Justia Communications Law Opinion Summaries

The plaintiff filed a complaint against the defendant, alleging that he made and retained an unauthorized copy of her computer hard drive, which contained private and confidential data. The complaint included a claim for violation of Penal Code section 502, which prohibits unauthorized use of any computer system for an improper purpose. The plaintiff sought damages and attorney fees.In the Superior Court of San Diego County, a civil jury trial was held, and the jury found in favor of the defendant on all of the plaintiff's causes of action. The trial court entered judgment for the defendant. Subsequently, the defendant filed a motion for attorney fees and costs under section 502, subdivision (e). The trial court granted the defendant's costs but denied his request for attorney fees, concluding that section 502 does not permit an award of fees to prevailing defendants and that, even if it did, it would be unreasonable to award fees in this case because there was no evidence that the plaintiff's claim was frivolous or abusive.The defendant appealed the order to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, State of California. The appellate court agreed with the defendant that section 502 allows the award of attorney fees to prevailing defendants. However, the court concluded that section 502 defendants may only recover attorney fees where the plaintiff's claim was objectively without foundation when brought, or the plaintiff continued to litigate after it clearly became so. The appellate court found that the trial court acted within its discretion in finding that the plaintiff's claim was not frivolous or abusive and affirmed the order denying attorney fees. View "Hay v. Marinkovich" on Justia Law

In June 2015, Dylann Roof shot and killed nine people at Mother Emanuel AME Church in Charleston, South Carolina, including M.P.'s father, Reverend Clementa Pinckney. M.P., a minor, filed a lawsuit against Meta Platforms, Inc. (formerly Facebook, Inc.) and its subsidiaries, alleging that Facebook's algorithm recommended harmful content that radicalized Roof, leading to the murders. M.P. asserted claims of strict products liability, negligence, and negligent infliction of emotional distress under South Carolina law, as well as a federal claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) for conspiracy to deprive her of her civil rights.The United States District Court for the District of South Carolina dismissed M.P.'s complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), concluding that Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act barred her state law tort claims. The court also found that M.P. failed to plausibly allege a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3).The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that M.P.'s state law tort claims were barred by Section 230 because they sought to hold Facebook liable as a publisher of third-party content. The court also determined that M.P. failed to plausibly allege proximate causation under South Carolina law, as her complaint did not provide sufficient factual foundation linking Roof's Facebook use to his crimes. Additionally, the court found that M.P. forfeited her challenge to the dismissal of her Section 1985 claim by not adequately addressing it in her appellate brief. The court also concluded that any potential claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1986 was barred by the one-year statute of limitations. Thus, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment granting Facebook's motion to dismiss. View "M.P. v. Meta Platforms Inc." on Justia Law

The case involves the Insurance Marketing Coalition Limited (IMC) challenging a decision by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) regarding the interpretation of "prior express consent" under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA). The TCPA requires that robocalls must have the called party's "prior express consent." The FCC's 2012 regulation defined this as "prior express written consent" for telemarketing or advertising calls. In 2023, the FCC issued a new rule further interpreting "prior express consent" to include two additional restrictions: (1) consent must be given to only one entity at a time, and (2) the subject matter of the calls must be logically and topically associated with the interaction that prompted the consent.The FCC's 2023 Order was challenged by IMC, which argued that the FCC exceeded its statutory authority under the TCPA. IMC contended that the new restrictions conflicted with the ordinary statutory meaning of "prior express consent." The FCC defended its rule, claiming it was consistent with the common understanding of the phrase and within its authority to implement the TCPA.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the FCC's additional restrictions on "prior express consent" were inconsistent with the ordinary statutory meaning of the phrase. The court held that under common law principles, "prior express consent" means a willingness for certain conduct to occur, clearly and unmistakably stated before the conduct. The court concluded that the FCC's one-to-one-consent and logically-and-topically-related restrictions impermissibly altered this meaning.The Eleventh Circuit granted IMC's petition for review, vacated Part III.D of the FCC's 2023 Order, and remanded the case for further proceedings. The court determined that the FCC had exceeded its statutory authority by imposing additional restrictions that were not supported by the TCPA's text. View "Insurance Marketing Coalition Limited v. Federal Communications Commission" on Justia Law

The case involves the Federal Communications Commission's (FCC) 2024 Safeguarding and Securing the Open Internet Order, which reclassified Broadband Internet Service Providers (ISPs) as offering a "telecommunications service" under Title II of the Communications Act, thereby subjecting them to net-neutrality regulations. The FCC's order also classified mobile broadband as a "commercial mobile service" under Title III, imposing similar regulations.Previously, the FCC had fluctuated in its classification of broadband services. In 2015, the FCC classified broadband as a telecommunications service, which the D.C. Circuit upheld under the Chevron doctrine. In 2018, the FCC reversed this classification, treating broadband as an information service, a decision also upheld by the D.C. Circuit. The 2024 order reversed the 2018 decision, reinstating the 2015 classification.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the 2024 order. The court held that Broadband ISPs offer an "information service" under 47 U.S.C. § 153(24), not a telecommunications service. The court reasoned that ISPs provide the capability to retrieve and utilize information via telecommunications, which fits the definition of an information service. The court also found that the FCC's interpretation of the statute was inconsistent with its plain language and historical context.Regarding mobile broadband, the court held that it does not qualify as a "commercial mobile service" under 47 U.S.C. § 332(d)(1) because it is not interconnected with the public switched network, which refers to the traditional telephone network using the North American Numbering Plan. Consequently, mobile broadband is classified as a "private mobile service" and is not subject to common-carrier regulation.The Sixth Circuit granted the petitions for review and set aside the FCC's 2024 Safeguarding Order. View "Ohio Telecom Ass'n v. FCC" on Justia Law

A California corporation, China Unicom (Americas) Operations Limited (CUA), was authorized to provide domestic and international telecommunications services under certificates issued by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) pursuant to § 214 of the Communications Act of 1934. In 2020, the FCC ordered CUA to show cause why its certificates should not be revoked due to national security concerns related to its Chinese government ownership. CUA responded, but the FCC found the responses inadequate and initiated revocation proceedings.The FCC's International, Wireline Competition, and Enforcement Bureaus issued an order to show cause, citing national security concerns and CUA's lack of candor. CUA argued against the revocation, claiming the FCC lacked authority and that it was entitled to a formal hearing. The FCC, however, found CUA's responses insufficient and proceeded with revocation based on national security risks and CUA's lack of trustworthiness.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the FCC has the authority to revoke § 214 certificates based on national security concerns and that the FCC's decision was supported by substantial evidence. The court found that CUA's ultimate Chinese government ownership and the overlap of its board members with the Chinese Communist Party posed significant national security risks. Additionally, the court upheld the FCC's finding that CUA demonstrated a lack of candor and trustworthiness in its dealings with the FCC.The court also rejected CUA's procedural arguments, concluding that the FCC followed appropriate procedures and that a formal evidentiary hearing was not required. The Ninth Circuit denied CUA's petition for review, affirming the FCC's revocation of CUA's § 214 certificates. View "CHINA UNICOM (AMERICAS) OPERA V. FCC" on Justia Law

Ann Jones filed lawsuits against Bloomingdales.com, LLC, and Papa John's International, Inc., alleging that their websites used "session replay" technology to record her electronic communications, including mouse movements, clicks, and keystrokes, without her knowledge. She claimed this technology invaded her privacy by creating a detailed record of her website visits, which could be used for targeted advertisements and website improvements.In the Eastern District of Missouri, the district court dismissed Jones's complaint against Bloomingdales for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, citing a lack of concrete injury as she did not allege the capture of sensitive information. In the case against Papa John's, the district court dismissed the complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction. Jones appealed both dismissals.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the cases and consolidated them for oral argument. The court held that Jones did not plausibly allege a concrete injury in either case, affirming the lower courts' judgments. The court noted that Jones's allegations did not demonstrate that the session-replay technology captured any private or sensitive information, such as social security numbers, medical history, or financial details. The court compared the situation to a security camera in a physical store, where customers do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy regarding their general movements.The Eighth Circuit concluded that Jones lacked standing to sue because her allegations did not show a concrete harm to her privacy. The court emphasized that merely asserting an invasion of privacy without supporting facts is insufficient to establish standing. Therefore, the court affirmed the dismissals of both cases. View "Jones v. Bloomingdales.com, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, a group of sex-trafficking victims, were trafficked through advertisements posted on Backpage.com, an online advertisement forum. They sued Salesforce, a company that provided cloud-based software tools and related support services to Backpage. Salesforce moved for summary judgment on the grounds that section 230 of the Communications Decency Act bars Plaintiffs’ claims. Plaintiffs allege that Salesforce knowingly assisted, supported, and facilitated sex trafficking by selling its tools and operational support to Backpage even though it knew (or should have known) that Backpage was under investigation for facilitating sex trafficking.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas denied Salesforce’s motion for summary judgment, holding that section 230 does not shield Salesforce because Plaintiffs’ claims do not treat Salesforce as a publisher or speaker of third-party content. After denying Salesforce’s motion for summary judgment, the district court sua sponte certified its order for interlocutory appeal, identifying three controlling questions of law on which there may be substantial grounds for difference of opinion.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s denial of summary judgment. The court held that Plaintiffs’ claims do not treat Salesforce as the publisher or speaker of third-party content because they do not derive from Salesforce’s status or conduct as a publisher or speaker or impose on Salesforce any duty traditionally associated with publication. Therefore, section 230 does not provide immunity to Salesforce. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "A. B. v. Salesforce" on Justia Law

C.H., an eleven-year-old, was sexually exploited by a stranger on Omegle.com, an online platform that connects users in video chatrooms. The stranger, referred to as John Doe, threatened C.H. into creating child pornography. C.H.'s parents sued Omegle.com LLC, alleging violations of 18 U.S.C. § 2255 (Masha’s Law) for knowingly possessing child pornography and the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act for knowingly benefiting from a sex trafficking venture.The United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida dismissed the claims, citing section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, which protects providers of interactive computer services from being treated as the publisher or speaker of user-provided information. The court also found that the sex trafficking claim did not meet the Fight Online Sex Trafficking Act (FOSTA) exception to section 230 because C.H.'s parents did not allege that Omegle.com had actual knowledge of benefiting from sex trafficking.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that C.H.'s parents did not state a claim under Masha’s Law because they failed to allege that Omegle.com knowingly possessed or accessed child pornography. The court also held that the FOSTA exception to section 230 requires actual knowledge of sex trafficking, not just constructive knowledge. Since C.H.'s parents did not plausibly allege that Omegle.com had actual knowledge of the sex trafficking incident involving C.H., the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the claims. View "M.H., et al. v. Omegle.com LLC" on Justia Law

The case involves the Protecting Americans from Foreign Adversary Controlled Applications Act, which was signed into law on April 24, 2024. The Act identifies certain countries, including China, as foreign adversaries and prohibits the distribution or maintenance of applications controlled by these adversaries, specifically targeting the TikTok platform. TikTok Inc. and ByteDance Ltd., along with other petitioners, challenged the constitutionality of the Act, arguing that it violates the First Amendment, the Fifth Amendment's equal protection and takings clauses, and the Bill of Attainder Clause.The lower courts had not previously reviewed this case, as it was brought directly to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. The petitioners sought a declaratory judgment and an injunction to prevent the Attorney General from enforcing the Act. The court had to determine whether the petitioners had standing and whether their claims were ripe for judicial review.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit concluded that TikTok had standing to challenge the Act and that its claims were ripe. The court assumed without deciding that strict scrutiny applied to the First Amendment claims and upheld the Act, finding that it served compelling governmental interests in national security and was narrowly tailored to achieve those interests. The court also rejected the equal protection, bill of attainder, and takings clause claims, concluding that the Act did not constitute a punishment, was not overinclusive or underinclusive, and did not result in a complete deprivation of economic value. The petitions were denied. View "TikTok Inc. v. Garland" on Justia Law

The case involves six plaintiffs who are users of Tornado Cash, a cryptocurrency mixing service that uses immutable smart contracts to anonymize transactions. Tornado Cash was sanctioned by the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) for allegedly facilitating money laundering for malicious actors, including North Korea. The plaintiffs argued that OFAC exceeded its statutory authority by designating Tornado Cash as a Specially Designated National (SDN) and blocking its smart contracts.The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas granted summary judgment in favor of the Department of the Treasury, finding that Tornado Cash is an entity that can be sanctioned, that its smart contracts constitute property, and that the Tornado Cash DAO has an interest in these smart contracts. The plaintiffs appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case and focused on whether the immutable smart contracts could be considered "property" under IEEPA. The court concluded that these smart contracts are not property because they are not capable of being owned, controlled, or altered by anyone, including their creators. The court emphasized that property, by definition, must be ownable, and the immutable smart contracts do not meet this criterion. Consequently, the court held that OFAC exceeded its statutory authority by sanctioning Tornado Cash's immutable smart contracts.The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's decision and remanded the case with instructions to grant the plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment based on the Administrative Procedure Act. The court did not address whether Tornado Cash qualifies as an entity or whether it has an interest in the smart contracts, as the determination that the smart contracts are not property was dispositive. View "Van Loon v. Department of the Treasury" on Justia Law