Justia Communications Law Opinion Summaries

In 1984, Goldsmith, a portrait artist, granted Vanity Fair a one-time license to use a Prince photograph to illustrate a story about the musician. Vanity Fair hired Andy Warhol, who made a silkscreen using Goldsmith’s photo. Vanity Fair published the resulting image, crediting Goldsmith for the “source photograph,” and paying her $400. Warhol used Goldsmith’s photograph to derive 15 additional works. In 2016, the Andy Warhol Foundation (AWF) licensed one of those works, “Orange Prince,” to Condé Nast to illustrate a magazine story about Prince. AWF received $10,000. Goldsmith received nothing. When Goldsmith asserted copyright infringement, AWF sued her. The district court granted AWF summary judgment on its assertion of “fair use,” 17 U.S.C. 107. The Second Circuit reversed.The Supreme Court affirmed, agreeing that the first fair use factor, “the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes,” weighs against AWF’s commercial licensing to Condé Nast. Both the 1984 and the 2016 publications are portraits of Prince used in magazines to illustrate stories about Prince; the “environment[s]” are not “distinct and different.” The 2016 use also is of a commercial nature. Orange Prince reasonably can be perceived to portray Prince as iconic, whereas Goldsmith’s portrayal is photorealistic but the purpose of that use is still to illustrate a magazine about Prince. The degree of difference is not enough for the first factor to favor AWF. To hold otherwise would potentially authorize a range of commercial copying of photographs, to be used for purposes that are substantially the same as those of the originals. AWF offers no independent justification for copying the photograph. View "Andy Warhol Foundation for Visual Arts, Inc. v. Goldsmith" on Justia Law

A 2017 terrorist attack on an Istanbul nightclub, committed on behalf of ISIS, killed Alassaf and 38 others. Alassaf’s family sued Facebook, Twitter, and Google (which owns YouTube) under 18 U.S.C. 2333, which permits U.S. nationals who have been injured by an act of international terrorism to sue for damages. They alleged that the companies knowingly allowed ISIS and its supporters to use their platforms and “recommendation” algorithms for recruiting, fundraising, and spreading propaganda and have profited from the advertisements placed on ISIS content. The Ninth Circuit reversed the dismissal of the complaint.A unanimous Supreme Court reversed. The 2016 Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act, section 2333(d)(2), imposes secondary civil liability on anyone “who aids and abets, by knowingly providing substantial assistance, or who conspires with the person who committed such an act of international terrorism.” The Court concluded that it is not enough for a defendant to have given substantial assistance to a transcendent enterprise. A defendant must have knowingly provided substantial assistance in the commission of the actionable wrong—here, an act of international terrorism. The allegations do not show that the defendants gave ISIS such knowing and substantial assistance that they culpably participated in the attack. There are no allegations that the platforms were used to plan the attack; that the defendants gave ISIS special treatment; nor that the defendants carefully screened content before allowing users to upload it. The mere creation of media platforms is no more culpable than the creation of email, cell phones, or the internet generally.The allegations rest primarily on passive nonfeasance. The plaintiffs identify no duty that would require communication-providing services to terminate customers after discovering that the customers were using the service for illicit ends. The expansive scope of the claims would necessarily hold the defendants liable for aiding and abetting every ISIS terrorist act committed anywhere in the world. The Ninth Circuit improperly focused primarily on the value of the platforms to ISIS, rather than whether the defendants culpably associated themselves with the attack. View "Twitter, Inc. v. Taamneh" on Justia Law

In 2015, ISIS terrorists unleashed coordinated attacks across Paris, killing 130 victims, including Gonzalez, a 23-year-old U.S. citizen. Gonzalez’s family sued Google under 18 U.S.C. 2333(a), (d)(2). They alleged that Google was directly and secondarily liable for the terrorist attack that killed Gonzalez, citing the use of YouTube, which Google owns and operates, by ISIS and ISIS supporters.The Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit, finding most of the claims were barred by the Communications Decency Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. 230(c)(1). The sole exceptions were claims based on allegations that Google approved ISIS videos for advertisements and then shared proceeds with ISIS through YouTube’s revenue-sharing system. The court held that these potential claims were not barred by section 230, but that the allegations nonetheless failed to state a viable claim. The complaint neither plausibly alleged that “Google reached an agreement with ISIS,” as required for conspiracy liability, nor that Google’s acts were “intended to intimidate or coerce a civilian population, or to influence or affect a government,” as required for a direct-liability claim.The Supreme Court vacated. The complaint. independent of section 230, states little if any claim for relief. The Court noted its contemporaneously-issued “Twitter” decision and held that the complaint fails to state a claim for aiding and abetting. The Court remanded the case for consideration in light of the Twitter decision. View "Gonzalez v. Google LLC" on Justia Law

Chapman filed a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) (5 ILCS 140/1) request, seeking information pertaining to the Citation Administration and Adjudication System (CANVAS) for the enforcement of parking, red-light, and speed-camera tickets. The Chicago Department of Finance denied the request, citing section 7(1)(o), which exempts: “Administrative or technical information associated with automated data processing operations, including but not limited to software, operating protocols, computer program abstracts, file layouts, source listings, object modules, load modules, user guides, documentation pertaining to all logical and physical design of computerized systems, employee manuals, and any other information that, if disclosed, would jeopardize the security of the system or its data or the security of materials exempt under this Section.” The First District affirmed an order requiring the production of the documents.The Illinois Supreme Court reversed. The requested records are file layouts under section 7(1)(o); a reasonable, commonsense interpretation of section 7(1)(o) indicates that file layouts are exempt from disclosure. While public records are presumed to be open and accessible, the legislature has specifically provided for a narrow exemption with respect to administrative or technical information associated with automated data processing operations. Section 7(1)(o)'s exemption is focused on the security of the government body’s data system, and requiring a hearing to determine whether disclosure would jeopardize the security of that system every time a file layout is requested would weaken the specific exemption. View "Chapman v. Chicago Department of Finance" on Justia Law

The Communications Act of 1934 and the Telecommunications Act of 1996 were enacted to provide all Americans with universal access to telecommunications services. The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) implemented that mandate by establishing the Universal Service Fund, which now comprises four program mechanisms to “help[] compensate telephone companies or other communications entities for providing access to telecommunications services at reasonable and affordable rates throughout the country, including rural, insular and high costs areas, and to public institutions,” 47 U.S.C. 254. Certain telecommunications carriers must fund these efforts; on a quarterly basis, the FCC publishes the percentage of “interstate and international end-user telecommunications revenue” that covered telecommunications carriers must contribute to the Fund’s programs (the quarterly contribution factor). The Fund is administered by the Universal Service Administrative Company (USAC).A group of consumers, a nonprofit organization, and a carrier challenged this statutory arrangement as violating the nondelegation doctrine. They also alleged that the role of a private entity in administering the Fund violates the private-nondelegation doctrine. The Sixth Circuit denied a petition for review. Section 254 sufficiently guides the FCC’s discretion; Congress provided an intelligible principle and its delegation does not violate the separation of powers. USAC is subordinate to the FCC and performs ministerial and fact-gathering functions. View "Consumers' Research v. Federal Communications Commission" on Justia Law

independent-expenditure political action committees (super PACs) do not give money directly to candidates, party committees, or ballot-initiative movements. They spend money themselves to advocate for or against candidates, parties, or initiatives. The Fund wants to operate as an Indiana independent-expenditure PAC but fears that the state’s Election Code does not allow it to accept unlimited donations from corporations, in violation of the First Amendment. Indiana’s election officials say they do not believe their laws could be enforced that way.Indiana’s campaign finance laws allow corporations to make contributions "to aid in the election or defeat of a candidate or the success or defeat of a political party or a public question.” Section 4 imposes limits on direct corporate contributions to candidates and party committees but imposes no cap on contributions to committees unaffiliated with a political party, such as PACs. Section 5 ensures that corporations cannot use PACs as a loophole to avoid contribution caps by requiring corporations to designate their contributions to PACs “for disbursement to a specific candidate or committee listed under section 4.” Section 5 does not address how or whether a corporation could earmark a contribution for a PAC's independent expenditure for or against a candidate or party.The Seventh Circuit certified to the Indiana Supreme Court Does the Indiana Election Code—in particular, sections 3-9-2-3 to -6—prohibit or otherwise limit corporate contributions to PACs or other entities that engage in independent campaign-related expenditures? View "Indiana Right to Life Victory Fund v. Morales" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted in part and denied in part the Lawrence County Sheriff's Office's motion for judgment on the pleadings as to this action brought by Relator, an inmate, and denied as moot Relator's claim for a writ of mandamus, holding that the mandamus claim was moot.Relator sought certain records from the Lawrence County Sheriff's Office, which determined that the request was too vague to grant. Relator then filed this action requesting, among other things, a writ of mandamus ordering the Sheriff to produce the requested records and seeking awards of statutory damages, attorney fees, and court costs. The Sheriff filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings. Thereafter, Relator received the requested records. The Supreme Court held (1) the Sheriff was entitled to judgment on the pleadings as to Relator's mandamus claim, which was moot; (2) Relator was entitled to $700 in statutory damages but was not entitled to attorney fees and court costs; and (3) Relator's remaining motions were moot. View "State ex rel. Woods v. Lawrence County Sheriff's Office" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed as modified the judgment of the district court denying Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiffs' claims of open records violations, holding that Iowa's Open Records Act, Iowa Code chapter 22, may permit Plaintiffs to pursue claims based on untimeliness and that the district court did not err in granting Defendants' motion to dismiss.In 2020 and 2021, Plaintiffs requested public records from Defendants. Plaintiffs brought this suit in December 2021, and in January 2022, Defendants provided responsive records. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the timeliness claims were moot. The district court denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed as modified, holding (1) most of the claims concerning production of already-produced records were moot; and (2) with some qualifications, Plaintiffs could pursue claims that Defendants violated chapter 22 through delays in responding to Plaintiffs' open records requests. View "Belin v. Reynolds" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted a writ compelling the Mansfield Correctional Institution to produce records requested by Relator against the Mansfield Correctional Institution under Ohio's Public Records Act, Ohio Rev. Code 149.43, holding that Relator was entitled to a writ.Relator requested information and records from the prison warden's office regarding three assaults committed against her son while he was incarcerated at the prison. After the prison asserted that all responsive records had been produced Relator brought this action. The Supreme Court granted the writ with respect to some of the requested records and granted a limited writ compelling the prison to produce additional requested records or to certify that no responsive records existed and denied Relator's motions to transfer this case to the court of claims, to strike the prison's merit brief, and other motions, holding (1) the prison failed to prove that certain withheld information fell squarely within an exception to the Act; (2) the prison did not carry its burden of proving that no other documents existed that were responsive to certain requests; and (3) Relator was not entitled to a writ of mandamus as to the remaining evidence. View "State ex rel. Sultaana v. Mansfield Correctional Institution" on Justia Law

The Lemasters run a Lawrence County, Kentucky towing business, which was on the county’s “rotation list” of companies to call when it needed to order a tow. Both as fire chief and in his towing business, Lemaster sparred with Carter, Lawrence County’s “judge-executive,” the elected head of its executive branch. Lemaster criticized Carter on Facebook. Five days later, the 911 Center sent an email to dispatchers; its subject identified Lemaster Towing and the Cherryville Fire Department. Its body stated in all caps: “Per Judge Carter do not tone them out on any fire calls[;] use nearest department[;] . . . Lemaster Towing is no longer on the rotation list[.]”The Lemasters sued Carter and Lawrence County under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and state law, alleging that Carter violated the First Amendment by removing Lemaster Towing from the rotation list in retaliation for Lemaster’s criticisms. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed as to the Monell claims against the county; Lemaster did not tie the actions to any county policy. The court reversed as to Carter. Carter conceded that his communications with dispatch employees could constitute an adverse action. The record would allow a rational jury to find that Lemaster’s Facebook post motivated Carter’s decision to remove Lemaster Towing from the rotation list. View "Lemaster v. Lawrence County, Kentucky" on Justia Law