the platform’s safety. The complaint detailed TikTok’s collection and sale of young users’ personal data to advertisers, the use of design features to maximize user engagement, and public statements about youth safety that the State alleged were misleading.The case was first heard in the Eighth Judicial District Court of Nevada, where TikTok moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction and failure to state a claim, arguing that the court lacked jurisdiction, and that the Communications Decency Act (CDA) § 230 and the First Amendment immunized it from liability. The district court denied TikTok’s motion in part, finding that it had specific personal jurisdiction over TikTok based on purposeful conduct directed at Nevada, and that the State’s NDTPA claims were not barred by CDA § 230 or the First Amendment. Other claims were dismissed without prejudice.The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed TikTok’s petition for writ relief. The court held that the district court properly exercised specific personal jurisdiction over TikTok, as the State made a prima facie showing that TikTok purposefully directed its conduct at Nevada through targeted marketing and data collection. The court further held that the CDA § 230 and the First Amendment do not bar the State’s NDTPA claims at the pleading stage, as the claims target TikTok’s own alleged misrepresentations and harmful design features, not third-party content or expressive activity. The Supreme Court of Nevada denied TikTok’s petition. View "TikTok, Inc. v. District Court" on Justia Law

The case concerns multiple petitions for review challenging a Federal Communications Commission (FCC) order that established new rate caps for communications services provided to incarcerated individuals. The FCC’s order, issued pursuant to the Martha Wright-Reed Just and Reasonable Communications Act of 2022, also dismissed as moot certain petitions for clarification and waiver filed by Securus Technologies, LLC, a provider of these services. After the FCC published portions of the order in the Federal Register, several parties—including service providers, advocacy organizations, and state governments—filed petitions for review in various federal appellate courts, contesting different aspects of the order.Following the filing of these petitions, the FCC notified the United States Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation (JPML) under 28 U.S.C. § 2112(a)(3), which randomly selected the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit to hear the consolidated petitions. The administrative record was filed in the First Circuit, and subsequent petitions filed in other circuits were transferred there pursuant to statute. Some petitioners, notably Securus and Pay Tel Communications, Inc., argued that the petitions should be transferred to the Fifth Circuit, asserting that it was the proper venue based on the timing and nature of the initial filings. The First Circuit denied these transfer motions, and a request for mandamus to the Supreme Court was also denied.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that the petitions for review are properly before it, as the administrative record was filed there pursuant to the JPML’s direction. The court rejected arguments for mandatory transfer to the Fifth Circuit, finding no legal basis to override the JPML’s selection or to collaterally attack its determination. The court also declined to exercise its discretion to transfer the petitions elsewhere. View "Direct Action for Rights and Equality v. Federal Communications Commission" on Justia Law