Justia Communications Law Opinion Summaries

Several residential property owners and a short-term rental platform challenged two ordinances enacted by the city. The first ordinance, adopted in 2023, restricts short-term rental licenses to one per residential block and distributes them by lottery. The second ordinance, adopted in 2024, requires short-term rental platforms to verify the license status of properties before facilitating transactions, and to periodically reverify this status. Plaintiffs alleged that these ordinances infringed upon their constitutional and statutory rights, including claims under the Takings Clause and Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana reviewed the plaintiffs’ claims. It dismissed all claims under Rule 12(b)(6), except for Airbnb’s Fourth Amendment challenge regarding a monthly reporting requirement in the 2024 Ordinance. The district court granted Airbnb summary judgment on that particular claim. Airbnb appealed the dismissal of its other claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit examined the case de novo. The court held that the 2023 Ordinance did not constitute a per se or regulatory taking under the Takings Clause, noting that the ordinance neither physically appropriated property nor severely impaired economic expectations. It also found the ordinance to be a reasonable zoning regulation that balanced public interests. Regarding Section 230, the Fifth Circuit ruled that neither the booking nor verification requirements of the 2024 Ordinance treated Airbnb as the publisher or speaker of third-party content, and thus were not preempted. The court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the Takings Clause claim and the Section 230 claim, as well as the dismissal of other claims raised by the plaintiffs. View "Bodin v. New Orleans" on Justia Law

In this case, several major third-party food delivery platforms operating in New York City challenged a city ordinance enacted in 2021. The law required these platforms to share specific customer information—including full name, phone number, email address, delivery address, and order contents—with restaurants upon request. Typically, platforms retain this data and provide only limited details to restaurants. The platforms argued that the law forced them to disclose information about their customers, implicating First Amendment protections against compelled speech.Prior to this appeal, the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York reviewed cross-motions for summary judgment. The district court determined that the law compelled speech by requiring platforms to share customer data, and concluded that the deferential standard from Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of Ohio did not apply. Instead, the court applied the intermediate scrutiny standard from Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission of New York and found the law could not survive that review. The district court granted summary judgment to the platforms and permanently enjoined enforcement of the law against their Marketplace products.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case on appeal. The City argued that Zauderer’s deferential standard should apply and, alternatively, that the law was valid under intermediate scrutiny. The Second Circuit disagreed, holding that Zauderer did not apply because the law compelled disclosure about third parties, not about the platforms’ own services. Applying Central Hudson’s intermediate scrutiny, the court found the law failed because the City had not shown a reasonable fit between its interests and the law’s means, especially given less burdensome alternatives. The Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment, holding the law unconstitutional as applied to the platforms’ Marketplace products. View "DoorDash, Inc. v. City of New York" on Justia Law

Amazon.com Services, LLC filed suit against Perplexity AI, Inc., an artificial intelligence company, asserting that Perplexity’s web browser tool, Comet, unlawfully accessed Amazon’s website in violation of the federal Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) and California’s Comprehensive Computer Data Access and Fraud Act (CDAFA). Perplexity’s Comet browser includes an AI “Assistant” that, when activated by a user, navigates Amazon.com on the user’s behalf, sending browser screenshots to Perplexity’s servers for further instruction. Amazon claimed that this use of the Assistant, despite their explicit prohibition, amounted to unauthorized access to its servers.The United States District Court for the Northern District of California granted Amazon a preliminary injunction, finding that Amazon was likely to succeed on its claims under both the CFAA and CDAFA. The district court concluded that Perplexity, through its Assistant, accessed Amazon’s password-protected accounts without authorization, obtained private information, and caused Amazon to incur significant costs responding to this activity. The court also determined that the equitable factors supported granting the injunction, citing irreparable harm and the public interest.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit vacated the preliminary injunction and remanded for further proceedings. The Ninth Circuit held that Amazon was unlikely to succeed on the merits of its claims because Perplexity did not “access” Amazon’s computers within the meaning of the CFAA or CDAFA; instead, the access was performed by the user employing the Assistant as a tool. The court found that the district court erred in its analysis of the equitable factors, which favored Perplexity, and concluded that an injunction was not warranted under these circumstances. The disposition was to vacate the injunction and remand. View "AMAZON.COM SERVICES, LLC V. PERPLEXITY AI, INC." on Justia Law

Texas enacted a law imposing new requirements on certain social media platforms, termed "digital service providers" (DSPs), to restrict minors’ access to specific categories of content. These requirements included monitoring and filtering content deemed harmful, prohibiting targeted ads to minors, preventing unlawful ads, verifying user age for access to certain material, and requiring age registration for account creation. Two groups challenged the law: one group, including technology industry organizations, contested the monitoring and filtering requirement; another group, comprised of a student coalition, individuals, and an ad agency, challenged several provisions, including the monitoring and filtering, targeted ads, unlawful ads, and age-verification requirements.In the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas, both plaintiffs sought preliminary injunctions against enforcement of the law. The district court granted injunctions in part, enjoining the monitoring and filtering requirements for both groups, and enjoining the targeted ads, unlawful ads, and age-verification requirements for the student coalition group. The court found these provisions likely unconstitutional or vague, and held that the plaintiffs had standing based on the chilling effect on their speech and listening rights. The Attorney General of Texas appealed, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit consolidated the cases.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the student coalition plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge the monitoring and filtering, targeted ads, and unlawful ads requirements, as they were not directly regulated and failed to show a substantial risk of imminent harm. Their challenge to the age-verification requirement was foreclosed by Supreme Court precedent. However, the court held that the monitoring and filtering requirement, as challenged by the industry groups, is preempted by Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s injunction as to the industry group, but vacated and remanded the injunction as to the student coalition plaintiffs. View "Computer & Communications Industry Association v. Paxton" on Justia Law

A wireless carrier began operating a cell tower in a city, after which several nearby residents reported experiencing symptoms such as headaches and nausea, attributing these to radiofrequency emissions from the tower. The city’s board of health investigated and issued an emergency order, finding the symptoms consistent with radiation sickness, deeming the cell tower a public nuisance, and requiring the operator to show cause why the tower should not be shut down. If the operator did not respond, the order would require cessation of the tower’s operations.The cell tower operator responded by filing suit in the United States District Court, arguing that the board’s order was preempted by federal law, specifically the Telecommunications Act of 1996 (TCA). The board subsequently rescinded its order, and the federal suit was voluntarily dismissed. Following this, six residents filed an action in the Massachusetts Superior Court, challenging the board’s decision to rescind the order and arguing that the board had failed in its duty to abate a public nuisance. The Superior Court judge treated the board’s motion to dismiss as one for judgment on the pleadings and ruled that federal law preempted the board’s order, dismissing the case.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, after transferring the case from the Appeals Court, affirmed the dismissal. The court held that enforcement of the board’s order would conflict with the TCA’s objective of establishing a uniform, national regulatory regime for wireless telecommunications, including radiofrequency emissions standards set by the Federal Communications Commission. Local efforts to impose additional restrictions based on health concerns, even as an adjudicative order, were found to be preempted by federal law and an obstacle to the accomplishment of congressional purposes. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed. View "Gilardi v. Board of Health of Pittsfield" on Justia Law

The case centers on the Federal Communications Commission’s (FCC) regulation of the 4.9 GHz band, which is allocated for public safety communications but has seen very limited use. To address underutilization, the FCC created a plan to appoint a “Band Manager” to oversee this spectrum. The new rules allow the Band Manager to transfer unused portions of the spectrum to FirstNet, a federal entity that operates a public safety network in a different frequency band. Incumbent licensees, such as local governments and transit agencies, faced restrictions limiting their rights to expand use within this band, while some organizations argued the FCC did not go far enough in reallocating the spectrum.Several parties challenged the FCC’s order. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit addressed whether the petitioners had standing. It found that the Public Safety Spectrum Alliance and the Public Safety Broadband Technology Association lacked Article III standing due to insufficient evidence of injury to their members, and thus their petition was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. However, the court determined that at least one petitioner from the Coalition for Emergency Response and Critical Infrastructure, specifically the San Francisco Bay Area Rapid Transit District, had standing, allowing the court to consider their claims.On the merits, the court held that the FCC’s order did not violate statutory limitations on FirstNet’s authority, did not require competitive bidding under the Communications Act, and did not unlawfully assign spectrum to a federal entity. The court also found that the FCC’s actions were not arbitrary or capricious, as the agency reasonably balanced the interests of incumbent licensees against the public interest and explained its regulatory choices. Challenges to the lawfulness of future spectrum transfers to FirstNet were deemed unripe. The court dismissed the petitions lacking standing and denied or dismissed the remaining challenges. View "Public Safety Spectrum Alliance v. FCC" on Justia Law

After the Nebraska Public Service Commission (PSC) awarded a grant to a telecommunications company to build a broadband network in rural Gage County, the company sought a permit from the Gage County Board of Supervisors to construct its network along a county right-of-way. The permit was initially recommended for approval by the county highway department, but the board ultimately denied the application. The main reason expressed by the board was an objection to the company’s receipt of public funds to build in areas that overlapped with another provider, which had also received public funding from the county.The telecommunications company filed a petition in error in the District Court for Gage County, arguing that the board’s decision exceeded its authority and was arbitrary. The district court agreed, finding that the board had improperly attempted to overturn the PSC’s grant funding decision and that it lacked the authority to do so. The court concluded that the board’s denial was not based on relevant statutory grounds and sustained the petition in error.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed whether the board’s denial could properly be challenged by a petition in error and whether the board acted within its authority. The court held that the county board was required to act in a judicial manner when considering such permit applications and that the company properly pursued relief through a petition in error. The Supreme Court determined that the board’s denial was an improper attempt to nullify the PSC’s funding decision, which the board had no authority to do, and that no other valid basis supported the denial. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s decision to sustain the petition in error. View "Pinpoint Holdings v. Gage County" on Justia Law

A man was investigated after Google and Yahoo flagged several of his email accounts for sending and storing what appeared to be child pornography. Both companies identified the user through information like a shared recovery phone number, birthdate, and selfies associated with the accounts. Yahoo manually reviewed and confirmed the images as child pornography before reporting them to the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children (NCMEC). Google used both human review and a hash-value matching protocol, whereby a file’s unique digital fingerprint was compared against a database of previously identified illegal images. One of the files in the defendant’s account matched the hash of a known child pornography image. Law enforcement, after receiving tips from NCMEC, conducted warrantless searches and confirmed the illicit nature of the files, leading to search warrants for the defendant’s residence and devices, which yielded more incriminating evidence.The United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida denied the defendant’s motions to suppress the evidence (arguing a Fourth Amendment violation), to dismiss one of the charges on double jeopardy grounds, and to exclude certain evidence. The court also rejected his arguments concerning the admissibility of defense evidence, the sufficiency of the evidence, and the jury instructions. The defendant was convicted by a jury on both distribution and possession charges and given an enhanced sentence based on a finding of a pattern of activity involving abuse or exploitation. His subsequent motions for psychological evaluation and sentencing continuance were also denied.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that Google’s use of hash-value matching constituted a valid private search under the Fourth Amendment, so the government’s warrantless review did not violate the defendant’s rights. The court also held that possession and distribution of child pornography are separate offenses for double jeopardy purposes. The appellate court affirmed all district court decisions except for the application of a pattern-of-activity sentencing enhancement, which it found improper; it vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing. View "USA v. Brillhart" on Justia Law

In response to a mass shooting in Buffalo, New York, that was planned, publicized, and broadcast via social media, the state legislature enacted the Hateful Conduct Law (HCL). This statute requires social media networks conducting business in New York to provide a clear, easily accessible mechanism for users to report "hateful conduct" and to maintain a public policy describing how the network will address such reports. "Hateful conduct" is defined as using a social media network to vilify, humiliate, or incite violence against groups based on protected characteristics. Plaintiffs, including operators of social media platforms, challenged the law before it took effect, arguing that it would compel them to speak against certain content and chill protected expression.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York granted a preliminary injunction, finding that the HCL likely violated the First Amendment by compelling social media networks to endorse the state’s definition of hateful conduct and to publish policies about it. The court determined that the law could have a chilling effect on free speech, even though it did not require removal of the content itself. The Attorney General appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, which determined that resolution of the constitutional issues depended on the proper interpretation of the HCL under New York law. The Second Circuit certified three questions to the New York Court of Appeals concerning the scope of the statute’s requirements.The New York Court of Appeals concluded that social media networks comply with the law if their reporting mechanism and public policy do not explicitly reference or define "hateful conduct," as long as users can report such conduct and learn how reports will be addressed. The court further held that the law does not require networks to respond to reports of hateful conduct. The certified questions were answered accordingly. View "Volokh v James" on Justia Law

The case concerns a challenge to Ohio’s Parental Notification by Social Media Operators Act, which requires operators of certain social media platforms to obtain verifiable parental consent before unemancipated children under sixteen can enter into contracts to use their services. The Act defines covered operators based on features such as enabling social interaction, profile creation, and content sharing, and details factors to determine whether a site targets or is likely to be accessed by minors. The law imposes civil penalties for non-compliance and grants enforcement authority to the Ohio Attorney General.When the Act was set to take effect, NetChoice, LLC—a trade association representing major online platforms—sued the Ohio Attorney General in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio. NetChoice argued the Act was unconstitutional on First Amendment and vagueness grounds, asserting that it would chill protected speech and was impermissibly vague about which platforms were covered. The district court agreed, finding that NetChoice had standing, that the Act was a facially unconstitutional content-based restriction on speech that failed strict scrutiny, and that it was unconstitutionally vague. The court permanently enjoined enforcement of the Act.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court’s judgment. The appellate court held that NetChoice lacked third-party standing to assert the First Amendment rights of its members’ minor users due to a conflict of interest between the trade group and the affected minors. The court further found that, even considering NetChoice’s own First Amendment and vagueness claims, NetChoice failed to show the Act was facially unconstitutional. The Sixth Circuit held that the Act, while content-based and subject to strict scrutiny, was narrowly tailored to compelling state interests in protecting children and was not impermissibly vague in all its applications. The case was remanded for entry of judgment in favor of the Attorney General. View "NetChoice, LLC v. Yost" on Justia Law