Justia Communications Law Opinion Summaries

Four candidates for federal office challenged a Public Notice issued by the Media Bureau of the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) that interpreted federal law to require broadcasters to offer the lowest unit charge (LUC) advertising rates not only to candidates for public office but also to political parties and joint fundraising committees with non-candidate members during pre-election periods. The candidates argued that this expanded interpretation unlawfully diluted their statutory right to LUC rates by extending it to entities whose spending cannot be considered spending by or on behalf of a candidate under campaign finance law.Prior to seeking judicial review, the candidates filed an Application for Review with the FCC, urging the Commission to set aside the Media Bureau’s Public Notice as a novel and unlawful interpretation of the LUC requirement. The Commission took no action on the application for several months, even as the relevant election period approached. The candidates then filed a Petition for Review with the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, seeking expedited consideration. While the case was pending, the FCC Chairman circulated a proposed order to the other commissioners to dismiss the candidates’ application as an improper vehicle for review, and the Media Bureau denied a similar reconsideration petition from another party, maintaining that the Public Notice merely reiterated existing guidance.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit determined it had jurisdiction, finding that the Public Notice was a final order of the Commission and that the Commission had constructively denied the candidates’ application by failing to act. On the merits, the court concluded that the LUC statute unambiguously limits the lowest unit charge to legally qualified candidates for public office and does not extend this benefit to political parties or joint fundraising committees with non-candidate members. The court granted the Petition for Review and set aside the FCC’s Public Notice as unlawful. View "Brown v. Federal Communications Commission" on Justia Law

In 2022, Soohyung Kim and his company, through an affiliate, secured a winning bid to purchase TEGNA, a large broadcast television company. The transaction required regulatory approval from the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) within 450 days, as specified in the merger agreement. The proposal drew objections from several organizations and individuals, including labor unions, public interest groups, and a rival bidder. Amid ongoing objections and extended public comment periods, the FCC’s Media Bureau ultimately failed to approve the license transfer within the required timeframe, resulting in the expiration of the merger agreement and obligating Kim’s group to pay significant break-up fees.After the collapse of the merger, the appellants filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia against both the FCC and various private parties. They alleged constitutional and statutory violations, including Equal Protection claims, Communications Act violations, federal civil rights and conspiracy claims, and D.C.-law tort claims, asserting that the FCC and private parties conspired to prevent the merger based on race. The District Court dismissed all claims. Regarding the FCC, the court found the appellants lacked standing for prospective relief, as they failed to allege a substantial risk of future injury. The court also dismissed the Communications Act claims for lack of jurisdiction. As to the claims against private parties, the court applied Noerr-Pennington immunity and found no plausible basis for the civil rights or tort claims.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the District Court’s dismissal. The court held that the appellants lacked standing against the FCC due to insufficient allegations of likely future injury. The court further held that the claims against private appellees failed because the complaint did not plausibly allege intentional race discrimination or actionable tortious interference, and thus did not state a claim upon which relief could be granted. View "SGCI Holdings III LLC v. FCC" on Justia Law

Two investigative journalists, on assignment for a nonprofit media organization known for undercover reporting, infiltrated Democratic political consulting operations in 2016 using false identities. One reporter, posing as a philanthropist, met with a political consultant who then arranged for his colleague to hire the second reporter, also undercover, as an unpaid intern at the consultant's firm. The intern secretly recorded conversations and internal meetings over eight days, gaining access to nonpublic information. The media organization later published a video series alleging a conspiracy to incite violence at political events, using footage from both public interactions and the intern’s covert recordings.After the video’s release, major clients of the consulting firm terminated their contracts, citing concerns about scandal and the security breach. The consulting firm and its principals sued the journalists and their organizations in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, alleging fraudulent misrepresentation, conspiracy, and violations of federal and D.C. wiretapping laws. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants on some claims but allowed others to proceed to trial. A jury found for the plaintiffs on the remaining claims and awarded damages for lost contracts and statutory damages for wiretapping.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the verdict. It held that the First Amendment barred damages based on losses caused by the publication’s protected speech, as the plaintiffs failed to prove that the unprotected conduct (the infiltration and covert recording) was the predominant cause of their damages. The court also held that the intern did not owe a fiduciary duty to the consulting firm under D.C. law, and therefore the wiretapping claims could not stand. The court reversed the district court’s denial of judgment as a matter of law and vacated the damages awards. View "Democracy Partners, LLC v. O'Keefe" on Justia Law

A large group of plaintiffs, including several states, individuals, school districts, and local governments, brought suit against Meta Platforms, Inc., and associated entities, alleging that Facebook and Instagram’s design features encourage addictive behavior and inadequately protect young users from harmful content. Additional defendants included TikTok-related entities, school districts, and others. The cases were consolidated in multidistrict litigation, where plaintiffs asserted various claims, including personal injury and state law violations.The United States District Court for the Northern District of California organized the litigation into several tracks based on the nature of the claims and plaintiffs. Meta moved to dismiss certain claims, arguing that Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act provided them with immunity. The district court granted the dismissal in part, finding some claims barred by Section 230, but denied dismissal as to others, particularly where claims did not target Meta’s role as a publisher of third-party content. Meta sought interlocutory appeal on some orders, which the district court denied, and then appealed other orders as of right under the collateral order doctrine. TikTok entities joined in Meta’s arguments.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed whether it had appellate jurisdiction to hear Meta’s and TikTok’s interlocutory appeals. The court held that Section 230 provides a defense to liability, not immunity from suit, and that the denial of such a defense is not immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine. The court found none of the requirements for a collateral order were met, emphasizing that Section 230 does not constitute a statutory or constitutional guarantee against trial. Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit dismissed the appeals and cross-appeals for lack of jurisdiction. View "STATE OF COLORADO V. META PLATFORMS, INC." on Justia Law

A Florida pharmacy received a two-page fax from subsidiaries of Johnson & Johnson, which described a patient support program called Janssen CarePath that offered resources and savings options to help patients afford Xarelto, a prescription anticoagulant. The fax outlined how the program could assist patients regardless of their insurance status and included information about Xarelto’s uses and side effects, with instructions to explore savings options on a website. The pharmacy alleged that this fax was an unsolicited advertisement in violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA).The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey initially dismissed the pharmacy’s complaint on two grounds: that the fax was not an advertisement under the TCPA and that the pharmacy did not plausibly allege the defendants had sent the fax. The pharmacy amended its complaint, and the defendants again moved to dismiss. The District Court granted the second motion solely on the basis that the fax did not qualify as an advertisement within the meaning of the TCPA, declining to address other arguments.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case, applying plenary review to the District Court's grant of the motion to dismiss. The Third Circuit held that a reasonable factfinder could determine the fax promoted Xarelto with profit as an aim, making it plausible that it was an unsolicited advertisement under the TCPA. The court also found that the pharmacy adequately alleged the defendants sent the fax and put both defendants on notice. The Third Circuit reversed the District Court's dismissal, allowing the pharmacy's claim to proceed. View "S.A.S.B. CORP v. Johnson & Johnson Health Care Systems Inc" on Justia Law

Several residential property owners and a short-term rental platform challenged two ordinances enacted by the city. The first ordinance, adopted in 2023, restricts short-term rental licenses to one per residential block and distributes them by lottery. The second ordinance, adopted in 2024, requires short-term rental platforms to verify the license status of properties before facilitating transactions, and to periodically reverify this status. Plaintiffs alleged that these ordinances infringed upon their constitutional and statutory rights, including claims under the Takings Clause and Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana reviewed the plaintiffs’ claims. It dismissed all claims under Rule 12(b)(6), except for Airbnb’s Fourth Amendment challenge regarding a monthly reporting requirement in the 2024 Ordinance. The district court granted Airbnb summary judgment on that particular claim. Airbnb appealed the dismissal of its other claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit examined the case de novo. The court held that the 2023 Ordinance did not constitute a per se or regulatory taking under the Takings Clause, noting that the ordinance neither physically appropriated property nor severely impaired economic expectations. It also found the ordinance to be a reasonable zoning regulation that balanced public interests. Regarding Section 230, the Fifth Circuit ruled that neither the booking nor verification requirements of the 2024 Ordinance treated Airbnb as the publisher or speaker of third-party content, and thus were not preempted. The court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the Takings Clause claim and the Section 230 claim, as well as the dismissal of other claims raised by the plaintiffs. View "Bodin v. New Orleans" on Justia Law

In this case, several major third-party food delivery platforms operating in New York City challenged a city ordinance enacted in 2021. The law required these platforms to share specific customer information—including full name, phone number, email address, delivery address, and order contents—with restaurants upon request. Typically, platforms retain this data and provide only limited details to restaurants. The platforms argued that the law forced them to disclose information about their customers, implicating First Amendment protections against compelled speech.Prior to this appeal, the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York reviewed cross-motions for summary judgment. The district court determined that the law compelled speech by requiring platforms to share customer data, and concluded that the deferential standard from Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of Ohio did not apply. Instead, the court applied the intermediate scrutiny standard from Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission of New York and found the law could not survive that review. The district court granted summary judgment to the platforms and permanently enjoined enforcement of the law against their Marketplace products.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case on appeal. The City argued that Zauderer’s deferential standard should apply and, alternatively, that the law was valid under intermediate scrutiny. The Second Circuit disagreed, holding that Zauderer did not apply because the law compelled disclosure about third parties, not about the platforms’ own services. Applying Central Hudson’s intermediate scrutiny, the court found the law failed because the City had not shown a reasonable fit between its interests and the law’s means, especially given less burdensome alternatives. The Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment, holding the law unconstitutional as applied to the platforms’ Marketplace products. View "DoorDash, Inc. v. City of New York" on Justia Law

Amazon.com Services, LLC filed suit against Perplexity AI, Inc., an artificial intelligence company, asserting that Perplexity’s web browser tool, Comet, unlawfully accessed Amazon’s website in violation of the federal Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) and California’s Comprehensive Computer Data Access and Fraud Act (CDAFA). Perplexity’s Comet browser includes an AI “Assistant” that, when activated by a user, navigates Amazon.com on the user’s behalf, sending browser screenshots to Perplexity’s servers for further instruction. Amazon claimed that this use of the Assistant, despite their explicit prohibition, amounted to unauthorized access to its servers.The United States District Court for the Northern District of California granted Amazon a preliminary injunction, finding that Amazon was likely to succeed on its claims under both the CFAA and CDAFA. The district court concluded that Perplexity, through its Assistant, accessed Amazon’s password-protected accounts without authorization, obtained private information, and caused Amazon to incur significant costs responding to this activity. The court also determined that the equitable factors supported granting the injunction, citing irreparable harm and the public interest.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit vacated the preliminary injunction and remanded for further proceedings. The Ninth Circuit held that Amazon was unlikely to succeed on the merits of its claims because Perplexity did not “access” Amazon’s computers within the meaning of the CFAA or CDAFA; instead, the access was performed by the user employing the Assistant as a tool. The court found that the district court erred in its analysis of the equitable factors, which favored Perplexity, and concluded that an injunction was not warranted under these circumstances. The disposition was to vacate the injunction and remand. View "AMAZON.COM SERVICES, LLC V. PERPLEXITY AI, INC." on Justia Law

Texas enacted a law imposing new requirements on certain social media platforms, termed "digital service providers" (DSPs), to restrict minors’ access to specific categories of content. These requirements included monitoring and filtering content deemed harmful, prohibiting targeted ads to minors, preventing unlawful ads, verifying user age for access to certain material, and requiring age registration for account creation. Two groups challenged the law: one group, including technology industry organizations, contested the monitoring and filtering requirement; another group, comprised of a student coalition, individuals, and an ad agency, challenged several provisions, including the monitoring and filtering, targeted ads, unlawful ads, and age-verification requirements.In the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas, both plaintiffs sought preliminary injunctions against enforcement of the law. The district court granted injunctions in part, enjoining the monitoring and filtering requirements for both groups, and enjoining the targeted ads, unlawful ads, and age-verification requirements for the student coalition group. The court found these provisions likely unconstitutional or vague, and held that the plaintiffs had standing based on the chilling effect on their speech and listening rights. The Attorney General of Texas appealed, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit consolidated the cases.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the student coalition plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge the monitoring and filtering, targeted ads, and unlawful ads requirements, as they were not directly regulated and failed to show a substantial risk of imminent harm. Their challenge to the age-verification requirement was foreclosed by Supreme Court precedent. However, the court held that the monitoring and filtering requirement, as challenged by the industry groups, is preempted by Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s injunction as to the industry group, but vacated and remanded the injunction as to the student coalition plaintiffs. View "Computer & Communications Industry Association v. Paxton" on Justia Law

A wireless carrier began operating a cell tower in a city, after which several nearby residents reported experiencing symptoms such as headaches and nausea, attributing these to radiofrequency emissions from the tower. The city’s board of health investigated and issued an emergency order, finding the symptoms consistent with radiation sickness, deeming the cell tower a public nuisance, and requiring the operator to show cause why the tower should not be shut down. If the operator did not respond, the order would require cessation of the tower’s operations.The cell tower operator responded by filing suit in the United States District Court, arguing that the board’s order was preempted by federal law, specifically the Telecommunications Act of 1996 (TCA). The board subsequently rescinded its order, and the federal suit was voluntarily dismissed. Following this, six residents filed an action in the Massachusetts Superior Court, challenging the board’s decision to rescind the order and arguing that the board had failed in its duty to abate a public nuisance. The Superior Court judge treated the board’s motion to dismiss as one for judgment on the pleadings and ruled that federal law preempted the board’s order, dismissing the case.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, after transferring the case from the Appeals Court, affirmed the dismissal. The court held that enforcement of the board’s order would conflict with the TCA’s objective of establishing a uniform, national regulatory regime for wireless telecommunications, including radiofrequency emissions standards set by the Federal Communications Commission. Local efforts to impose additional restrictions based on health concerns, even as an adjudicative order, were found to be preempted by federal law and an obstacle to the accomplishment of congressional purposes. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed. View "Gilardi v. Board of Health of Pittsfield" on Justia Law